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THE CRISIS IN CHINA

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ON
WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE

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DOWAGER EMPRESS OF CHINA

THE CRISIS IN CHINA

BY

GEORGE B. SMYTH; REV. GILBERT REID; CHARLES JOHNSTON; JOHN BARRETT; ROBERT E. LEWIS ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN; M. MIKHAILOFF; REAR-ADMIRAL LORD CHARLES BERESFORD; HIS EXCELLENCY WU TING-FANG; DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON THE RT. HON. SIR CHAS. W. DILKE

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THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

NEW YORK AND LONDON
HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
1900

197089

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CAUSES OF ANTI-FOREIGN FEELING IN CHINA.

CAUSES OF ANTI-FOREIGN FEELING IN CHINA.

WHAT are the causes of the present anti-foreign outburst in North China, and what are the reasons for the bitter anti-foreign spirit which prevails throughout the Empire, and which is kept from springing into universal action only by the firmness of some enlightened and far-seeing Viceroys? I wish to answer both these questions, and in the order in which I have here stated them; though it would probably be more logical to answer the more general question first, as the present situation is to a large extent but a specially malignant outbreak of a disorder which infects the whole Chinese system. Nevertheless, as the terrible crisis in North China is the subject of more immediate interest, it will not be inappropriate to consider it before taking up the larger subject which the second question presents. In discussing these questions, my chief desire is to be entirely fair; and yet it may happen that

some will think me too warm an advocate of the Chinese. I shall, indeed, have to present the Chinese side, since no one can justly write of the antagonism of China toward foreigners without showing how large a share the foreigners themselves have had in producing it. The subject is on that account not a pleasant one for us of the West to think of; for, in studying it, we shall see much to be ashamed of, and find that much of the prejudice and hatred of Western men and Western institutions of which we so bitterly complain in the Chinese is due to ourselves, to the way in which we introduced ourselves among them, and to the way in which we have often since treated them. Western injustice toward the East is the cause of much of the Eastern hatred of the West. Nay, more, it will be seen that, when we were moved by the purest and loftiest motives, we did not succeed in making ourselves welcome. Through ignorance or zeal or the coincidence of unhappy accidents, our very benevolence has itself been misunderstood and offensive.

The first question, as to the causes of the present anti-foreign outbreak in North China, may be put in another form: Who are the Boxers, and how and why have they become what they are? For these people are everywhere considered the

cause of the present disturbance, and the chief agents in its murderous crusade against foreigners.

The Boxers are a patriotic secret society; but, as in the case of all other such associations in China, their origin and history are difficult to trace. Though it is but a year since the society began to attract public attention by its depredations against foreigners, it is said to have been in existence for several years. It seems at first to have been partly an athletic association, and partly a kind of mutual protective organization, for defense against the roving bands of robbers which sometimes infest the province of Shan-tung; and it was called by the name which has since become infamous, the "Righteous Harmonious Fist," translated for brevity by the short and expressive word "Boxers." It is certain that it showed no special hostility toward the native Christians, and gave no trouble to missionaries or other foreigners. The question, then, is how to account for the change which made of this society of men, associated to oppose the lawlessness of freebooters, the most cruel and bloodthirsty anti-foreign organization in the history of China. The reasons must be sought in the recent history of Shan-tung, and they are not hard to discover.

Up to the fall of 1897, Shan-tung enjoyed an excellent reputation for its treatment of foreigners and native Christians; indeed, there were more Christians in that province than in any other in the Empire, except Fuh-keen. On the 1st of November of that year, however, there was a riot in which two German Catholic missionaries were brutally murdered, and Germany promptly seized upon the crime as a pretext for what it had long contemplated, the seizure of a portion of Chinese territory. On the 14th, Admiral Diedrichs landed troops at Kiao Chow, and negotiations were entered upon for the formal cession to Germany of that which she had already seized. On the 6th of the following March, a treaty was signed at Peking by which the country round about the Bay of Kiao Chow, as far inland as the neighboring hills, was ceded to the German Empire for ninety-nine years; the Governor of Shan-tung was dismissed, six other high officials removed, an indemnity of 3,000 taels paid, and a promise made to build three "expiatory" chapels. Germany obtained in addition a concession for two railways in the province, and the right to open mines within a region of territory twenty kilomètres wide along them. These were hard terms, but that which was most bitterly resented was the seizure of territory. This high-handed act

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worked an ominous change in the attitude of the people toward foreigners, and especially Germans. It was not safe for Germans in small companies to travel in the interior, and three who later unwisely did so were attacked, though they fortunately escaped with their lives. To punish the perpetrators of what the German Government chose to consider another unprovoked crime, the commander of Kiao Chow immediately sent troops to the scene of the attack, and they burned down two villages. This harsh and indiscriminate retaliation, in which innocent suffered as well as guilty, inflamed the people to madness, and many foreigners predicted serious results. These were not long in coming. A bitter anti-Christian, anti-foreign spirit showed itself throughout the province, which was later intensified by the Imperial Decree of March 15th of last year, issued on the demand of France, conferring practically official rank on Roman Catholic bishops and missionaries. The position of equality with Viceroys and Governors thus given to the bishops, and equality with provincial treasurers, provincial judges, taotais and prefects given to the various orders of priests, together with the right of interview without the mediation of consul or minister, gave the Roman Catholics an influence of which the people had good reason to believe

they would not be slow to avail themselves. In lawsuits between their adherents and non-Christian people, the latter had, or thought they had, no chance; and, as in other provinces, there was general complaint of the constant interference of the priests in litigation.

Enraged at the injustice thus perpetrated, seeing in the missionaries and the Germans the causes of the country's humiliation, and in the conduct of the latter especially the beginning of an attempt by the foreigners to seize the province and, finally, the whole Empire, the Boxers began the series of crimes which have since made them infamous, preached a patriotic, anti-Christian, anti-foreign propaganda, and resolved to drive from the country the intruders, and all that they represented. They also made claims to strange spiritual powers to influence the public. They practised hypnotism, and the effects which they thus produced on individuals awed the multitude into a belief in their possession of mysterious, supernatural powers. It came in time to be believed that they could make those who joined them impervious to the bullets of foreigners. The "Boxer spirit" movement, as it accordingly came to be called, spread like wildfire, and led to frightful excesses, the burning of churches, the

slaughter of native Christians, the murder of missionaries.

Such, in brief outline, is the history of the rise of the Boxer movement in Shan-tung. But how did it come to spread till it covered the whole province, invaded the metropolitan province of Chi-li, took possession of the capital itself, and now holds within its grasp the persons, alive or dead we know not, of the ministers of the great Powers of the West? There is but one answer—by the connivance of the officials, by the treachery of the Governor of Shan-tung, acting under direct orders from the Empress Dowager herself. Had this wretched and cruel woman been so minded, and had she so ordered, the movement could have been crushed long before it became dangerous; but she refused even to attempt to put it down, and degraded any official who was honest enough to oppose it and protect the Christians and foreigners within his jurisdiction. And all because she thought she saw in the strength of the uprising, in its fierce fanaticism, in its murderous hostility to foreigners the means of accomplishing the most cherished ambition, both of herself and of the bigoted crew of Manchu reactionaries who surrounded her, the expulsion from China of all foreigners and of all the ideas, religious, social

and political, which foreigners represent. That this charge is not groundlessly made is shown by the simple fact that Yuan-Shih-kai, the Governor of Shan-tung, and his predecessor, Yu-Hsieu, under both of whom the Boxer uprising has grown, were her own appointees, acting under her immediate orders. The *North China Herald,* the best informed and most ably edited foreign paper in China, in its issue of June 6th, after showing how Governor Yu, because of his intense hatred of foreigners and all Chinese who had anything to do with them, gave open help and encouragement to the Boxers, for which his dismissal was demanded by one of the foreign ministers, says:

> "There can be no question about the Boxers having been encouraged by the government, because Yu-Hsieu, their patron, after having been recalled to Peking from Shan-tung, was specially honored by the Empress Dowager, and given the Governorship of Shan-se. Yuan-Shih-kai, the new Governor of Shan-tung, could easily have put down the Boxers when he first went to Chinanfu, the provincial capital, but he was not allowed to."

Who prevented him? Who could have prevented him but the Empress Dowager, to whom he owed his appointment, and whose servant he was? These two men, Yu and Yuan, allowed the fiendish work to go on, because she wished it; at a word from her, they would have crushed it.

Again, the conduct of which she is here accused is in complete accord with her course ever since, in September of 1898, she deposed the unhappy Emperor for his too zealous devotion to reform, and took the power of the throne into her own hands. Since then, she has seized and beheaded six leaders of the Reform party, banished many more, and dismissed from office every official, not too powerful to be touched, who has shown the least sympathy with the new order. Kang-Yu-Wei, the chief adviser of the Emperor, and the head and front of the movement, she has pursued with implacable vengeance; as recently as the 14th of last February, she offered a reward of a hundred thousand taels for his capture, alive or dead.

That the Boxer outbreak has thus grown to its present terrible proportions largely through her support, given both openly and in secret, is not a matter of inference, but of positive knowledge. If, as late cablegrams report, she has herself fallen a victim to its fury, and has been made a prisoner in the palace, or been poisoned, by the Boxer leader, Tsai-Yi, the Prince of Tuan, one of her special favorites—a man to whom, by a decree of January 31st last, she granted two extra steps in official rank and a eulogistic tablet written by the imperial hand, and whom by a decree of

the 7th of March she made Second President of the Imperial Clan Court—it only shows how well her ministers have learned the lesson which she taught them. The fury of even her hatred of foreigners was too mild for some of her favorites. If she seems to have shrunk from the horrors to which her own infamous course has led, they shrink at nothing, not even at the attempted wholesale butchery of the foreign ministers themselves. But the guilt of the movement, with its awful record of crimes, the widespread destruction of property, the massacre of native Christians, the murder of foreigners, the whole terrible tragedy now being enacted in the North, is chiefly hers.

It is time now to consider the second question proposed at the head of this article: What are the reasons for the bitter, anti-foreign spirit which prevails throughout China? The subject is particularly important, inasmuch as this feeling appears to be of comparatively recent origin. The Chinese have not always shown the hostility to foreigners which so generally characterizes them now. Colquhoun, in his "China in Transformation," says:

"Before the advent of the Manchus China maintained constant relations with the countries of Asia: traders from Arabia, Persia, and India trafficked in Chinese ports and

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EMPEROR OF CHINA

passed into the interior. The tablet of Sian Fu shows that missionaries from the West were propagating the Christian religion in the eighth century; in the thirteenth, Marco Polo was not only cordially received, but held office in the Empire, and at that time the Christian religious ceremonies were tolerated at Peking, where there was an Archbishop. To the close of the last Chinese dynasty (1644), the Jesuit missionaries were well received and treated at the capital; and, as Huc remarks, the first Tartar Emperors merely tolerated what they found existing. This would seem to show conclusively that the Chinese did not formerly have the aversion to foreigners which is usually assumed."

How are we to account for the change? No one cause produced it; it is the result of a cumulation of causes all working toward the same end.

As the beginning of the change coincided in a general way with the Manchu conquest, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the first and most obvious explanation is that it is due, in part, to the policy of the conquerors. This is the view taken by Huc in his well-known book, "The Chinese Empire." He says:

"The Manchoos were, on account of the smallness of their numbers in the midst of this vast Empire, compelled to adopt stringent measures to preserve their conquest. For fear that foreigners should be tempted to snatch their prey from them, they have carefully closed the ports of China against them, thinking thus to secure themselves from ambitious attempts from without."

With the exception of the large-minded Kang-

Hsi, the greatest of all the Manchu sovereigns, this has been the general policy of the present dynasty. No concession has ever been gained from it except by force, or the threat of force. It has done everything in its power to make friendly relations with the West impossible. It was only in 1842 that the first ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, were opened to commerce, and that after a war in which China was worsted. The opening of ports in the Yangtsze River was by way of indemnity for the murder of Margary, a British consular officer, in 1874. Others have been opened as the result of diplomatic threats, and still others in consequence of the war with Japan. It was by force, too, that China was compelled to enter into diplomatic relations with Western States. The right of their ministers to reside in Peking, and freedom of residence and travel in the interior, both had to be fought for, and were acknowledged only after defeat in war. The Manchu Dynasty has given nothing which was not wrung from it; it has made no concessions of its own accord; it has never taken a single step toward putting its relations with foreign powers on a footing of sincere friendship. And the policy of the rulers has been carried out by the Mandarins, most of whom have ceaselessly striven to make foreign residence in

China a painful experience, and to embitter by every means in their power the relations between the foreigners and the people. The terrible situation in North China to-day is but the natural result of this exclusive, anti-foreign policy; the Manchus are making a last desperate effort to expel the West and all that the West stands for from the Empire.

In the changes which the ideas of foreigners, if allowed their proper influence on the people, would effect, they see their own destruction, and are fighting for that which for two centuries and a half they have exercised, the right to misrule and plunder the nation which they conquered. Unhappily, the people do not understand the facts, and centuries of precept and example have taught them to feel for the foreigner part of the hatred with which their rulers are drunk.

It would be fortunate if the Manchus alone were to blame for the anti-foreign feeling of China. Unhappily, the foreigners themselves have had a large share in creating it. The circumstances attending the first introduction of Europeans to the Chinese were such as to give that people the impression that the visitors were little better than pirates and murderers, and not a little has occurred since to deepen that unhappy feeling. "Rapine, murder, and a constant appeal to force,"

says Gorst, "chiefly characterized the commencement of Europe's commercial intercourse with China." When the first Portuguese traders visited that country in the sixteenth century, they were well received; but they were soon followed by a horde of unscrupulous adventurers, who sometimes forced their way into the interior and committed high-handed acts of piracy. So incensed were the Chinese at this violence that, when Portugal, a few years later, sent an ambassador to Peking, he was sent back to Canton, thrown there into prison and finally executed.

Still more deplorable was the impression made by the Spaniards. After they seized the Philippine Islands in 1543, a great expansion of trade with China resulted; and such large numbers of Chinese settlers went there that in time they outnumbered the Europeans in the proportion of twenty-five to one. The Spaniards saw in this great influx of Chinese immigrants a menace to their own sovereignty, and they massacred the larger part of the defenceless and innocent Chinese.* The impression which such savage butchery of its people made on their native province of Canton may easily be imagined, and partly accounts both for the reception which the English

* See "China," by H. E. Gorst, pp. 202, 203.

met with in the following century when they first entered the Canton River, and for the fact that the people of that province are, with the exception of those of Hu-nan, the most truculent haters of foreigners in China.

The early Dutch and English adventurers had also a share in blackening the reputation of Europe in the East, and it is not surprising that the Chinese came in time to look upon all Europeans as barbarians, men whose only objects were robbery and war.

The period of unblushing barbarism came to an end at last, and Europe set about entering into relations with China on the principles of international law. But, even then, the claims made to equality, however reasonable and just, gave great offense to the Chinese Government and people. To understand this, it is necessary to consider a peculiarity of Chinese civilization too often overlooked—its age-long isolation.

The civilization of China is the development of its own national genius and life. Of no nation in the West can this be affirmed. The countries of America and Europe have been so closely related on terms of equality that the civilization of no one of them can be said to be entirely its own. They have so acted and reacted, one upon another, by physical force and moral and intellectual

influences, that the civilized life of each is the development, not of its own national genius merely, but that modified in many and various directions by the civilization of each of the others. Vastly different have been the conditions under which the civilization of China has grown. With the exception of India, to which she owes Buddhism, I do not know to what other country she is indebted for anything. She has been surrounded by peoples who, in all the great qualities of life, were vastly inferior to her. She developed a splendid literature, an elaborate system of social customs, a noble system of ethics, and they are all her own. Her own, too, were some of the greatest inventions of man—gunpowder, printing, and the mariner's compass. Beginning at a time which antedates the birth of every other nation now living, she has developed, with the exception already noted, her own national life, learning nothing from her neighbors and teaching them all, the quick, intelligent Japanese no less than the slow, phlegmatic Corean. Such a history naturally taught her to look upon herself as the first of nations; she was acknowledged as such by all the nations around her. The inevitable result followed; she looked upon all other countries as her inferiors. When, therefore, men went to her from Europe, not only claiming

equality, but professing to be able to teach her, it was a shock to the national pride not easy for the West to appreciate. It is not pleasant for a people who have thought themselves the chosen of the world, and who, it must be admitted, had, under the circumstances, some reason for thinking so, to be summoned to sit at the feet of men whom their peculiar history and recent experience had taught them to look upon as barbarians. The claim to equality, then, made by foreigners in their relations with China has been a cause of offense, a fruitful source of antagonism. If it be said that the claim was right, and that China has had time to learn the folly of her conservatism and the madness of her intolerant national pride, let it be remembered that the feelings of a nation do not easily change, that the prejudices of centuries cannot be overcome by the teachings of a decade.

Another source of friction and bitterness, this time with the Mandarins, has been the attempt to enforce some of the commercial clauses of the treaties, particularly those relating to the abolition of inland taxes on foreign goods. On such importations, between the port of entry and their destination in the interior, a tax called "likin" is levied at various customs barriers on the way. This is a serious burden on foreign trade, and it

has been provided by treaty that imported goods shall be exempt from such charges on payment at the port of entry of an extra sum equal to half the regular import tariff. As the duty so levied would all be paid to the Central Government, it follows that the local administration would thereby be deprived of a large part of its customary revenues. Two results would ensue—difficulty in meeting the expenses of the provincial governments, and a large curtailment of the perquisites or "squeezes" of the officials. It is often, indeed, claimed that the latter are simply robbery, and the cutting off of this source of personal revenue from the Mandarins would be an act of justice. But this is not entirely true. The salaries of the officials are so miserably inadequate to meet their necessary expenses that the officials are compelled to resort to various illegal methods to add to them. That they do so excessively, "squeezing" all that the business will allow, is but too true; but that does not alter the fact that the administrative system whose servants they are forces them to the practice of illegal and dishonest expedients. Before, therefore, the treaty clauses dealing with this subject can be quietly enforced, such administrative changes must be made as will remove from the provincial authorities their greatest temptation to robbery. Until this is

done, and it will not be done without pressure from without, there will remain a fruitful source of official antagonism to foreigners, a cause of friction irritable alike to Chinese Mandarins and to foreign officials and merchants.

Missions and missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, have also added to the causes of antagonism. I am aware that this is denied by many of those who are interested in missions, but no one will question it who is acquainted with the facts. It is not wise to argue from the nobility of the missionary motive to its ready appreciation by the Chinese people. The motive, so apparent to us, is not equally apparent to them. They look at it through a medium of unfortunate accompaniments of which we never think. Apart altogether from the offense to the national pride involved in undertaking to teach a faith claiming to be higher than their own, the whole missionary movement is unhappily associated with conquest, and its toleration is the result of successful war. Noble, therefore, though the motives of the Christian Church are, its work is tainted by its association with force and conquest. To thoughtful Chinese familiar with the recent history of their country, the presence of the missionary in every province, in country villages as well as in great cities, is a reminder of the national humiliation.

There are, indeed, exceptions; there are among the leading classes men who look upon the Christian missionaries as China's best and only disinterested friends, and the number of such is happily increasing; but for the present at least the vast majority do not think so.

There are two things in missionary work which distinctly add to the causes of irritation—one, the teaching itself; the other, the partly foreign, partly Chinese political status of those who accept it. They are mistaken who suppose that, because of the excellence of Christianity, it must lead only to peace and has nothing in it to give occasion for offense. The preaching of it is not the innocuous thing which it is sometimes considered. Like every high moral force, when it confronts a lower, conflict is inevitable. The instinct of self-preservation compels the adherents of the old faith to fight for its existence. Christianity not only creates, it also destroys; it sets up new beliefs, new ideals, new standards of conduct, a new object of worship, but it pulls down the old. This is its necessary record everywhere else; it is its record in China.

In religious matters, the Chinese are among the most tolerant of men; but in their case Christianity is opposed to a practice which has prevailed from the very beginning of their history,

on which they think the whole fabric of society is based. The opposition of Christianity to ancestral worship is what offends the Chinese most, for they consider it an attack on the most sacred of obligations, on the very foundation of society itself. Missionaries are aware of this, and most of them are scrupulously careful in speaking of it. I have heard many sermons and addresses by them in the seventeen years which I have spent in China, but never one in which the ancestral cult was spoken of offensively. But, while speaking tenderly, the opposition to it is there; the churches have adopted toward it a position of uncompromising hostility, and the people know it. Here lies one of the chief sources of popular hostility to foreigners, and there is no way of avoiding it, unless the policy of toleration be adopted which was followed by the early Jesuits. But, as this was rejected by the Catholics themselves on command of the Pope, it is not likely to be adopted by them again, and it certainly never will be by the Protestants. What, then, is going to be done? The thoughtless, ignorant whereof they speak, will say: "Withdraw, rather than continue an enterprise so provocative of hostility." But this is impossible. The Christian Church must preach Christianity. To ask it to reject its missionary commission is to ask it to

commit suicide. No nation has ever yet been Christianized without conflict, and no nation ever will be. Nevertheless, it is unwise not to recognize in the preaching of the new faith a source of antagonism, and it is unjust to censure the Chinese too severely for their opposition to what they do not clearly understand, to a process which they regard as destructive of the fundamental principles of their national life. With the years will come knowledge, but it will come only after opposition and strife.

Two lessons, at least, may be learned from this, namely, the tremendous responsibility which our Missionary Societies incur in sending missionaries to China, and the solemn obligation under which such responsibility puts them to send to that distant, difficult and dangerous field only the choicest men and women they can find. There is no service for which the selection of candidates should be so carefully made. The ordinary qualifications are not sufficient. Zeal alone will not do. Besides the passion for humanity, of which every missionary should be possessed, he should have in addition the great virtues of intellectual sympathy, the power of appreciating another's position, the ability to see the truth where it exists, and tact which is unfailing. With such qualities as these, the missionaries may hope in

time to overcome prejudice, make their position clear, and win an acceptance for the great message which they preach. In that message only is China's salvation, for in it alone are the promise and the power to effect the moral regeneration which is her supreme need.

Another cause of bitterness in connection with missionary work is found in the peculiar political status of the native converts, and the immunity from various exactions which the treaties guarantee them. It is often asserted by opponents of missionaries that they are constantly interfering with the ordinary judicial processes of the country, saving their converts from the payment of taxes, and calling upon Consuls and Ministers, irrespective of treaty provisions, to interpose in their behalf. All these charges are untrue, so far, at least, as Protestant missionaries are concerned. Mistakes are sometimes made, but no men are more scrupulous than they in their observance of the laws of the land. Nevertheless, there are real sources of irritation in this connection which cannot be denied. The clauses of the treaties which guarantee religious liberty to Chinese converts have usually been interpreted to mean that they shall not be persecuted for religion's sake, and, specifically, that they shall not be compelled to contribute to the maintenance of

idol temples, or toward paying the expenses of idol processions. Under these heads, many cases are taken by the missionaries to the Consuls, who then refer them to the Chinese officials. Unfortunately, it sometimes turns out on investigation that the cases do not come within the treaty limits at all, but are old troubles, or even new ones, which the Christian complainants persuaded the missionary were instances of religious persecution. The embarrassment of such a discovery is painful, painful to the missionary who was deceived, to the Consul who took the case up, and to the Chinese Magistrate who tried it. Worse than all is the effect in the village where the parties to the trouble reside, where the Christian is accused of trying to use his relation to the foreigners to crush his neighbors. The resulting irritation and prejudice are lamentable in the extreme.

Even when the cases are genuine, and the Christians are declared by the Magistrate exempt from the exactions referred to, there are two parties offended; the people are angry because some of their neighbors are saved by foreign influence from a pressure which they themselves have to submit to and which becomes heavier in proportion as the Christians are relieved from it;

and the Magistrate is humiliated because at the demand of a foreign official he has to give judgment against the wishes of a majority of his own people. Here, therefore, is another widespread source of popular irritation. But how is it to be avoided? The question is too complicated to be discussed here. Some would withdraw Consular protection altogether and leave the converts entirely to the laws of the land. In that case, fairness would demand that the missionaries be treated in the same way and be subject to the same laws. But no class of foreigners in China can be left without protection without endangering the interests, if not the lives, of all. Deny the protection of their country to missionaries, and all other foreigners will speedily find that the protection promised them will be of little avail. The problem is one for statesmen, the thing I wish to note being simply that the peculiar position of converts, the privileges and immunities they enjoy, are among the causes of the antagonism which the Chinese entertain toward foreigners. These observations are made in no spirit of criticism, but with a sincere desire to draw the attention of the missionary authorities and the Christian public to the facts, in order that the subject may be thoroughly studied, and such

regulations be adopted, if possible, as will lessen the area of friction and reduce the number of the causes of trouble.

In addition to all this, missionaries are often thought of as spies of their own governments; and by some of those who are familiar with the history of other parts of Asia, the fate of India is feared for their country. Many a time have I been asked what my Government paid me for coming to China, and when I answered, "Nothing," and showed that I had no connection with the Government whatever, my reply was evidently received with no little incredulity. Again, in the minds of many, the whole missionary movement is suspected because of the striking contrast between its professed aim and the conduct of some Christian governments toward China. And surely this cannot be wondered at. With Western missionaries preaching peace and Western governments practicing murder, it should not surprise us if the Chinese suspect the former as much as they fear the latter. You cannot go to a people with the Bible in one hand and a bludgeon in the other, and expect that they will accept either cheerfully.

Some European governments have been guilty, even in recent times, of the most atrocious conduct toward China. In 1884, a French fleet entered the Min River and anchored ten miles below the

great city of Foochow, in Southeastern China, to frighten the government at Peking into paying an indemnity demanded by the French Minister for alleged guilty complicity in helping the people of Tonquin in their fight against the seizure of their country by France. When he failed, the case was given over to the Admiral, the French ships opened fire, and in less than an hour the Chinese fleet, with the exception of one ship, was destroyed and over 3,000 Chinese killed, and all without a declaration of war. The bodies of the dead floated out to sea on the tide, many of them were borne back on the returning current, and for days it was hardly possible to cross the river anywhere between the anchorage and the sea twenty miles below without seeing some of these dreadful reminders of French treachery and brutality. The people of the city were roused to fury, and the foreigners would have been attacked but for the presence of American and English gunboats anchored off the settlement to protect them. If some of us had been killed the world would have rung with denunciation of Chinese cruelty, but the 3,000 victims of French guns would never have been thought of.

Two years ago the French perpetrated an equally atrocious outrage at Shanghai. Wishing to enlarge their settlement, they desired to obtain

possession of a large rest house for the dead which belonged to the people of Ningpo. Failing in negotiations, the French Consul proceeded to tear down the surrounding walls. The people opposed; marines were landed from a French cruiser in the river; they fired on the crowd and killed twenty. The people of other nationalities at Shanghai prepared to defend themselves, but they all knew that any riots, if riots occurred, should be laid to the injustice and brutality of France.

The burning down of villages in Shan-tung by the Germans, to which I have already referred, was an act of the same character.

All these instances of the cruel use of force by foreigners were heralded far and wide by the Chinese newspapers, and the impression made on the people it is not hard to imagine. These papers have also made the reading public aware of the deprivations of territory recently suffered by China, and of the cool discussions of the dismemberment of the Empire indulged in by the foreign press. No wonder the people were humiliated and angry. Many a time have I been asked by thoughtful and patriotic Chinese when the end would come and China cease to be an independent State. All her finest harbors have already been taken; there is not a place on her coast where her

fleet can rendezvous, except by the grace of foreigners. Port Arthur, a fortified harbor, on which millions were spent, has been leased to Russia; Wei-Hai-Wei, with its fortifications, on the coast of Shan-tung, to England; Kiao Chow, also in Shan-tung, with the finest bay on the coast of China, large enough to accommodate the fleets of the world, to Germany; and Kwang-Chau bay, on the southern coast of Kwang-tung, to France. There would be some justification for these seizures—for seizures they are, though called only "leases"—if they had been made in retaliation for broken pledges, for crimes for which the government was responsible; but every one knows that, with the apparent exception of Kiao Chow, and the exception is apparent only, they are all due to the mutual fears and mutual jealousies of foreign States. The sovereignty of China over her own domain is not recognized; he who is strong enough may take what he pleases, and his neighbor, lest the balance of power be broken, may go and do the same. That under such circumstances the wrath of the people is aroused is no matter for wonder. The West cannot sow the wind in the East without having later to meet the terrible necessity of reaping the whirlwind.

I have tried to give a fair analysis of the causes of the anti-foreign feeling which prevails in

China. It is not complete; there are other causes which might be mentioned. But I have given those which are most important, those which concern us most. It must be evident, I think, after studying them, that the antagonism of Chinese to foreigners is not altogether groundless; that foreigners themselves have had a large share in creating it. I trust that when the present fierce uprising is put down, when peace is restored to the distracted Empire, and the time for the settlement of claims has come, this painful fact will not be forgotten.

GEORGE B. SMYTH.

THE POWERS AND THE PARTITION OF CHINA.

THE POWERS AND THE PARTITION OF CHINA.

THE unusual attention given to Chinese affairs for two years past has been largely due to affairs in China which are foreign as well as Chinese. The scramble of European Powers has shifted from Constantinople to Peking, and into this scramble Japan and the United States have entered. The destiny of China seems to depend upon action taken in London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris and Tokyo. The future of Europe and America, and the question of the new "balance of power," depends on action taken in Peking. After all, in an unexpected way, one-fourth of the human race as concentrated in China must be reckoned with in making the map of the world.

The attitude of the great Powers to China is only partially indicated through the voice of the people, the press and public debate, and has

scarcely been enunciated through the Governments. China is thus in the dark as to what others want or intend to do, and we are all more or less puzzled in proportion to our degree of solicitude for her welfare.

For two years the writer, in a campaign for the International Institute of China, has been brought in contact with influential and thinking men in as many as ten countries, and especially with those most deeply interested in, or responsible for, the character of the relations which the West will hold with the Far East. Necessarily, it is in many cases impossible to give an authorized statement of acting ministers, but we can give impressions and our grounds for certain beliefs, which may help to explain the real situation.

I. GREAT BRITAIN.—Every British Government, until the present, has been in favor of maintaining the integrity of China. Parties have been agreed on this matter. So long as Great Britain was the predominant Power in China, this policy was unmodified. With the growing advance of other Powers, and especially with the increasing influence of Russia at the capital of China, the present Salisbury Government drifted into a policy of passivity. Instead of insisting on maintaining the integrity of China, it excused

itself from that task, and insisted on maintaining British interests, whatever became of China. The strong position sustained in the speeches of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in the early part of 1898 for the "open door," was relinquished for the new theory of "spheres of interest," as enunciated by the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, and as illustrated by the agreement made with Russia concerning spheres of railway and mining concessions. All the time, however, the Government has declared that the open door is not closed, and plainly shows a desire to have China kept intact.

The "open door" policy, or that of "equality of opportunity," is, no doubt, the preference of the British people. The burdens of a world-wide empire drive out ambition for further territory and political responsibilities in China.

At the same time, there has been a strong, active, persistent agitation for "spheres of influence," or more particularly for a British sphere of influence in the Yang-tse Valley. Not merely statesmen of the Opposition, but men on the same side of the House with the Government, have advocated these ideas. Several times the defense of the "open door" has been left to members of the Cabinet. The claim has been that there is no longer an open door, that the Government has weakened, that British interests are imperilled,

that British influence has declined, and that the only hope for Great Britain is to "ear-mark" the Yang-tse Valley. The undercurrent is suspicion of Russia and the conviction that Russia has already practically taken possession of Manchuria, while Germany holds sway in Shan-tung. Very few openly declare for the partition of China, but their arguments, if carried out, would drift that way. In any case, China's wishes or rights are utterly ignored. This agitation, and its support by the London press, has tended to weaken British reputation in China.

Lord Charles Beresford came back from his commercial investigations in China with two propositions for maintaining the open door—the one military, namely, drilling Chinese troops for the defense of the Yang-tse Valley; and the other political, namely, a combination of Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the United States, as antagonistic to Russia and France. Both of these propositions failed to secure the support of the British Government, and Lord Charles Beresford has, therefore, joined with the critics of the Government, and in doing so has drifted into the idea that the open door was closed, and that Great Britain should make sure of some special sphere, before all should be lost to her.

Nevertheless, the critics of the policy of the

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THE TAKU FORTS

Government have latterly a slight impression that, if it is too late to argue for an "open door," it may also be too late to argue for a "sphere of influence." The agitation for a particular sphere has aroused other nations to make claims of their own. The result is such an intermingling of interests that division into separate spheres would be harder to effect than the maintenance of competition everywhere. For Great Britain to secure a sphere of her own would require one of three things. One way would be to secure it by agreement with China, but China would not, or could not, make such an agreement and retain even the semblance of sovereignty. Another way would be by agreement with other rival Powers; but, in attempting this, all that the British desire would not be granted, while other Powers would secure more in the way of recognized spheres than they now seem to aim at. A third way would be for Great Britain to consult neither China nor the other Powers, but to establish herself suddenly in the part that she seeks for her own; but this she cannot do without numerous complications with China and the Powers, and, furthermore, she has too much on her hands elsewhere to attempt such a colossal venture as an independent demarcation of her own sphere. Therefore, as the British already have interests outside the Yang-tse Val-

ley, and other Powers have interests within the Yang-tse Valley, there comes the chance to China to be left unmolested.

II. RUSSIA.—The suspicion that the British hold toward the Russians with reference to China is about equalled by Russian suspicion of Great Britain. British suspicion arises from an ignorance of what the Russians really think or intend to do. Russian suspicion arises from the open declarations and threatening propositions of the British public and its free press.

Nine out of ten persons in the United Kingdom believe that Russia wants to take possession of the whole of China, or at least of Peking and all North China. Our personal conviction to the contrary has always been received with surprise as a strange hallucination. The ground for this conviction can be briefly stated.

Russia is more of an Oriental nation than any other European Power. There is much in common between Russia and China. They are both conservative and autocratic in government. The proximity of territory and partial homogeneity of race would naturally lead these two nations to sympathize with each other, especially if others sought to intrude. Russia, as the stronger of the two, might have an ambition to dominate her neighbor, as she has dominated vast tracts and

different tribes in northern Asia; but the international relations of both Russia and China forbid this. Russia knows that if she advances into China, other Powers will do the same. The subjection of the whole of China to Russia is a very different thing to the complex partition of China. The former is impossible; the latter to Russian eyes is undesirable. In Asia, Russia prefers a peaceful neighbor like China to her two European rivals, Germany and Great Britain—both intensely military and much wealthier than herself. The Slavic sympathies are more with the Mongolian than with the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon, in anything that pertains to China.

There are those who praise highly the foresightedness of Russian diplomacy. It is a common idea that Russia forms a definite plan, and works for its execution, slowly but with determination, through years, and even into centuries. My own impression is quite different. The Russians are not long-headed either in commerce or diplomacy. They rather have a supreme belief in Providence as a destiny leading their race and their Czar to ever-expanding spheres of domination. They design nothing, for Providence is leading them on.

An essential factor in the political attitude of Russia is the Czar. He has already given proof

of his peaceful intents, not only in world-wide problems, but specifically in China. He has announced to the world that Talien-wan is open to the trade of all nations, but few Englishmen and Americans have given even meagre praise to his published declaration and peaceful policy.

There is a small faction in Russia, led by Prince Ookhtomsky, which is positively friendly to China. In frequent conversations with this gentleman, we were struck with his intense and intelligent interest in the welfare of China. His paper, the *Viedomosti,* is noted both for its antagonism to the British and its defense of the Chinese. After hearing our plan for an International Institute at Peking, he had three editorials prepared in its advocacy, one being entitled in English " A Helping Hand to China."

The opponents of Russia generally close the door of discussion by the statement, " Russia has already taken possession of Manchuria." Facts, however, do not support this charge. Manchuria is still under Manchu rule, and the people pay taxes to China, not to Russia. There is even less interference in internal affairs than China complains of in other parts of China from other countries. Nothing has been done to frustrate the work of either Protestant or Catholic missionaries. The port of Newchwang is still an open

port, and it is yet to be proved that foreign trade in Manchuria has been hampered by Russia. Russia, quite sensibly, has wanted an ice-free port, and the opportunity to improve the industrial development of her own extensive domain. She now seeks to become something of a commercial nation, and to extend commercial relations with the United States on the one side and with England on the other. She also aspires to predominant influence in Chinese affairs, as other nations do, and the time will come, perhaps, when education and missions, as well as commerce and diplomacy, will form a part of Russian enterprise.

All this is other than the scheme to dismember China. And yet the dismemberment of China is very much "in the air." Russia, therefore, is preparing and strengthening her position. Let any other nation seize a portion of Chinese territory, then Russia will at once seize Manchuria and Mongolia to march on to Peking. Russia, even more than many Englishmen, would prefer to have China held together.

III. FRANCE.—For many years France and Great Britain were joined in the effort to open up China. Latterly, France and Russia have been joined, and this last alliance has aroused the suspicion of the British. The chief influence of France in China has been missionary rather than

commercial, and this fact tends to restrain any personal desires for Chinese dismemberment. From the beginning of treaty relations with China, all Catholic missions have been regarded as under the French protectorate. The only exception has been the case of Germany during the last decade. The special favor accorded to France has been increased within the last year by China's recognition of the official status of Catholic missionaries and the right of the French Minister at Peking to interfere and protect. This, therefore, gives scope for French influence in every province of China, and also in Mongolia and Manchuria. France knows very well that, if China were to be dismembered, her influence in the missionary line would be curtailed. She, therefore, prefers to keep China intact and have influence everywhere in China.

In even the commercial line France does not care to be limited to a few provinces along the Tonquin border. She has a French "settlement" in Shanghai and Tientsin, and a "concession" in Hankow. She is the largest investor in the railroad to be built between Hankow and Peking. She has also great political influence at Peking. To divide China would not serve the interests of France.

IV. GERMANY.—The other leading European

Power concerned in the future of China is Germany. The occasion for the rise of German influence in China was the massacre of two German Catholic missionaries in the Province of Shan-tung. One-third of that province is a German diocese. The protection of the Catholic mission within that section was transferred from France to Germany ten years ago. In addition, Germany has influence in a commercial way by securing as an outcome of the missionary difficulties the port of Kiao Chow, and certain railroad and mining concessions throughout the province. This is the German "sphere of interest," which may lead to actual possession. Such a result would not, however, be for the best interests of Germany. Germany has Protestant missions in the south where France would rule if China were to be dismembered. German merchants are also given wide scope for trade at all the treaty ports and through the natives far into the interior. A few high-handed officers or irresponsible adventurers may boast of making Shan-tung a German possession, but the German Government and German merchants would fare better by being friendly and true to China and by exerting influence over the whole of China. The danger to be faced is from the massacre of more Germans, which would cause Germany to ignore

Chinese rule and proceed to rule for herself. In fact, I regard this as the greatest danger to the preservation of China. The Chinese in Shan-tung are turbulent, and, through the aggressiveness of the Germans, most hostile to foreigners, and especially to the Germans.

V. THE UNITED STATES.—Different from the influence of the European Powers in China is that of the United States. While the equal of any of the Powers, this advancing Republic, the predominant Power on the American continent, has maintained from the year 1842 a friendly attitude to China. Even with the cry for expansion and her presence in Asiatic waters, she has displayed no inclination to participate in the dismemberment of China. Certain Americans are inclined to unite with the British in some definite China policy, while others look with favor on closer relations with Russia, but the National Government, in so far as it has a policy, puts forth no positive action either to divide China or maintain her integrity, but seeks to protect American interests as guaranteed by treaties. Naturally, this policy, like that of the British Government, is more allied to an "open door," with equality of opportunity, but there is no readiness to resist the aggressions of other Powers, so long as American trade is not hampered nor

American citizens molested. It is, therefore, possible for the United States to maintain equally friendly relations with China, with Great Britain, with Russia, or any other Power, if nothing is done to eliminate China as a treaty-making Power, or to make sections of China partial to some one country in rights, privileges and opportunities. If China is not to be dismembered, there is no need for the United States to interfere, but if dismemberment is to be undertaken, the very existence of extensive American interests, commercial and missionary, and the fact that for over half a century the United States has had in Eastern Asia diplomatic relations equally with others, will require that the United States be not only consulted, but given an equal share in the distribution of new opportunities.

The average American has less respect for the Chinese as a race than have most of the European peoples. This is probably owing to the greater acquaintance on the part of Americans with Chinese laborers than with the better class Chinese, and to American legislation on the Chinese question. We hear much of the obligation of the Chinese to observe the treaties, but very little of American obligation in relation to China. In consequence there is striking unconcern as to the welfare of the Chinese or the permanence of the

Chinese Empire. Very few realize the danger to American interests of allowing the dismemberment of China. The downfall of the Chinese Government is thought of as something similar to the displacement of Indian rule by British domination, whereas China would be parcelled out among different nations, and would not be like one people under one foreign rule.

Any change of American sentiment in the direction of recognizing the importance of keeping China intact has been largely brought about by an increased conviction that, legitimately, the United States must enter into movements that affect the world, and more particularly by the ambition to expand American trade throughout the whole of China. The sense of fair play, furthermore, is shocked by such a colossal programme as that of trying to divide a great and ancient Empire among outside nations, mutually jealous and relying for supremacy on skill in warfare.

VI. JAPAN.—In any question that concerns China, Japan must have a part. As Japan is the neighbor of China, this is to be expected, and as she is the recognized equal of Christian nations, this is her right. To prevent the further aggressions of Europe, and especially of Russia, all the people of Japan may be said to be in favor of

defending China and strengthening her independence. The end of China might be the beginning of the downfall of Japan. As Oriental nations, they stand or fall together. The question of the "open door" was hardly thought of when Japan vanquished China on sea and land, but when Russia, France and Germany proceeded to interfere in the result, and later on to make demands for privileges for themselves, which China could not resist, then Japan reversed her course and sided with China. An alliance, formal or informal, is inevitable.

Thus, through mutual jealousies of the nations, China may be held together. All seek their own interests first, from what some would term patriotic motives, and yet this very self-interest is dependent on the preservation of China. A scramble for conquest, possessions, sovereignty, in China would endanger the peace of the whole world. Even a struggle for established spheres of influence, with Chinese authority weakened more and more, would not only be treacherous to China, but provoke such discord, animosities, riots and resentments as to make the loss and trouble of the participants greater than the gain and honor. Each nation, while anxious for more influence, is opposed to the increased influence of any other nation. The whole territory of China

presents so many opportunities for foreign enterprise that all prefer competition to exclusiveness and dismemberment.

GILBERT REID.

THE STRUGGLE FOR REFORM IN CHINA

THE STRUGGLE FOR REFORM IN CHINA.

SIGNS are not wanting that we are on the eve of another political convulsion in China, a violent reaction from the masterly and masterful intervention of the Dowager Empress. The forces which have been swaying China this way and that for the last generation are still actively at work; while time is surely if slowly wearing away the barrier which has kept the flowing tide in check.

Many writers, in a glow of controversial zeal, were led to represent the palace revolution as the visible evidence of an occult struggle between Russia and England for the sovereignty of the Far East; and, considering the forced retirement of the Emperor Kuang-Hsu a victory for the Russian party, they confidently predicted a speedy countercheck from Great Britain, and exulted over it in advance as a victory for progress, enterprise and a higher phase of civilization.

In reality, the revolution in Peking had nothing

whatever to do with either Russia or England. It happened that one of the chiefs on the side of the Dowager Empress, the venerable Li Hung Chang, was a firm friend of Russia, and this gave color to the partisan view; but it might just as well have been the other way. The watershed of the Chinese movement, so to speak, is a question of internal policy alone.

There are, in fact, two parties in China, one extremely radical and the other extremely conservative. The former is the party of the Emperor Kuang-Hsu; the latter is the party of the Dowager Empress Tshu-Chsi. The Conservatives, under the lead of this remarkable woman, aspire to keep China as far as possible a forbidden land, a second Tibet, governed on traditional and theocratic lines. The Radicals, on the other hand, desire to see China follow the lead of Japan, and put on the whole armor of civilization, as we understand it in Europe and America.

But the Conservatives are in sympathy with Russia only to a very limited extent; it is, with them, a sympathy of tradition rather than of policy, for the relations between Russia and China go back to the Middle Ages. They regard Russia as a friendly Asiatic despotism, and hardly as a European country at all.

The Radicals, on the other hand, have no par-

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ticular sympathy with England. It is, indeed, one of the elements of their policy to foster closer relations with Japan, in order that China and Japan together may be able to stand independently as a great Asiatic power, throwing off the yoke of European, and especially of English, interference.

In truth, the questions which divide these two parties in China are much more serious and profound than one would be led to believe from reading the accounts of the critics and chroniclers of our press. They have a way of leaping to conclusions, which shows a great deal of courage, it is true, but, on the other hand, a great ignorance of the Oriental world, and of the thoughts and feelings of Oriental peoples.

It is taken as axiomatic, for example, that a theocratic government is something wholly out of place in the modern world; an exploded superstition of a bygone age; something quite out of keeping with modern ideas and modern life. But Germany, and indeed every monarchical country, is in principle a theocracy; for the kingship is founded on divine right; and the fact that the coronation is a religious ceremony shows that the divine sanction is still conceived as authorizing the Emperor to rule. Russia, where the Emperor himself sets the crown upon his head, is even more

directly theocratic; the ruler draws his right direct from heaven, without the interposition of the Church. But every monarchy is in principle a theocracy, just as every aristocracy admits the principle of ancestor-worship.

So that there is nothing essentially incompatible with Western ideas in even the extreme ideals of the Chinese Conservatives. And, as far as they believe in adhering to the traditional and native forms of Chinese life, and, incidentally, of Chinese arts and handicrafts, there is much to be said for them, too; for these are the forms of life which they have developed for themselves during generations, and even now their arts and crafts are in many things so superior to ours that we buy as ornaments things which they destined simply for common use. In Europe the very latest ideal in arts and crafts is the introduction of the personal and creative element in all workmanship as against machinery. But this was the ideal of China and Japan from the very outset. Every Japanese and Chinese artisan is an artist, and in this they are a century ahead of their Western critics.

So that one may easily make out a very strong general case for the Conservatives in China. And, when this has been done, it becomes doubly interesting to apply the same process in detail, and to

inquire what precisely were the innovations which the Emperor Kuang-Hsu sought to introduce, and why this attempt was so completely frustrated.

First, a word about the Emperor himself. Kuang-Hsu is an imperial title, meaning "Enduring Majesty;" the prince's personal name is Teai-Tsien. He is only twenty-seven years old, though he has borne the title of Emperor ever since the death of his cousin, the Emperor Chai-Chin, five and twenty years ago, and has been sole responsible ruler, in theory at least, for the last nine years. The Emperor Kuang-Hsu is slight and delicate, almost childish in appearance, of pale olive complexion, and with great, melancholy eyes. There is a gentleness in his expression that speaks rather of dreaming than of the power to turn dreams into acts. It is strange to find a personality so ethereal among the descendants of the Mongol hordes; yet the Emperor Kuang-Hsu might sit as a model for some Oriental saint on the threshold of the highest beatitude. Though it is eleven years since his marriage with Princess Eho-na-la, the Emperor is childless.

It is not so long since the nobles of our most civilized Western lands counted it a vice to write well, and slept on rushes in their torch-lit, wooden halls. Their ideals were war and hunting, with

bows and arrows, for the most part, with legalized plundering of the agricultural population to renew their supplies of bread. In those days China was far more civilized than any European country; and, in the life of the Chinese Empire, that period is only as yesterday. The two things which have done most to change the relative positions of East and West are gunpowder and printing, yet both of these have been known in China for ages. So that any inherent superiority on the part of the West is rather a pleasing fiction; much might be said in the contrary sense. The West is superior in combative and destructive elements—the very things which the religion of the West has been trying to eradicate for two thousand years; so that, even from a Western point of view, Europe's material victory is a moral defeat.

Yet it is none the less true that China has been overshadowed and left behind by the Western nations, and the recognition of this fact is the starting point of the Emperor's policy.

He conceives the remedy to be an infusion of new life into the education of the people; a supersession of the wonderful system of intellectual training, perfected centuries ago, which forms all minds alike on the great Chinese Classics, "the best that has been thought and said" in the Celestial Land. It is the battle of utility against culture

fought out once more on Chinese lines. Chemistry and physics, engineering and military science are to take the place of essays and poems exquisitely fashioned after ancient models, now the sole test of talent throughout the Empire, and perfection in which is the royal road to fame and fortune.

It is hard to tell which we should most admire, the genuine enthusiasm of all China for literary culture, for familiarity with the highest thoughts and noblest words of the sages, or the marvellous ingenuity and precision with which this knowledge is tested by a system of examinations hardly equalled, and never surpassed, by any nation in the world—the vast halls, with their cloister-like divisions for ten thousand candidates; the seals set on the doors before the papers are given out; the counted sheets of stamped paper with name and number for the essays and poems of each candidate; the army of clerks copying the themes in red ink, lest any personal sign or mark should lead the examiner to recognize a favored pupil; the enthusiastic crowds gathering at the doors; the cannons and music which greet the candidates first to come forth; the literary chancellor ceremoniously presiding; the lists of the successful eagerly bought up in the streets; the chosen essays and poems sent to Court for the delectation of the

Emperor; the gold-buttoned caps and blue silk gowns of the graduates; and, lastly, the almost pathetic provision that whoever continues without success to try for any degree until his eightieth year shall receive it free, from the Emperor himself, as a reward for faithful love of learning.

By the way, we should keep some of our admiration for the more than human ingenuity with which the Chinese students sometimes evade even the strictest precautions: the tunnels dug beneath the examination halls, through which surreptitious knowledge is passed up to the candidates, written minutely on the finest paper; the offices where needy and brilliant essayists are hired to personate dull, wealthy scholars; the refinement of knavery that decrees that, while the rank of the examination to be compounded for rises in arithmetical progression, the bribe increases in geometrical ratio. All this but shows, by crooked ways, how highly learning is esteemed.

Yet all this, while it reminds us how foolish we are to think of Chinamen as uncivilized, is not enough to win the battles of the world. Therefore, the Emperor Kuang-Hsu deemed it necessary to decree reform and the introduction of the utilitarian spirit. Peking is to have a University, as a rallying point for the modern spirit; and here a characteristic note of Chinese radicalism is

struck; for the methods and standards of this first Chinese University are to be taken not directly from Europe, but mediately through Japan. It is conceived that Western ideals will then have undergone a process of partial assimilation and amelioration, making them more immediately suitable for the Chinese mind. In other words, it is held that the Japanese have already improved the culture they received from Europe, and that the Chinese, following in their steps, will improve it still further.

This drawing together of China and Japan is one of the key-notes of the radical programme of the Emperor Kuang-Hsu. "China and Japan," says a recent edict, "have a common language, they belong to the same race, they have all interests in common."

So a band of students are to set out from the Celestial Empire to the Flowery Land, as guests of the Japanese nation, there to absorb the light which they are presently to radiate, as teachers, in their own land. Two hundred are to go, as a beginning, and they are already being chosen among those who have some knowledge of Japanese. And before they return, if Kuang-Hsu's programme is carried out, Peking will have, besides her University, a whole system of primary and intermediate schools, and this system, mod-

elled on the best Western plans, will gradually be extended to every considerable city of the Empire.

The University of Tokio, which is held to be the high-water mark of blended European and Japanese culture, is to serve as the model for the Peking institution, and temporary quarters have been assigned to the teachers in the princely palaces of the capital, pending the erection of suitable University buildings. Meanwhile, the sum originally allotted to the Committee on Education has been increased threefold, by a special Imperial edict, and the sum set aside for the maintenance of the committee has been doubled.

The thoroughly practical spirit pervading this new educational movement in China is shown in an Imperial order recently dispatched to the coast provinces: the Viceroys, Governors, Prefects and District Magistrates—the four chief degrees in the executive hierarchy—are directed to furnish the Emperor with precise information as to possible means of increasing the naval schools and supplying new training-ships for the fleet. A further very practical move is the formation of a Committee on Railroads and Engineering, with orders to draft plans for the opening of schools of railroad engineering at a number of central points through the Empire, from which, it is

hoped, railroads will soon radiate to every considerable town, and through all the provinces.

Close on the heels of this follows another Committee on Agriculture, Manufactures and Trade. To the President and Vice-President of this committee are specifically reserved the right of free access to the Emperor at all times, on the business of their departments; and when we remember the divinity that hedges in the Son of Heaven we shall better understand how much he is in earnest, and how clearly he shows it by sacrificing his ceremonial prerogatives. A School of Agriculture is to be formed, with branches in each district of every province of the Empire, and these branch schools are to procure the latest agricultural machinery, and to exhibit its advantages to the mass of cultivators in the rural districts. It is hoped that a decade will not pass before the whole agriculture of China is transformed by the use of tilling and harvesting machines.

Another innovation, which seems to have been borrowed from India, was suggested by last year's famine in the three provinces of Hu-pé, Shan-Si and Shan-tung, all not very far from the capital. The Emperor had discovered that the system of distributing free rations among the starving populations was not a success—or, perhaps, we should say, the system of allotting con-

siderable sums to that end. For there is the old tale of peculation and dishonest officials, a Chinese version of the charges more than once brought against the American Government in its relations with the Red Indians. The Emperor proposes to adopt the British Indian expedient of relief-works, and further intends to improve the occasion by employing the men at these works in the various new industries which he is seeking to introduce throughout the provinces. This would include the building of railroads, the establishment of agricultural machinery, the extension of irrigation and the introduction of new manufactures. So that a famine will come as a blessing in disguise.

Another very important reform touches the procedure in civil cases. It is said that the Chinese courts have a bad eminence in civil law's delays, keeping a good fat process on the files for months and years, and even decades, to the end that many bribes may be taken; and after a judge has taken many bribes from both sides it becomes very embarrassing to decide the case at all. The traditional solution in India is to put the final decision up to auction. Before we pass too heavy a sentence on this form of corruption and brand it as the mark of an inferior race, we should remember that Sir Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam,

Viscount St. Albans, whom Shelley wrongly called "Lord Bacon," and whom Mr. Gladstone even more wrongly called "Francis, Lord Bacon," was degraded for selling the decisions of the highest court in the England of his day. Experience makes it probable that this reform will be one of the hardest to enforce, since its success depends largely on the good-will of the very judges to be reformed.

Yet another measure shows a daring spirit of innovation: the foundation of a new Medical College at Peking, for the express purpose of introducing the methods of modern Europe. A license for this College has already been granted; but it has dark days before it, for it strikes a blow at vested interests of the most extensive character, founded on most venerable traditions. It is as though the Federal Government were to organize and endow a College for Mental Healing. One could predict stormy days for it, whatever opinion one held as to the Efficacy of Faith. It is true that Kuang-Hsu throws a sop to Cerberus by including in the course the traditional medical practice of China side by side with the new methods of the West. But it seems to me that this is a false move; for what battles there may be between the rival professors! Homeopathy and allopathy will be nothing to it.

But the next reform on the Emperor's list admits of no healing balm. It is a decree for the suspension of the famous Six Boards, a series of venerable sinecures, supposed to look after the education of the heir apparent, the royal stables, the due performance of bowings and kneelings, the imperial banquets, and so forth. Every European Court has half a dozen departments equally ornamental. These interesting survivals—and the salaries—are to become a thing of the past, their nominal duties are to be passed on to Committees of the Senate, and the buildings they occupied are to be turned over to the new Medical College and the Peking University.

From a tactical point of view, this seems the Emperor's first grave mistake, for it sets the whole of the permanent Civil Service against the reform programme. Like many another bringer of glad tidings, his course might have been smoother if he could only have been persuaded to leave the Scribes and Pharisees alone. And the whole army of bureaucrats and lesser officials has evidently taken alarm, for we find a recent edict of the Emperor speaking in the following terms:

"The Government of the Chinese Empire, striving to elevate the various departments of the administration, and with the sole design of conferring benefits on the people, wishes to employ to this end the methods of the nations of

the West, since what is common to the Western nations and the Chinese, has been brought to greater excellence by the former, and may, therefore, serve for our advancement.

"At the same time, the bureaucrats and scholars of this Empire, whose views of foreign nations are characterized by the greatest ignorance, pretend that Western nations are totally devoid of order and enlightenment, not knowing that among the Western nations there are many forms of political science which have as their sole aim the moral elevation of the people, and their material well-being, and which, from their high development, are able to heap benefits on mankind, and to prolong the span of human life. In the West, all efforts are directed to procuring the blessings which mankind is entitled to.

"In our ceaseless efforts to reform various departments of the administration, we are by no means prompted by a mere desire for novelty, but by a sincere aspiration for the well-being of the Empire entrusted to us by Providence, and handed down to us by our ancestors. We shall not have fulfilled our duty, if we fail to secure to all our people, the blessings of peace and prosperity.

"And we are not less grieved at the slights which China has had to submit to, at the hands of foreign governments. But so long as we do not possess the knowledge and science of other peoples, we shall not be able to defend ourselves against them.

"At the same time, our subjects evidently fail to understand the true purpose of our unsleeping endeavors and exertions. The reason of this is that the lower classes of officials and the bureaucrats devoted to routine [the Scribes and Pharisees] not only do not make our intentions clear, but, on the contrary, intentionally confuse the people with vain and unseemly speeches. Grieved and vexed that a true understanding of our intentions has not reached our subjects, we inform all China, by the present decree, of the true purpose of our doings. This is in order that our

enlightened intentions may be known to the whole people, and that the people may know that trust is to be reposed in their Ruler, who, with the help of all, will mould the Government according to new principles, for the strengthening and elevation of the Chinese Empire.

"To this end we order the Viceroys and Governors to print these our decrees, and to exhibit them on notice-boards, and we order the Prefects and District Magistrates, and all schoolmasters, to explain these decrees to the people. And likewise, we command the Treasurers, Provincial Judges, District Inspectors, Prefects, heads of districts and sub-districts, to lay before us, without fear, statements of their views on all imperial questions. And these statements are to be forwarded to us sealed, and must on no account be kept back by Viceroys and Governors. Finally, we order the present decree to be exhibited in a prominent place, in the offices of all Viceroys and Governors."

This is a most important document, and the key to much that will happen in the natural course of events in the Chinese Empire during the next few years. It is the personal confession of faith of the despotic Ruler of four hundred millions, more than a quarter of the whole human race. To carry out a programme like this Kuang-Hsu had need to be endowed with an uncommonly strong will, and, further, with unerring insight into the character of his helpers. Very much of future history depends on his possession of these two gifts.

Another projected reform is intended to cut at

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THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE, PEKING

the root of what is certainly the greatest evil in the system of Chinese Government—the malversation of the revenues, made possible by the very loose system of accounts in vogue in the Treasury Department. An autocrat has been defined as one whose budget is not audited; if this be so, the Chinese Empire is suffering from an epidemic of autocrats. This time the trouble lies not so much with the Scribes and Pharisees, as with their friends, the Publicans and Sinners—the farmers of taxes, who bid so much for the right to extort what they can from a long-suffering public. The result of this malversation is such that while the taxable capacity of China is simply enormous, the system of peculation is so thorough and so much sticks to the fingers of the collectors that the Government is almost chronically bankrupt. The estimated revenue of the Chinese Empire amounts to about twenty cents a year for each inhabitant. This is about one-fiftieth of the rate for most European countries, and less than one-hundredth of that of some. So that if the revenues of China were raised to about the same level per head as, say, those of Belgium or Austria-Hungary, China would have a sum of from four to eight thousand million dollars a year to apply to imperial and administrative purposes. And should the innovations contemplated by

Kuang-Hsu really be introduced, there is not the faintest doubt that China could bear as heavy taxes as Belgium or Austria-Hungary, and in that case what a formidable vista is opened up in the direction of allotments for the Chinese Army and Navy to be turned out of the new and modernized schools. Further, what sums could be spent on bounties to enable any and every manufacture to compete with European rival products, not only in China, but in all the markets of the world. The open door is one of those beautiful rules that may work both ways. Supposing the door should be found to open outwards as well as inwards, and supposing the first thing to come forth were a flood of subsidized screw-nails, sufficient to drive Mr. Chamberlain out of the market, would there not be a sort of poetic justice in that?

As far as the revenue is concerned, Kuang-Hsu's avowed purpose does not go beyond a stricter system of accounts, a stoppage of some of the innumerable leaks in the aqueducts which deprive the imperial reservoirs of their supplies. But even a slight measure of success in this direction will raise the revenue of China to a formidable amount, and, further, would increase her borrowing power practically without limit.

And here we approach a very important matter

from an international standpoint. To carry out these schemes requires an army of trained and honest administrators; it also requires considerable material resources to keep things going while the changes are being introduced. But, while there are doubtless many strong and honest men in China, the Emperor does not seem as yet to have laid his hand on them; and, as an alternative, he suggests, or adopts the suggestion of, a very remarkable measure. It is nothing less than an appeal to Japan to lend China a band of trained administrators, such as England has lent to Egypt and India. Only, in the case of China, the initiative comes from the borrower, not from the lender. And in the light of this idea the recent Japanese mission to Peking, under Marquis Ito, acquires a new significance.

An excellent statement of this side of the question appeared in a recent number of one of the Peking radical papers. It is worth quoting at some length.

The writer begins by citing instances from the early history of China, and the story of Peter the Great, to show that reforms may best be carried out by foreign agents. He then urges the Emperor to seek the assistance of Marquis Ito in the task of regenerating China, asserting that only by a Japanese alliance can China take a firm attitude

toward foreign powers and keep back the horrors of a general war. He continues:

"If Your Majesty could only persuade Marquis Ito to become confidential adviser of China, the reforms which you have undertaken would be promptly carried out, and the international bond between China and Japan would be greatly reinforced; while without Japan's help, the early realization of these reforms is impossible. Even granting that, among the Chinese who have recently entered the arena of public life, a few may be found endowed with the necessary strength of will, they are certain to meet with numberless hindrances, caused by the envy and fear of the enemies of progress. They will spend their energies and lose their reputations in vain efforts, and the ills of the body politic will remain uncured. On the other hand, Marquis Ito, as the experienced minister of a foreign government, who possesses Your Majesty's fullest confidence, and who is well known to fame, could have nothing to fear from intrigues in the task of introducing reforms. And foreign powers, in their international relations with China, would begin to treat our country in a very different manner. Their schemes of aggrandizement at our expense would instantly relax, and this would be the beginning of the transformation of China from a poor and weak country, surrounded with dangers, into a land full of wealth and strength, and rejoicing in the blessings of assured peace. This is the first reason why we must borrow talent from other nations.

"The fundamental principles of Chinese policy are isolation and separation, whilst among Western nations the principles of government are the very opposite of these, namely, intercourse and union; principles which serve to bring about the development of moral and material resources, while isolation and exclusion lead to the very opposite result. To these two principles, intercourse and

union, the nations of the West are indebted for their greatness and civilization.

"From the geographical point of view, nations inhabiting the same continent should first unite among themselves. From the point of view of race and language, it is best for kindred peoples to be joined. The peoples of Europe and America do not inhabit the same continent as ourselves; they belong to another race, and speak other tongues. Therefore, in view of these natural obstacles, they cannot be closely united with China. It is quite otherwise with Japan. Although, carried away by her extremely rapid progress, and that unexpected development which roused the apprehensions of both Europe and America, Japan made war on China, yet, when confronted by Russia, Japan was helpless. It is true that, in order to counterbalance Russia, Japan is making friends with England; but experienced men of affairs are convinced that war between them cannot be averted in the future. Whichever side wins, there will be great changes in the balance of power in Asia. England approached Japan solely because of Russia; England is foreign to us in race; she is foreign to us therefore in spirit also. What if England, whose sole motive is profit, should find it profitable to change sides and enter into an alliance with Russia? Then Japan, standing alone, would certainly perish. Therefore Japan's natural ally is China. If the Celestial Empire, with its vast natural resources, its huge area, its enormous population, should really enter into an alliance with Japan, borrowing from Japan new methods for the development of China's resources, and for the education of competent men, then Japan and China together, in firm union and alliance, could easily withstand either Russia or England, and assure a general peace. This would secure the integrity of the Chinese Emperor's hereditary dominions, and put an end to foreign encroachment. The designs of foreign nations can only be withstood by the material might of China, acting under the moral and intellectual

guidance of Japan. Russia cherishes designs of encroachment on the north; as regards England, which is striving to maintain peace and gain its own ends, its demands make Russian policy necessary, but in reality England's designs are wholly commercial and selfish. If an alliance existed between China and Japan, Russia could doubtless carry out her design of a Congress in the interests of universal peace, and could enter into enduring and peaceable relations with the other nations of Europe. This is not only very desirable for China and Japan, but it is an object worthy of the sincere aspiration of the whole human race."

At this point a temporary stop was put to the Chinese dream of regeneration by the interposition of the Conservative party, under the leadership of the Dowager Empress Tshu-Chsi. This very remarkable woman is the widow of the Emperor I-Tshu, and was co-ruler with the Emperor Chai-Chun from 1861 to 1875, when Kuang-Hsu nominally ascended the throne, being then three years old. As a result of her interposition, the *Imperial Gazette* announced, as we all remember, that the Emperor found it impossible to deal unaided with the vast mass of administrative affairs in the present critical condition of the Empire, "and requested Her Majesty, the Dowager Empress, who had twice directed the affairs of China with marked success, to lend him her guidance in the conduct of imperial business." Then came three edicts: First, the quite credible announcement that the young Emperor "was

very sick;" then, that several reforms were postponed, the famous Six Boards being reinstated; and, lastly, a series of vigorous measures directed against the young Emperor's advisers. Finally it was declared that, as of yore, the Empire would be governed according to the principles of the sage Confucius.

One of the principles of this sage is obedience to parents; and we must take into account the enormous moral weight this obligation has in China before too hastily accusing the young Emperor of cowardice and supineness. But time is on his side.

It is always a delicate matter to speak of a lady's age, especially if that lady be an Empress; but the masterful Dowager is not far from the patriarchal three score years and ten, while her right-hand man, the hardly less masterful Li Hung Chang, is seventy-five. These two are certainly among the twenty most considerable personalities in the world at this moment, a sufficient evidence that the Chinese race is not effete. But mortality will claim its own, and then will come the turn of young Kuang-Hsu. If it comes even four or five years hence, he will be only about thirty, and his character will have matured in the meantime. I have quoted two Chinese documents at length, in order to show that, if we

are counting on the moral and intellectual inferiority of the Chinese, we are suffering from a dangerous illusion. Therefore the success of the young Emperor's plans is quite a probable event; and that success will mean a huge revenue for China; a vast army and fleet on the most modern models, with skilled officers, probably Japanese; a quite unlimited power to subsidize Chinese manufacture against all the world's competition, with a working class of hundreds of millions ready to accept marvellously low wages and quick to master the cheapest and best methods. In a word, it would mean the possible swamping of Western lands, in a military as well as a commercial sense. So that the policy of the door which may open outwards is about the most dangerous for the West that could well be conceived.

CHARLES JOHNSTON.

POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES IN CHINA.

POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES IN CHINA.

THE map of China is bewildering, but interesting. It shows the first empire of the world in population and the third in area—more than 400,000,000 people in 4,300,000 square miles. It reveals a wonderful winding coast-line of 2,000 miles, facing seas teeming with commerce and trade. Populous cities are located along every few days' journey, and landlocked harbors make frequent indentations. Into the vast interior run great navigable waterways, with innumerable lesser tributaries and canals. Few high mountains break the surface, and the conformation of the land is plainly adapted to supporting countless millions of people. Travel inland from the treaty ports adds to the interest aroused by study of geographical plates. There is little to disappoint, because there is much to pleasantly surprise. China may be deemed barbaric by the unthinking foreigner, but the observing student everywhere finds evidence of

former civilization, and discovers potentialities for future development.

The government may be weak, but the people are still virile. The lack of material progress is largely responsible for China's stagnant condition. She long ago reached the limit under her ancient system of education, law, government, transportation, and commerce. What she now needs is the quickening touch of the material hand, protected by an enlightened administration of government, law and order. We must be charitable toward China. Her shortcomings may be largely attributed to dry-rot, which may characterize any older government, and which, in lesser terms, is so often found in long-established but wealthy business houses.

Reorganized in absolute independence or under foreign protection, China may become, in another generation, one of the first-class Powers of the world, in fact as well as in theory. She may rival and surpass the record of Japan. She has the natural resources, the population and the location necessary for a brilliant development. With the interior gridironed with railways, canals dredged, river bars deepened, mines opened, roads built, likin and "squeeze" taxes abolished, all ports and points open to foreign trade, and honest administration inaugurated,

China will astound the world with her capabilities. Possibly she is now on the verge of giving us that welcome surprise.

What is to be the outcome of the present crisis? It would seem that it must be one of the following possibilities: First, China may be experiencing a narrow escape from permanent "break-up," by which she will receive the last warning that will arouse her from the lethargy of the past, and, imitating Japan, make her become a mighty Asiatic power. Second, she may be forced by the combined moral and physical influence of foreign nations to reorganize her government under their temporary direction and guidance, and so eventually save her integrity. Third, she may be placed under a joint protectorate of the Powers until she shall prove whether she will be able to stand alone under new conditions or must be partitioned among them. Fourth, she may be divided into admitted spheres of influence, where each Power will be supreme, and actual sovereignty will result in time.

It is to be sincerely hoped that the first may be possible, but, if not, the heroic method of the second or third may be necessary. The last is least desirable, but the most threatening. The general belief of the lay world seems to be that

the "break-up" of the Empire is at hand, and therefore laymen as well as heads of foreign offices are reported as contemplating how such division of China would affect each nation. I say the last suggestion is the least desirable, because it seems least adapted to protect American interests, and means the end of one of the greatest empires in the world's history which is deserving of a better fate. A wide realm where America now has equal rights of trade with every other foreign nation, and where uniform duties prevail, would be ruthlessly parcelled out among European nations which are competitors with us for the Chinese markets, and would have a distinct advantage over us, even if they did not apply tangible discriminating duties. No two sections would have like tariffs. Conditions of commerce would vary according to the characteristics and methods of the controlling power. We might be safe and even better off in the Yang-tse Valley, but entirely shut off in Shengking, Shansi and Shan-tung on the north, or in Kwangtung and Kwangsi on the south. The negotiations of Secretary Hay should protect our rights even if China be divided, but diplomatic assurances of the present may be newly interpreted under future changed conditions. Possession is nine-tenths of the law. What

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policy Russia, France and Germany might follow when their respective spheres become sovereign domain would, I fear, be little influenced by their present "open-door" promises. True, if these theoretical divisions remain purely and simply "spheres of influence," we should be safe; but the moment the evolution into areas of sovereignty is completed, we will not be able to depend on any former treaty rights, but only and entirely on our capabilities for successful competition in spite of local tariffs.

The cotton manufacturers of America, especially those of the Southern States, are more concerned than any other export interests. Their trade in North China, the seat of the present "Boxer" troubles, has grown in ten years from $1,600,000 to $10,000,000, and bids fair, under favorable conditions, to grow to $25,000,000 in the near future. They fear that if Russia obtain absolute possession there will be discrimination in this particular section in favor of the new cotton-mills of southern Russia, and that they will eventually be crowded out, where under Chinese sovereignty they would be safe. Russia's diplomatic promises on this point may sound honest, and they may be honest and sincere at the present, but no one can tell what will be the influence of the Russian cotton-spinners

on a new ministry. If Secretary Hay has safeguarded American interests into a possible period of sovereignty, he has indeed won a notable victory. Let us hope that he has succeeded on this very point, and that future events will attest his foresight.

I must admit, on the other hand, that I take a more optimistic view of Russian influence than many others. It would seem to me that throughout Russia, and especially in Asiatic Russia, the United States is to find one of its largest and most remunerative markets. Russia is just entering on a period of material development, which will make immense demands on both our raw and manufactured products. The effect of the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway will be everywhere awaited with profound interest, but the cost of such a long land haul of freight to Eastern Siberia and China will always give an advantage in favor of our products shipped across the Pacific direct, or by the Nicaragua Canal from New Orleans and New York.

Before discussing what may be the territorial limits of spheres of influence or areas of control, it is well to bear in mind several influences that will tend to keep China intact. First, she has survived many other shocks, some of which

were as severe as this, notably the brief wars with Japan, France and England, and former rebellions. Second, the Powers of Europe and Japan are keenly jealous of each other, and will admit of no division that is not satisfactory. They may even become engaged in international war, and China be the least sufferer. Third, the United States, which in a way holds the key to the moral situation, is opposed to any alienation of territory, while Great Britain and Japan maintain the same attitude. Fourth, there is a large element of very able men in China, despite common opinion to the contrary, that have sufficient statesmanlike qualities to govern China wisely and successfully. These would be supported by a considerable part of the population that is ready to take active interest in public affairs, if there be no danger of political exile or punishment. Who can doubt the ability of such men, for instance, as the eminent Chinese Minister at Washington to take the lead in guiding China out of her present difficulties? Fifth, it will be found that China's particular weakness in the present trouble is the lack of national police, or of organized forces of law and order, such as a well-trained army. If she had possessed even a small, trustworthy, well-disciplined force under foreign officers, the present riots

could have been put down at the moment and place of inception. The rest of the world would hardly have noticed the disturbance.

Therefore, if China will immediately reorganize her essential forces of order throughout the Empire, she will take the first principal step to preserve her integrity.

Further study of the map of eastern Asia will assist in comprehending the extent of possible spheres of influence. We will assume that Russia, Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan and possibly Italy are the Powers that would share in any spoliation of Cathay. Russia first interests us because of her territorial preponderance on the north and her aggressive policy in Manchuria. Were China divided Russia's allotment would probably include all Manchuria, with an area of 364,000 square miles and population of 10,000,000; Mongolia, with an area of 1,300,000 square miles and population of 2,000,000; East Turkestan and Jungaria, with 550,000 square miles and 1,000,000 people. With these she would also claim the northern province of Chi-li, in which Peking and Tientsin are located, and which has an area of 115,000 square miles—as much as the Philippines—a population of 20,000,000, and a frontage on the gulf of Pechili. Altogether, Russia's sphere would include an

area of 2,300,000 square miles, or equal to two-thirds of the United States proper, and a population of 43,000,000.

Germany, beginning with Shan-tung, would demand the hinterland of Shansi, Shensi, Honan and Kansu, with a combined area of 406,000 square miles and a population of 76,000,000. She would require the southern end of Chili to connect Shan-tung with the hinterland, but Russia could easily grant that concession. Control of this section of China would give to Germany the greater part of the valley of the Hoangho and a considerable portion of the Grand Canal.

Great Britain has always laid claim to the Yang-tse Valley as the natural thoroughfare and connection through China to her Indian possessions, and as the section in which she has done the most to develop commerce and resources. Were this apportioned to her, she would control part of Kiangsu on the coast, Anhui, Hupeh, part of Kiangsi, Hunan, Szechuan, Kweichau, part of Yunnan, and also portions of Kwangsi and Kwangtung, to connect with Hongkong and Kowloon at the mouth of the West River. The area occupied would exceed 800,000 square miles, and contain a population of 190,000,000. If Russia were given all Mongolia and Tur-

kestan, Great Britain, in order to protect India, would claim Tibet, including Koko Nor, with an area of 650,000 square miles and a population of 6,000,000.

France, from her position in Tonkin and Annam, would be allotted all that portion of Kwangtung and Kwangsi south of the West River, the island of Hainan and southern Yunnan. This would well round out her Asiatic dependencies, and give her an added area of 160,000 square miles, or larger than France proper, and an increased population of 30,000,000. Canton, the populous capital of southern China, would be included in British territory.

Japan would claim the rich province of Fukien, which is just across the channel from her possession of Formosa. With it she might acquire portions on Kiangsi and northern Kwangtung. Fukien has within its limits the large prosperous cities of Fuchau and Amoy. Her Chinese spoils would aggregate 25,000,000 in population and 50,000 miles in area. Japan, moreover, would be a thorn in the side of Russia and Germany, and when they were demanding vast portions of China she might quietly insist on annexing the major portion of Korea.

Italy would ask for fertile Chekiang, on whose coast is located San-mun Bay. This province

has an area of 35,000 square miles and a population of 12,000,000, and includes the ports of Ningpo and Hangchau.

Glancing at a few more details of possible division, we note that Great Britain would probably hold that part of the Shan-tung promontory in which Wei-hai-wei and Chefoo are located. Russia would not only control Peking, Tientsin and Taku, but Niuchwang, one of the important gateways to Manchuria. Here again Japan might interfere and claim territory in the gulf of Pechili, and possibly insist on having part of Chi-li.

America should resist with all her moral influence such parcelling out of the Empire, and may prevent it. She cannot declare war on European nations in order to save China; she can accomplish more by a firm, peaceful than by a belligerent attitude. She should insist on her rights, but not join in a scramble for territory.

Through all this crisis and its ultimate solution, America must stand for the integrity of the Empire, and the "open door" as guaranteed by the original treaties with China and confirmed by the recent negotiations of Secretary Hay.

America's direct trade with China amounted in 1899 to $33,000,000, or one-tenth of the total foreign commerce of $330,000,000. This is an

increase of 100 per cent. for America and China respectively in ten years. If we include $10,000,000 trade with Hongkong we have the comparatively large annual total of $43,000,000 with China, which makes us third in the race. We follow Great Britain and Japan, but lead Russia, Germany and France. On the ground of commerce we have more right to interfere at Peking than the Continental Powers of Europe.

In face of the immediate necessity of protecting life and property, it is well to remember furthermore that America has more at stake, exclusive of ceded or leased ports and army garrisons, than any other nation except Great Britain.

As the original treaty conception of the "open door" is hazy to many who have not taken the trouble to study the question, I will quote the wording of our first convention with China, concluded July 3, 1844, at Wang Hiya and negotiated by Caleb Cushing:

"Citizens of the United States resorting to China for the purposes of commerce will pay the duties of import and export described in the tariff, which is fixed by and made part of this treaty. They shall in no case be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of any other nation whatever . . . and if additional advantages and privileges of

whatever description be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States and the citizens thereof shall be entitled thereupon to a complete, equal and impartial participation in the same."

Later treaties, including that of Tientsin, concluded June 18, 1858, by William B. Reed, that of Shanghai, concluded November 8, the same year, by the same plenipotentiary, that of Washington, July 28, 1868, by William H. Seward and Anson Burlingame, and that of Peking, November 17, 1880, by James B. Angell, all confirmed or enlarged upon these rights first granted.

JOHN BARRETT.

THE GATHERING OF THE STORM.

THE GATHERING OF THE STORM.

CHINA is not a savage land, her people are not barbarians. Her hoary civilization, however, has rusted out. Civil order is a *sine qua non* in a self-governing, self-respecting State. It is my purpose to deal with lawless occurrences which have taken place in various parts of China during the last two years; which are matters of record, and about which there is no doubt or exaggeration. It might be concluded from these occurrences that all foreigners in China have been in imminent peril. But, in point of fact, the vast majority of merchants and missionaries, whether in port cities or in the interior, have been undisturbed in their rights. Nevertheless, it is also clear from the facts that no one knows when mob violence will stop at his door.

Lord Charles Beresford told us when here, and has since written down, the revelations of incapacity and supineness made to him by the high officials of China. Though this supineness has

long been painfully apparent, yet no such official acknowledgment of it has ever before come to light. It shocks one to know that the Prince-President of the Tsung-li-Yamen, the Viceroys ruling Kiangsu, Anhui, Kiangsi, Hupei, Hunan, Fukien and Szechuan provinces and others, admit their inability to protect foreigners or foreign interests in China. Lord Beresford was led to the conclusion that "there is no real security for commerce throughout the whole of China."

The outrages have not been directed against any one class of foreigners. Arson and murderous assault have been indiscriminately perpetrated upon diplomatists, consuls, missionaries, scientists, customs officers and business men. Roman Catholic priests and convents, however, have been rather more often the victims of the malice of the people. In travelling in all parts of China many of these outrages on foreigners have been personally investigated by the writer.

At Shasi, in Hupei province, above Hankow, mobs sacked and burned the Imperial customs house and residence, the Japanese Consulate, a mercantile store-ship and the Swedish mission. The foreigners escaped in boats on the Yang-tse. The riot was, apparently, premeditated and carefully planned. On the same night, four hundred miles from Shasi, placards having called for the

expulsion of the "foreign dogs," and the officials doing nothing to prevent outrage, the missionaries escaped from the mobs which held both the roads, and drifted away in a rowboat.

Near Peking, the chief engineer of the Imperial Railway, an officer of the British Legation, and a major of the English army, while inspecting a portion of the new railway, were attacked by Chinese soldiers, badly bruised, and left in a bleeding condition. Soldiers also attacked Mr. Demston's house, and, killing one servant, looted the place. At Mentze, in Yunan, the French consulate was recently plundered, and the Imperial customs burned to the ground.

The province of Szechuan was, in 1899, for months in a state of anarchy, and the officials in a state of innocuous desuetude. The rebellion of 8,000 men, headed by Yu Man-tze, had for its express purpose the driving out of the foreign "dogs and goats." The brigands attempted to extirpate the Christians of the province. Father Fleury was captured by Yu Man-tze, and, during the eight months of his captivity, was carried from place to place, and wherever Christians were found Yu had them brought before Father Fleury and murdered at his feet. Such instances as the following have been the order of the day in Szechuan. At Shunching, the mission house was

torn to pieces, the mission buildings razed to the ground, the missionary hunted for his life. At Hopaochang, the mission was looted, the chapel burned, two priests captured, two servants killed, one Christian family plundered. At Hochow, the buildings of the mission were burned; at Kweifu the mission ruined. The city of Kiangpeh is across the river from the open port of Chungking. A new dispensary had been opened, and two Chinese medical students were temporarily in charge of it. The place was looted and one student was killed. "The powerlessness of the mandarins at such a crisis is really astonishing, and one is forced to ask if they are just as powerless as they appear to be." Lord Charles Beresford was told that Yu and his followers had burned four thousand houses and thirty chapels; that over 20,000 Catholics had been sent adrift, and property destroyed to the extent of $4,150,000. This amount is undoubtedly overstated, however.

An example of what such a state of affairs has meant to the individual may be seen in the case of Mr. Parsons, of the Church Missionary Society. He left Chungking to go back to his post at Paoning, with an escort of four soldiers. In crossing a river in a ferryboat, he saw a body of troops on the opposite bank. They raised the cry,

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A COMPANY OF CHINESE INFANTRY

"Kill the foreigner." When the boat reached the bank his escort fled, and the boat was overwhelmed with soldiers belonging to Yu Man-tze. Mr. Parsons was attacked with swords and knives, and, though he could swim but little, he threw himself into the river. Catching at a floating bamboo, he kept his head above water, and drifted with the stream, while the soldiers followed in a boat, prodding at him in the water. At length he got on board of a Chinese gunboat and was saved. But the officers and men of the gunboat showed no opposition to the rebels or their murderous assault, and did everything short of violence to keep him from getting on the boat.

Passing from Szechuan to Kuichow province, we must refer to the murder, on the public highway, of Mr. Fleming, of the China Inland Mission, and of the Chinese evangelist who was with him. "The evidence received from Kueiyang proves that the murder was deliberately planned by the gentry and officials," and yet the demand of the British Minister at Peking that the governor of the province be degraded, was flouted. At the city of Paoching-fu in Hunan, last September, a missionary called at the prefect's Yamen. A mob of between four and five thousand men assembled and demanded the foreigner. He escaped at the rear in a boat. But the mob,

in their attempt to get him, pulled down the first buildings of the Yamen's court. Penetrating to the inner court with lighted torches, they fired the great edifice of two hundred rooms, and plundered the chests in the treasury of $14,000.

In the north of Anhui, Honan and Kiangsu provinces, there has been a serious armed rebellion. The walled cities of Shuchou, Mengcheng, Meaoerchi and Kuyang were besieged and fell. Niu, the leader, butchered about two thousand men, women and children at the capture of Kuyang. The city gates of Hsuchou were "decorated with several hundred queues and scalps"—the Red Indian's style of civilization! It is believed that over 50,000 people lost their lives in this rebellion, which was in the Yang-tse basin, as was also the one in Szechuan. In Anhui province, Mr. Cook, manager of the Pochishan coal mines, had trying times. Two hundred natives tried to hang him, and, failing in that, to throw him down the shaft of the mine. After a desperate struggle he escaped.

The working of silver mines near Ningpo has been fraught with danger. The Fenghua magistrate decided to settle matters with the town of Sungao. The result was that his soldiers were disarmed and imprisoned by the townsmen, the official himself was nearly stripped of his clothing,

and his official chair was added to a bonfire. The foreigner in charge of the mine fled to the country. The course of the miner in China is a turbulent one.

The province of Shan-tung has been much disturbed during the year. Missions were burned, the houses of Christians pillaged, the Christians were harried, persecuted and murdered. Three Germans, officers and gentlemen, were murderously set upon by an unprovoked mob, and they saved themselves only after shooting down some of the rioters. Foreigners in the midst of this upheaval wrote: "The local officials are powerless to punish the offenders." "There is practically no guarantee for the safety of the lives and property of foreigners residing in the interior of China." This state of affairs resulted in German troops seizing and occupying a walled city or two, a hundred miles from the coast of Shan-tung. Their treatment of the Chinese was drastic but salutary, and, as a result, order is being restored.

Still another open rebellion—this one in southern China—has been quieted with difficulty. In Kuangsi province, about 7,000 men were in arms. The cities of Yunghsien and Peilin were "pillaged and dismantled," and many other places were laid low. The proclamation of one Chang is significant of the objective of this rebellion:

"I, Chang, obeying the orders of Heaven to gather all the braves and heroes together, with a special view to seek revenge for the people, to drive away the foreign devils and to protect China, have assembled over 300 philosophical scholars, about 3,000 military officers and more than 30,000 brave soldiers." And a whole province in South China was under their sway for several months.

Turning from southern China, I must refer to the region on the Yang-tse of which Tchang is the port city. Here rioting was mostly directed against the Catholic Christians. Chapels were burned, Christians robbed and their lands wrested from them. One priest, followed by 1,000 converts, travelled to Tchang for safety. The bandits had this legend on their banners: "Destroy the foreigner and advance the dynasty." They meant what they said, as the story of young, accomplished Father Victorian shows. This Belgian priest was located about 100 miles from Tchang. The bandits wrecked the mission, murdered the Christians, captured Victorian and hung him to a tree. "As this poor man hung from the tree to which he was tied, pieces were cut from his thighs and eaten by his tormentors. . . . Finally his body was cut open, from the chest to the bottom of the abdomen; he was disembowelled,

and the various organs were taken out and eaten by these semi-civilized people, who at the same time drank his blood. He was also mutilated in a way that cannot be described, and his head was cut off." This was penned by a person at Tchang who saw Victorian's body.

And, later on, comes the premeditated assault on the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society at Kienning, in Fukien province, near where the massacre occurred a few years ago. At Kienning the mob destroyed the church, the mission house, the dispensary, the leper asylum, looted the hospital, and beat the brains out of an aged Christian, throwing another Christian into a well. The officials gave Dr. Rigg and his associates no protection whatever, though the city had been placarded for several days to the effect that the foreigners were to be killed. Following the attack on the mission, bills were freely posted, in the name of the *literati*, calling on the people to "rise and kill every foreigner," and urging that the native Christians should be "hunted down like wild beasts or highway robbers, and rooted out until not one remains."

We return again to the consideration of the situation in North China. United States Minister Conger told me, a few months ago, that he was really apprehensive for the safety of Americans

in Shan-tung and Chi-li. Since that time the Righteous Harmony Fists have extended their organization, large numbers of soldiers and others have joined their ranks. The whole Manchu military force in northern China is said to be in sympathy with them. The Rev. Mr. Brooks has been murdered, hundreds of Christians have had their houses burned, while many have been killed in cold blood; portions of the Lu-Lan and the Tien Tsin-Peking railways have been torn up, and marines have been landed from the available ships of war. The avowed and applauded object of the Boxer organization is to drive out the "foreign devils."

I have written enough, though not all. What are some of the deductions? (1) The instances cited have occurred in twelve out of the eighteen provinces of China; it is therefore not a local condition. (2) These attacks have been made on all classes of foreigners. Foreigners were to be killed or driven out. (3) The Missionaries suffer most, because, according to treaty, missionaries only have the right to reside in the interior. (4) Of attacks on missionaries, two-thirds, or more, are directed against Roman Catholics.

The Treaty of Tien Tsin (article VIII.) says: "Persons teaching or professing it (the Christian

religion), therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities; nor shall any such peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the law, be persecuted or interfered with." Does it need more proof than has been adduced to show that this treaty protection is often without force? I know of no case of assault or pillage or murder where the Chinese authorities have lodged the claim that the foreigner thus maltreated had broken over his lawful rights. They confess negligence and attempt to make reparation, but that does not restore life. No missionary in China deserts his work for fear of outbreaks. Merchants do not look with favor on risks which are quadrupled and trade which is constantly disturbed. But the question which, we believe, deserves attention is this: What is to happen if civil order continues to become more chaste, and the incompetence of the Chinese Government is still more disgracefully shown? There are over one thousand missionaries in China. The American vested and business interests there are also great. Should there not be a clear national policy as to what America will, or will not do to meet the catastrophe into which China is fast drifting? This is a question not of partition, but of civil and treaty rights. As long as China

is treated as a "going concern," the line of operations is easily seen; but what is to happen when the government is recognized as a gone concern? That day seems to be approaching.

ROBERT E. LEWIS.

SHANGHAI, CHINA.

THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS.

THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS.

In order to appreciate the commotion in eastern Asia, which is in various ways agitating the whole world, it is essential to bear in mind that it is the product of two predominant factors, to which all collateral agencies are subordinate and accidental. It is no new problem which has been suddenly sprung upon the world, but only the *dénouement* of one which has been anticipated for fifty years and more. Nor is there any lack of prophetic record buried in government archives, in old periodicals and in shelved books. If there has been a slackening of categorical forecasts in the last few decades, it is simply because the voice grows weary of crying in the wilderness.

The two generative factors in the Far Eastern development to which we refer are, of course, Russia and China, which possess between them, in an altogether peculiar degree, the procreative properties which evolve great

events. Each is, in many essential respects, the complement of the other. In bulk they are approximately well matched; in territorial contiguity they are joined by 3,000 miles of common frontier. These primary physical conditions admit of the freest interaction of their correlative forces. Russia possesses the vigor of youth, and is constantly and preternaturally aggressive. China is decadent, paralyzed and fatalistically passive. These are ominous contrasts, but they by no means exhaust the catalogue. China is a rich possession. Russia is comparatively poor; her civilization is primitive; she has not reached her full stature, and she is confident in her own power to dominate and appropriate the resources of her gigantic but inorganic neighbor. Given the juxtaposition of two such human agglomerations, might it not be said that Nature herself was working for their fusion? The temptation to intermingle is, in fact, irresistible. As the barbarians looked down on degenerate Rome, so do the modern Goths regard with wistful eye and watering mouth the defenseless sheepfolds of the Chinese. China lies like a vast terrestrial depression with a body of water pent up alongside of it; and therein lies the essence of the Far Eastern question.

No doubt the active stage of this chronic

question which has recently startled the world was hurried on by the aggressive proceedings of third parties. Japan it was who first disturbed the equilibrium, and brought on an acute phase of the malady. The subsequent action of Germany, renewing the disturbance before it had had time to subside, created a fresh eruption. Both these inroads, lawless and unprovoked as they must be considered, were made because of the helplessness of China, and whatever plea of political justification may be claimed for either of them hangs upon the hypothesis that they were only anticipations of the aggressive action of Russia. It was the calculated movements of that power and the known impotence of China that determined, and will continue to influence, the proceedings of the other Powers.

Before either Germany or Japan had been called into being as world Powers, the Far Eastern problem which occupied studious observers was substantially the same as it is to-day. The forecasts of two serious students of contemporary history published between forty and fifty years ago have recently been cited in the English press. The authors happened to be both British Consuls in China, Sir Rutherford Alcock and Mr. Taylor Meadows, men who were too far in advance of their own generation to

attract the notice they deserved. The two men had little in common, and they arrived at their one conclusion independently and by somewhat different roads.

Their prognosis was singularly confirmed by another equally good authority, also in advance of his time. This was the late Edward Cunningham,* head of the leading American firm in China, a gentleman distinguished for the catholicity of his views, no less in the conduct of ordinary business than in matters of interest to the community of which he formed a part. It is deserving of mention that it was Mr. Cunningham, in his capacity of chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, who organized and raised the funds for those journeys of scientific exploration undertaken by Baron F. von Richthofen in 1870, which have shed so much light on the material condition of the Chinese Empire. For these explorations have supplied the data for all geological, mineralogical and strategic speculations about China on which the discussions of the present day are founded. It must be conceded that the man who so clearly grasped the prospective value of such discoveries

* Mr. Cunningham met his death, at the hands of an Italian poacher, within his own grounds, near Milton, Mass., in 1889.

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VICTORIA ROAD, EUROPEAN QUARTER, TIEN-TSIN

as to be willing to pay for them "cash in advance" was no mean authority on the political evolution of the section of the world with which he was personally acquainted. What Mr. Cunningham thought of the relations between Russia and China in 1869 was lucidly set forth in a memorial which he presented to the United States representative, on the subject of a revision of the Chinese treaty which was then under consideration.

"As for a policy of 'generosity' as affecting the destinies of the Empire in the interests of the people, one smiles either with contempt at the credulity, or admiration at the audacity, of such an exponent of their principles. These views of the progressive tendency of the Chinese rulers of to-day are, of course, asserted in the interest of these rulers, as, if foreign nations could be brought to believe them, they would leave the Chinese to develop in their own way. There being in truth no will, there would be no way; but still, as regards the rulers alone, they would be relieved from pressure and so gain their immediate object.

"Whether they would gain ultimately depends upon the disposition of Russia. If China stood isolated in the world, the forbearance of all might be an advantage. Shouldered as she is by so powerful and aggressive a neighbor, it may be that the only effective protection for the present dynasty is in the intimacy with the other Western Powers.

"If it can be made to appear that the Russians have the will and the power to occupy China, it will be granted that there is at least a strong likelihood of that great event coming to pass. As to the will there is no proof, of course. One can judge by analogy. They have extended themselves

in Asia wherever they have had an opportunity, and they have recently conquered and annexed the Kingdom of Bokhara at great cost, completing the extension of their dominions in that quarter to the borders of British India, a boundary which they must accept as final in that direction. The difficulties in that enterprise were greater, and the advantages not to be mentioned, as compared to those to be incurred or gained in the acquisition of China. In the actual direction of this Empire they have taken and occupied with forts within a few years the great tract of country lying between the Amur and the present frontier, without any advantage in the region itself to attract them, and apparently only for the object of reaching nearer to China proper. They obtained a valuable port upon the coast, but that they could have had without the costly annexation of so great a territory.

"They have more young men learning the Chinese language, in one way or another, than all the other Westerns together, and they push their traders into the country with a pertinacity quite uncalled for by the exigencies of their trade.

"Finally, there lies before them a prize unparalleled in the history of the world. A nation of, at least, 200,000,000 of industrious, energetic and ingenious people, ripe for conquest, and capable, when conquered, of giving inexhaustible supplies of excellent soldiers and sailors; a nation poor, indeed, in resources at present, but capable of a miraculous resurrection under an energetic rule. A country full of natural wealth, with an immense area of fertile soil already under cultivation; with a system of navigable rivers unsurpassed in the world; a coast abounding in fine harbors, and commanding this side of the Pacific; a dominion reaching to the tropics, and including in its wide embrace every climate and almost every valuable production of the earth.

"It is impossible that, with their antecedents, their settled policy for centuries, the Russians should fail in desire

for such a prize as this. As for the power, unless succored by other Western nations, the country would lie defenseless before the assault of 50,000 men led by a general skilled in modern war. Such succor, if it came at all, would probably come too late. By occupying the western and northwestern provinces under one pretext or another, and with the declaration that it was provisional and temporary, they could finally reach the coast and have possession of the main strategical points, with 200,000 or 300,000 Chinese soldiers under arms and in effective condition before any European Power would have concluded to intervene. Their conclusions then would be uninteresting.

"In view of this greatest of hazards, it would seem to be the natural policy of the government to cultivate as close relations with other Western people as possible; to introduce them into the country; to accept their inventions and improvements; to obtain foreign arms and equipments; to train an army to the European standard of efficiency and under European officers. These are the steps which would be pressed on the Chinese authorities by their well-wishers, and sedulously followed up, if they wish them to maintain even their present position.

"It may be, however, that with great interests of humanity, foreign representatives may not have the prosperity of the present dynasty and government really at heart. Of this I do not pretend to judge. They may feel that nothing will elevate the Chinese people and place the country fairly in the path of progress and reform but the government of a Western power. It does, indeed, seem impossible that any real good can come from the selfish and apathetic race of rulers that now misgovern the country, and in the interests of the millions who suffer from their incapacity or perversity, foreign powers are perhaps bound to withhold advice or suggestion that may delay the hour of deliverance. If such is the case, no course seems so wise as to leave them as much as possible to such seclusion as they can keep, and to

their present narrow policy. With no Western influence but Russia in the interior, and no advisers but their antiquated maxims, they will drop the easier prey into the lap of their vigorous neighbors—a friend or enemy, as he chose to take the part, and as circumstances recommend.

"Whether Russia will do good or evil to the world at large when she has an army of 2,000,000 on the Pacific, and a revenue to match, is a further point for consideration, but much beyond my province to discuss. I only express my conviction that such a course of things is not only possible but likely, if the Chinese inclination to resist progress and to hold Western nations at arms' length is allowed to control events."

And now within thirty years we see the almost literal fulfilment of this prediction.

A short reference to the occasion of Mr. Cunningham's memorial will help to elucidate the whole Chinese question as it stood then and as it stands now. The Treaties of Tien Tsin, concluded in 1858, contained a proviso that their terms might be revised in the Tariff and Commercial Articles, at the instance of either party, at the end of ten years. The British Treaty, being the first in importance, was in process of revision, for which great preparations were made during 1867 and 1868. These preparations took, partly, the form of memorials from the various mercantile bodies dotted along the coast and rivers of China. But the terms of the Chinese Treaties with all the Western Powers were such

as to render it virtually impossible to revise one without revising all, because of the "most favored nation" clause, which entitled each Power to claim whatever might be granted to any other. The obvious effect of this proviso was to vest the power of veto in the smallest state that had made a treaty with China. Consequently, the British negotiation necessarily assumed a cosmopolitan character, the representatives of other Powers being kept informed, point by point, as progress was made, as well as being frequently consulted in advance. Hence, there was nothing out of the way in an individual American merchant's communicating his views to his own Minister for the use of the British Negotiator, and it came about quite naturally that Mr. Cunningham's Memorial formed part of the voluminous record of the negotiations archived in the State Department and in the Foreign Office.

The revision of the treaties at that time hinged upon one fundamental question, which had been seriously pondered by the British Government, with the result that a mature decision had been arrived at respecting it. The true bearing of that question is more clearly perceptible now than it was thirty years ago—for it has not really altered, but remains essentially the

same question. It was simply whether pressure should be applied to the Chinese Government, either to secure fulfilment of existing treaties or to induce reasonable concessions in the revision of them. Up to that time nothing had ever been obtained from China without pressure, and the general consensus of opinion was that nothing ever would be obtained without it, not even redress for outrages and injuries. Pressure had always succeeded; persuasion never. Lord Elgin had left it on record that the Chinese yield nothing to reason, everything to fear; and the drama which has been played in Peking during the year 1898 has afforded daily accumulating proof of the truth of that famous dictum.

It was morally certain, therefore, that no revision of treaty—except in a retrograde sense—would be effected by mere argument. It was with this knowledge that the British Government entered on the revision campaign. The Chinese, on their part, also fully realized the conditions under which they entered on diplomatic negotiations which they could not openly decline, and, a very unusual thing for them, they made preparations for it, whether on their own initiative or on the prompting of their foreign advisers may remain an open question, though

the form and manner of the defensive preparation might be safely assigned to a foreign origin. But, however that may be, at an early stage of the revision proceedings the Chinese Government resolved to send an envoy to Europe and the United States for the purpose of persuading the treaty Powers that the case was precisely the reverse of that stated by Lord Elgin. The envoy was, in fact, to inform the governments of the West that the Chinese would yield nothing to fear, but everything to reason! The agent appointed, or, rather, the spokesman of the two Chinese envoys who formed the mission, was the Hon. Anson Burlingame, at that time Minister of the United States to China. He sailed from China to San Francisco in 1868, and thence proceeded to Washington. He was completely successful, and induced the United States Government to make a kind of convention with him which practically consisted of two provisions; one, that the United States would under no circumstances apply pressure to China; the other, that China would employ Americans to build their railways. Mr. Burlingame proceeded next to London, and converted Lord Clarendon to the same passive policy toward China, obtaining from him a similar self-denying declaration to

that which had been given by the Secretary of State in Washington.

The effect of these gratuitous declarations on the negotiations in Peking was marked and instantaneous. The hope of any liberal extension of the treaties was extinguished. The British Minister told his government so in plainer terms than are altogether usual between servant and master. "If it was difficult," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, "to negotiate for large concessions before the assurance authoritatively given by your lordship's communication to Mr. Burlingame, . . . it is now out of the question to hope for more than has already been conceded. . . . Strong in the assurance of two of the great treaty Powers, . . . it is quite certain that no further progress can be made at present." In other words, "you have stultified your agent, frustrated his efforts, and given away the interests of the country." The position was at last recognized by Lord Clarendon himself, who, in the autumn of 1869, wished to abandon the negotiations over which two years' labor had been expended, in the hope that, when the time came for other Powers to revise their treaties, Great Britain might retain an "open door" to profit by their negotiations.

The point of all this is that it is the policy dic-

tated by Burlingame* and accepted blindly by the cabinets of Washington and of London, which has been followed by the two countries for the last thirty years. And it is this particular policy which has brought China to the verge of anarchy and disruption. For it was a public renunciation of influence over the government. On the most favorable view that could be taken of it, it was a negative, sterile policy, devoid of authority, a law without a sanction. It was ruinous to China, because the withdrawal of the Powers who had an interest in the preservation of that country left her open to the designs of those Powers whose interests, or at least desires, lay in a contrary direction. While England has been fettered by her self-imposed total abstinence dogma, the destroyers of China have been free to revel in the prosecution of their schemes. Which is the actual position to-day.

The recovery of British influence is no child's play, for it means a reversal of the policy of a whole generation of statesmen. It is like gathering up water that has been spilt on the ground. This gives us, perhaps, the best key to the attitude of Her Majesty's government during the

* It was Mr. Burlingame's plea for a policy of "generosity" that Mr. Cunningham alluded to in the opening sentence of the extract from his Memorial above cited.

present year. It was in the position of a steamer in a fog, called on suddenly to reverse the engines, and running on to one obstacle while hurriedly avoiding another. Lord Salisbury himself pleaded this excuse at the Union Club, that his government had been taken aback by the rapid progress of events, and that it was no easy task for them at a moment's notice to discard the policy of Cobden, which had been the law of the land for half a century. There was something pathetic in the naïve confession that the dead hand of Cobden was still paralyzing the government of Great Britain, condemning it to conduct the business of the country on pious theories, which forbade it from taking any account of accomplished facts, and from adapting its course of action to the new developments of the world's life.

Of course, a wider sense is here given to the convenient term "Cobdenism," than the mere abolition of custom houses. The Cobdenism with which Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour and their supporters are so deeply infected extends over the whole field of national economics, and it has a serious meaning for all democratic countries. The events which are transpiring in distant parts of the world are putting popular government on its trial. England is in fact feeling

the strain of a new conflict, which will shortly be felt in a less, though constantly increasing, degree in the United States also. So long as the interests of a nation are kept within a ring-fence, no device of man could be more conducive to the happiness and prosperity of a community than government by the people. "What favor can we show you?" said Sir Robert Peel to the merchants of London. "Let us alone," was the city's manly response. The legislation of England during the present century has been a continuous demolition of the barriers which checked the free action of the people; and it is not to be doubted that, under the perfect liberty thus accorded to them, the national prosperity has made remarkable strides. Industrial and commercial progress in the United States has, of course, from the nature of the case, been vastly more rapid, and that in spite of sundry self-imposed restraints on trade from which the British people are free. The system that conduces so greatly to individual enterprise and wealth is no less conducive to the collective good of society at large. Cobdenism, if we may continue to use this convenient term, besides being faultless in theory, is also triumphant in practice, so long as no disturbing element intervenes.

Where the scheme fails is in the fact that, on

the great chess-board of the world's trade and politics, disturbing elements do and must intervene, in this case turning a domestic success into a foreign failure. Cosmic evolution itself has brought about conditions wholly unforeseen by Cobden, and still unrecognized by his disciples. Industrial and commercial competition have entered on a new phase. The isolated efforts of innumerable individuals are now opposed by compact forces marshalled by powerful governments. In their struggles with such combinations, traders and manufacturers who go a-warfare on their own charges must expect to be worsted. Adventurers, who enter the field with the whole machinery and resources of their national governments not only at their back, but in the van of their enterprises, possess advantages such as an organized army would possess against a host of volunteers. The full disclosure of the new species of international competition has been reserved for this present year, and the theatre of the discovery has been that great unexploited field of commerce, China. There we have seen, in a variety of aspects, the victory of action over inaction, and we have seen the superiority, in certain spheres of competition, of governments which lead their people, over people who lead their governments. While the

rulers of Russia, Germany, France and even Belgium have been heading national crusades of productive enterprise in China, the governments of Great Britain and the United States have held aloof, and allowed rights and claims to be established to their perpetual exclusion and detriment. The British Government has had nothing to oppose to these aggressive movements but Cobdenic maxims treated as if they were axioms of geometry, such as the "open door," "equality of opportunity," and so forth, which were never more than empty phrases, the survival of a state of things that had passed away. Ministers have again and again defended their inaction by pleading the novelty of the situation and the absence of precedents. The principle of non-interference with industry and commerce, and of leaving everything to individual initiative, no doubt fits like a glove the theory of popular government; and the principle of *laissez aller,* in relation to other nations, is one which lends itself easily to academic defense, while offering no offense to abstract morality. The only objection to these principles is that they do not harmonize with the facts of national life.

In this mercantile world in which we live everything has to be paid for, and government by the people for the people forms no exception

to the rule. Priceless as are its benefits, a price has still to be paid for them, and part of the price is incoherence, slowness of collective action, vacillation and ignorance in dealing with international affairs. The most prosperous countries are, naturally, those in which the citizens have no leisure for public questions which lie remote from their daily life, and who are only too content to resign their international interests to the governments of their choice. Hence, a breach of continuity in the management of affairs, the government waiting for the people and the people for the government. Thus vital national interests fall between two stools. This lapse of responsibility is easily traced in Great Britain, where the initiative, in former times exercised by government, has been step by step surrendered, as the tide of pure democracy has risen, so that now, when an emergency arises, there is no one ready or competent to deal with it. The state then is in the condition of an emigrant ship in a hurricane, left to the helpless devices of the passengers. The United States is in a somewhat similar predicament, with this difference, that, their interests being mostly at home, they have not as yet suffered visible injury for the neglect of their concerns abroad.

Observe now in what a different position such

countries as Russia and Germany stand, whose governments hold in leash the national forces, military, diplomatic and political, in readiness to strike at a moment's notice, with no popular voice or even national impulse to wait for. Republican France, even, enjoys a freedom of action scarcely inferior to her autocratic neighbor, for the people expect no consideration in foreign or colonial enterprises, which are consequently left to the discretion of the executive government and to the initiative of official adventurers. When, therefore, the Far Eastern question was opened by the Japanese war, these Powers promptly cleared for action, while England remained wrapt like a mummy in the cerements of a worn-out policy, unable to move hand or foot to safeguard her interests—actual or prospective. The fetish of non-interference in China had no chance against the energy of Powers who were inspired by a passion for aggression. Under the sway of this passion, China is being carved up like a sirloin of beef, as if there were no vitality in her. The ambition of Russia soars far above the mere military occupation of Manchuria or of the provinces of northern China. She makes straight for the brain centre of the Empire, paralyzing its functions. She is loosening the keystone of the arch, in order to find her account in the *débris*

of the structure. The process of disruption is in full action. In view of this, France, Germany and Japan are in haste to secure as large as possible a share of what they consider to be a crumbling building, before the northern Colossus engulfs the whole.

But none of these Powers has caused to consider what the disruption of a polity embracing 300,000,000 of Asiatics really means; for, even in the cynical and un-Christian epoch in which we live, only professed anarchists would be so anti-human as to lend a hand to accelerate such a calamity. In their greed for gain, however, the spectacle of a helpless nation and an effete government is too strong for moral restraint. We know something of what anarchy in China means, for we had experience of it some forty years ago, when hundreds of its cities were converted into cover for wild beasts, and tens of millions of lives were destroyed without cause. The commercial nations have the strongest interest in preventing the recurrence of such colossal devastation. Putting their motives on the very lowest and, therefore, the more lasting grounds, a depopulated country is of no use to the trader. On the other hand, China kept on her legs is a living mine of wealth to all those nations who are interested in the prosecution of honest trade.

The commercial nations, *par excellence,* are the Anglo-Teutonic, whose interest, in spite of an occasional freak of hot-blooded Kaisers, or the like, is not to break up old "China," but rather, if possible, to rivet the cracks in it. By the introduction of such improvements as railways, steamboats, mining and manufactories, by the infusion of the Western spirit as a new nervous force into the country, and of Western principles of action, the resources of China, in men and material, would be rendered capable of providing fertile employment for white men for centuries to come. This is the great undeveloped estate which the present generation of Anglo-Saxons have to leave to their ever-increasing offspring, an inheritance richer far than all the prairies and all the gold mines in the world, because crowned with a wealth of humanity of the most efficient quality, an enormous hive of industry only needing direction, and with capacities for consumption commensurate with their unrivalled powers of production. Had the British and American people been sufficiently alive to the value of this prize, when China was thrown into the crucible in 1894, they would have insisted on their governments safeguarding those precious interests, and not permitting the Chinese Empire to be sequestrated at the hands of the despotic and military states of

Europe. What has been done cannot be undone, but the rapid progress already made in disintegration furnishes an imperative reason for conserving what is left. The practical question is, how is this to be done?

China is in the condition of an invalid whose life can only be saved by transfusion of healthy blood. The system has to be cautiously and carefully revived, not by violence, but by tact and patience. A new order has to be evolved out of the present chaos, under which the prosperity of the nation may advance *pari passu* with the legitimate interests of the foreign peoples who seek their fortune in the country. The desideratum cannot be more intelligibly indicated than by saying that it is foreign capital and foreign enterprise that are needed to preserve and to fertilize this valuable field of commerce. China wants her communications to be opened up, her industries organized, her hidden wealth brought to the surface, her natural products utilized. And as, according to the traditional order of procedure of the English-speaking races, as well as of their Teutonic and Scandinavian kinsmen, the enterprise of the people precedes and draws after it the protection of their governments, it follows that the infiltration of capital and skilled direction into China is the proper lever by which the govern-



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VIEW FROM THE TARTAR CITY WALL, PEKING

ments of Great Britain and the United States may be moved to interest themselves actively in the welfare of that country. Only by such a policy can the predatory Powers be kept from ravaging the country and precipitating anarchy and red ruin among the largest population on the face of the earth. Every line of railway, therefore, every steam factory, every hole dug in the ground in the interior of the Chinese continent, under either British or American auspices, is a solid gain to the whole commercial world. It is "effective occupation" of the genuine kind, the only kind of occupation that will save the territory from being staked off into exclusive areas, that will keep the door open for the free intercourse of all nations. Consequently, the concession of a railway between Canton and Hankow to an American syndicate is an event of happiest augury, just as every step taken toward connecting western China with British India contributes to the establishment of free intercourse for all. Such concrete material interests lie at the root of national policy, and constitute the surest means of compelling the attention of our governments to the course of events in China. From whichever side we regard them, these are conservative as well as progressive measures; like mercy, twice blest, benefiting the people of China by opening out fruitful channels

for their labor, while at the same time affording productive fields for the creative energy of the West.

Far Eastern affairs have never loomed large before the people of the United States, for the simple reason that their business connections there were by comparison infinitesimal and practically stagnant. A sympathetic interest in Japan was, indeed, aroused on the opening of the Island Empire through the instrumentality of an American naval squadron and a capable diplomatist, and a fair amount of genuine business has sprung up between the two countries. But still the æsthetic has prevailed over the commercial relation with Japan, while in China American diplomacy has been mainly occupied in damming back the flood of Chinese immigrants which was supposed to be threatening the interests of white labor. But a vast change has come over the scene during the last six months, and never was it made clearer that a nation's course is marked out for it by circumstances often unforeseen, than in the revolution which the events of this year have made in some of the fundamental dogmas of American policy. May we not say, "There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will," when we see the United States, by the necessary sequence of her own acts, forced into the position

of an oceanic and an Asiatic Power? The course marked out for her by philosophical students of the map of the world, to which she seemed indifferent if not coldly averse, has been suddenly forced on her by the inexorable logic of events of her own making. Henceforth, her status as mistress of the Philippines and of the Sandwich Islands imposes on her the necessity of taking a hand in the game that is to be played in the western Pacific. Fortunate that the question was not delayed until the gates of China were closed and the resources of that Empire parcelled out among the anti-commercial nations! The Pacific Ocean acquired a new significance for the United States when the Spanish war broke out and while the battleship "Oregon" was rounding Cape Horn. That was an object lesson which came home to the least imaginative. It doomed the old ocean thoroughfare. It brought the Isthmian Canal within the range of practical politics, it gave a new turn to American speculation, widened the national outlook—in a word, it made the United States a world power *in posse*. Fortunate, we say, that all this happened before China had been disposed of (for without China the Philippines have no meaning), since it confers on the United States the dignity of a great mission as well as the opportunity for great national enlarge-

ment. China is a world necessity, and civilization cannot afford that she should become a mere carcass round which the vultures of the world shall gather.

ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN.

THE GREAT SIBERIAN RAILWAY AN INFLUENCE IN THE CHINESE QUESTION.

THE GREAT SIBERIAN RAILWAY AN INFLUENCE IN THE CHINESE QUESTION.

THE immense and sparsley populated country of Siberia was for a long time merely an accidental adjunct of the Russian Empire. Its sole importance to the latter lay in the fact that it supplied valuable furs and precious metals. In spite of its enormous extent, its fertility and its various natural resources, it attracted very few Russians who possessed land in their own country. The population consequently increased but slowly.

The first emigrants to Siberia were men who were at variance with the conditions of life in their native country, and were obliged to leave it either of their own free will, or otherwise. To the majority of Russians, Siberia remained an inhospitable land, and its very name called up no other thought than that of cold, exile and dreary drudgery. Time, however, slowly but surely

effected an improvement in the relations between Siberia and the mother country. On the one hand, the increasing population of Russia in Europe required more room, and this was to be found in the uninhabited parts of Siberia. On the other hand, the propagation of more exact information about its natural wealth and great fertility soon modified public opinion, and what had seemed but a land of exile began to exercise the allurements of a land of promise.

At that time the community of interests between Russia proper and its colony became daily more distinctly felt, and Siberia began to be of more vital importance to the former. Side by side with this slow economical evolution, a radical change took place, in the middle of this century, in the views of the governing bodies concerning Russia's political interests in Siberia. Simultaneously with the annexation of the Amur, Primorsk and Usuri territories, and the opening of Japan to foreigners, Russia firmly established herself on the shores of the Pacific and took steps to consolidate her power there. The time had now come when the government had to face the main obstacles which prevented closer intercourse between the two countries, retarded the solution of Russia's political problems in Asia and stood in the way of the normal development of the

region. These obstacles were time, distance and the vast extent of Siberia.

The only way to overcome these obstacles was by the construction of a railway throughout the whole extent of Siberia. This idea was first mooted about 1850, but the Russian Government for a long time hesitated to undertake the execution of this project, through apprehension of the immense expense it would entail. However, the present Minister of Finance, M. Witte, had the requisite faith in Russian financial resources. Being appointed Minister of Ways and Communications at the beginning of 1892, he rapidly conducted surveys of the railway line; and then, becoming Minister of Finance at the end of the same year, he insisted on the immediate construction of the great Siberian Railway.

According to the original plan, the direction of the Siberian Railway was to be as follows:

	Kilos.
From Chelyabinsk to Omsk, West Siberian Railway	1,415
From Omsk to Irkutsk Central Siberian Railway...	1,828
From Irkutsk to Missoyaga, Baikal Railway.....	318
From Missoyaga to Stretensk, Transbaikal Railway.	1,076
From Stretensk to Khabarovka, Amur Railway.....	2,132
From Khabarovka to Vladivostok, Usuri Railway...	764

Some time later, two very important changes were made in this original scheme.

In consequence of the great technical difficulties presented by the Baikal line, and in order to accelerate the construction of a continuous railway through Siberia, it was decided to make a straight line from Irkutsk to Lake Baikal. The train was to cross the lake on special ice-breakers, similar to those in use between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan in America. In consequence of even greater difficulties presented by the Amur line, permission to construct and exploit a railway in Manchuria, connecting the Baikal line with Vladivostok, was obtained by the Russo-Chinese Bank from the Chinese Government. Thus the estimated length of the Siberian Railway was reduced by about 550 kilometres. In March, 1898, the Chinese Government permitted the construction of a branch to Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, and in this way the Siberian Railway acquired two outlets to the Pacific, of which one is free from ice all the year round.

Though the project of constructing the Amur Railway was now left in abeyance, yet the junction of Vladivostok with Khabarovka was effected, and thus Russia will soon have both an uninterrupted railway route through Manchuria and a combined railway and waterway in the direction of Irkutsk, Stretensk, Shilka, Amur, Khabarovka, Vladivostok. The construction of

the railway is very rapidly advancing, and the West Siberian, Central Siberian and Usuri lines actually are completed and opened for traffic. On the other portions, work is being carried on very energetically.

Let us now glance at this country, of which so little is known, and consider the present and prospective results of the construction of the railway. Siberia occupies 5,000,000 English square miles in the northern part of Asia. Its natural features are very varied. The western and northern parts of this enormous country consist of a level plain: in the north, the lifeless swamps (tundra) merge into a large tract of virgin forest. Further south, this is succeeded by rich steppes, which resemble the pampas, and extend to the mountains which occupy the southern and eastern part of Siberia.

The polar tundra zone occupies all the space north of the sixty-fourth degree of latitude. It is a swampy plain covered with moss and bush and frozen during the greater part of the year. Its soil never thaws to a greater depth than one foot, and consists of alternate layers of frozen earth or pure ice. Anything approaching civilized life is out of the question in this desolate land. Its sole inhabitants are a few nomadic tribes, who eke out a living by fishing, hunting and the breeding of reindeer.

The region between the fifty-seventh and the sixty-fourth degrees is covered with thick virgin forest, consisting of ancient cedars, larches, pines and other species of firs. Further south we find, in addition to these, birch, poplar, aspen and even linden trees; a great quantity of berry-bearing and other bushes increase the variety of plants, and hops and other climbers winding round the trees remind one of the virgin forests of America. In this vast region, with its boundless forest wealth, habitable spots are chiefly found on the banks of the different rivers.

To the south of this forest tract, we find a cultivated belt of land, very spacious in the west and much resembling a steppe. It extends as far as the mountains which stretch along the south of Siberia. The steppes of Western Siberia have the appearance of plains, covered with luxurious vegetation and birch groves. The soil is rich and fertile, and tends to promote the development of agriculture and settled life. In these steppes, there are large water basins like Lake Chany, surrounded by smaller lakes.

The Siberian mountains extend along the southern border of Siberia and then occupy its whole eastern part. They are remarkable for their beautiful views. Many picturesque spots in the Altai Mountains and Semiretchensk might

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A PANORAMA OF VLADIVOSTOK

be compared with those of Switzerland, and the Irtish flowing through the mountains resembles the Rhine.

Siberia extends from the Arctic Circle right away to the steppes of Central Asia, and therefore presents many varieties of climate. There are the perpetual frost of the lifeless tundra deserts, the tropical heat of Central Asia, the genial climate of the favored spots at the foot of the Altai Mountains, the balmy air in the oases of the Chui Valley and Lake Issik-Kul and the striking southern vegetation of the banks of Amur. Owing to those climatic variations, we meet with the most startling changes in natural features, and an amazing variety of flora and fauna.

Siberia possesses four great river basins, which are equal to those of the largest American rivers. Three of them—Obi, Yenisei and Lena, with their numerous tributaries—greatly facilitate the trade of the interior, and the fourth river, the Amur, facilitates intercourse between Central Siberia and the Pacific.

The population of Siberia consists of very various elements. After the bloody and rapid conquest of Siberia, it became for some time an El Dorado for hunters and gold diggers. Like the Spaniards in America, these were attracted by the thirst for gain, and they treated the natives with the most

barbarous cruelty and plundered in the most irrational manner the natural treasures of the country. Some time later these rough and ready pioneers were succeeded by exiles. These were but few in number at first, but latterly there were as many as 18,000 to 20,000 yearly. The introduction of this element was of sinister import for Siberia. It was forced to accept criminals, who had been driven forth from their own country and who, hardened in their wickedness, could not but have a contaminating influence on the people they came among. Fortunately for Siberia, at the same time with this artificial colonization, a natural colonization was advancing, for men who had been unfortunate in their native land were attracted by the free life of Siberia and made their way thither in small but steady numbers. From these men, who had proved themselves enterprising and of great physical and mental vigor, the present population of Siberia has been evolved. It embodies all the best characteristics of the daring adventurers and *conquistadores* who first subdued it; of the exiles and emigrants, who went there in such numbers, and of the Cossacks and peasantry, whom the government induced to settle there by the offer of large subsidies, hoping thereby to promote the development of agriculture. The unaided struggle with stern Nature called all their

hardier qualities into play. The result is a vigorous, enterprising type, not unlike that which we meet with in the United States, Canada and Australia.

The Russian population of Siberia moved farther and farther eastward from the Ural Mountains through the southern part of Siberia; at present it occupies a broad, unbroken belt of land, which narrows down toward Lake Baikal. Small branches are found on the banks of the chief rivers, the Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena and the Usuri, and extend from the basin of the last to the shores of the Bay of Peter the Great. Besides this, little Russian communities are scattered about in different places.

The indigenous Mongol, Finnish and Tartar tribes of Siberia, which occupy immense tracts, are much smaller in number than the Russian population, whom they surround on all sides. Immediately beyond the Ural and north of the region entirely occupied by Russians, there lives the tribe of Voguls. Further north and northeast we find Siberian Tartars, Ostyaks, Samoyedes, Tunguses, Yakuts, Yukahirs, Koryaks, Tchuktchis, Kamchadales and Guiliaks. With the exception of the Tartars, who are partly settled, these are all nomadic tribes, and are engaged in hunting, fishing and cattle raising. In the extreme

north, reindeer breeding is carried on. South of the region occupied by Russians, there are settled Siberian Tartars, Kirghizes, Altayans, Kalmuks, Soyots and Buriats, who live only by cattle breeding and agriculture. Some of these elements of the Siberian population such as Tchuktchis, Guiliaks, Kamchadales, who are not amenable to the influences of civilization, are very scant in number, and will most likely die out altogether; others, such as Kirghizes and Buriats, on the contrary, are important ethnographical unities, and give promise of increased vitality.

The mineral wealth of Siberia, particularly in its eastern part, is fabulous; its extent is far from being finally determined, but it is certain that its treasures are almost inexhaustible. The area of its auriferous regions is much larger than that of the celebrated gold mines of California, Australia and Africa taken together. Beginning from the Alatau Mountains, of which both slopes are very rich in gold, this auriferous region extends eastward along the northern slope of the Saiansk Mountains in an almost continuous broad strip. Then it continues across both slopes of the Stanovoi and Yablonoi Mountains right away to the extreme east of Siberia. The extensive gold deposits of the Yenisei, Olekma, Vitim, and many other river systems, constitute, as it were, an

immense addition to the chief gold area. Up to the present, gold has almost exclusively been obtained from sand. Mining of gold ores is carried on in the Yenisei, Altai and Transbaikal district, but only to a very small extent, owing to the difficulty of working and the lack of mechanical appliances.

In many parts there are lodes of copper, silver and lead. Those found on the branches of the Saiansk and Alatau Mountains, in the district of Nertchinsk and the Kirgiz steppe are particularly remarkable. The quantity of metal contained in the ores varies greatly. Silver, lead and copper mining reached a high point of development last century, but within the past twenty-five years this industry has begun to fall off, chiefly owing to the rise in the price of labor.

Iron and coal exist in great quantities throughout the whole extent of Siberia, from the borders of the Government of Orenburg to the mouth of the Lena, to Kamtchatka, the Island of Sagalien and the frontier of Korea. At the present time, coal is worked only in the Kuznetsk basin, on the Island of Sagalien and in the Kirgiz steppes. It is also proposed to exploit the coal beds recently discovered in the southern part of the Primorsk province. These have been surveyed and found to be very rich, and to contain some quantity of

anthracite. Contiguous veins of coal and iron were found in some places, foundries were formed, but these have been in anything but a flourishing condition until quite lately, owing to the small demand for their output and their remoteness from the markets.

In western Siberia, common salt is extracted from the self-depositing lakes, which occur in considerable numbers in the southern portion of the steppe region lying between the forty-seventh and fifty-fifth degrees of north latitude, and the sixty-third and seventy-third degrees of east longitude (from Paris), which was once the bottom of a sea basin. In the northern portion of this salt basin, which embraces the Barabinsk and Kouloundinsk steppes, the salt lakes always contain a greater or less amount of other salts besides common salt. There are many lakes which contain rich layers of glauber salt only. In eastern Siberia there are very rich beds of rock salt, but the best salt springs and layers are found in thinly inhabited districts, so that transport to the markets is very expensive, owing to the want of proper means of communication.

Besides all this mineral wealth, tin, mercury and sulphur are found in the Transbaikal territory; naphtha on the Sagalien Island and many kinds of precious stones, such as lapis-lazuli,

topaz, beryl, aqua-marina, etc., in the Transbaikal territory.

In the basin of the Yenisei, large deposits of graphite are found. From experiments made in America this seems to excel the Ceylon variety in purity.

Siberia has long been famous for its fur-bearing animals and the teeming wealth of its rivers and lakes. After agriculture and cattle breeding, fishing and hunting are the chief pursuits of the inhabitants. The shooting and trapping of squirrels is at present the main object of the chase. In the northern part of eastern Siberia, where the slaughter of fur-bearing animals has not been quite so wholesale as in western Siberia, more valuable fur-bearing animals, such as the marten, ermine, sable, fox and arctic fox, are caught. Beavers, which formerly existed in Kamtchatka, are now very rare, but the fur industries in the waters washing the Russian shores of the Pacific are much more important at present. Among the most important is the seal industry, which is specially developed on the Commandorskie and Pribyloff Islands, the former belonging to Russia, the latter to America. From 1871 to 1891, 730,539 seal skins came into the market from Russian territory alone. Besides seals, the northern and eastern

waters of Russia are very rich in sea calves, whales, sea lions and other marine animals.

The supply of fish in Siberia, and particularly in the rivers falling into the Pacific and Northern Oceans, is almost inexhaustible. The Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan abound in fish. The more valuable species of fish, kinds such as sturgeon and salmon, are so plentiful that while making their periodical progress from the seas to the rivers, they force each other on to the bank whenever the stream happens to be shallow. Capital is so scarce, means of communication so scant, and the natives know so little of fish curing, that only so much fish has been consumed hitherto as was required locally, the remainder being sent to Japan by Japanese traders.

Notwithstanding the immense wealth of Siberia, manufacturing industry and trade have not been able to develop themselves to a corresponding extent, owing to the thinness of the population and the absence of cheap and suitable means of communication. Consequently, though there have been repeated attempts on the part of the government and private individuals to establish industry on a large scale in Siberia, manufactories and works have been started there only with the greatest difficulty, and only such have succeeded as served to meet the modest

wants of a small local population or produced an article of such value that it could bear the cost of carriage to a great distance.

Such was the general condition of the country at the time when the construction of the great Siberian Railway heralded the dawn of a new era.

Though the line will not be finished till 1902, some instances have already come to light which prove what a great civilizing effect it will have in future. Among others we may note the rapid increase in the population. As we have already mentioned, the Russian Government long ago took various measures to attract pure Russian elements to Siberia. At present the Russian Government deems it very necessary to consolidate Russian national feeling there in view of a possible invasion of the region by the yellow race in the near future. The government has, therefore, taken this matter under its direct control, propagating exact information about Siberia, publishing special maps on a large scale, preparing and adapting sections of land for the settlement of immigrants by the help of local government agents. Such places as still remain uninhabited, owing to their wild character, are carefully explored. There is yet but little land available for colonization, and which could be

granted to newcomers without encroaching on the reserves of the old inhabitants, whether Russian or indigenous; and the greater part of these lands is already occupied.

Therefore, the government has now permitted the occupation of tracts less suitable for culture, which have hitherto been waste land, as, for instance, the well-known Barabinsk steppe, which suffers from a lack of good water and is infested with insects that torment the inhabitants. Further, with a view to extending and enlarging the area for the reception of immigrants, forests are being cut down, drainage systems planned and wells sunk for the purpose of obtaining good water. In order to ensure the future prosperity of the immigrants, the government is taking measures of every description to preserve the forests and natural riches in those parts intended for settlements. It furnishes material assistance and provides medical aid for immigrants who are usually of the poorer classes, and it has set aside a special fund for their benefit. In this way, regions which till quite lately were endless steppes, such as we find in western Siberia, or dark, impassable forests, as in eastern Siberia, even now, when the railway is far from being completed, already show a great animation. In many places along the line settlements with a

population of 8,000 or 9,000 have already sprung up, such as the settlement of Novonikolaevsk, near the bridge across the Obi, the station of Taiga at the beginning of the Tomsk branch, and the stations of Niman and Krasnaya-rietchka on the Usuri line. The following table shows the annual number of immigrants:

In	Men.	In	Men.
1887	25,137	1894	72,224
1888	35,848	1895	120,000
1889	40,195	1896	201,622
1890	48,776	1897	84,978
1891	87,432	1898	175,000
1892	92,146		
1893	64,321	Total	1,047,679

The Siberian Railway has brought into the country not only a new population, but new institutions and new culture. It was difficult for the new arrivals from Russia to adjust themselves to the legal forms which already existed. This fact prompted the government to extend to Siberia the statutes of the Emperor Alexander II., relating to juries and the appointment of justices of the peace. The great importance of this reform can only be realized by Siberians, who, thanks to it, will really obtain speedy and equitable and clement justice, but who were previously tried in courts of an administrative char-

acter. In a short time this reform was followed by the long-wished-for abolition of transportation of criminals.

Simultaneously with the increase of population in the districts through which the Siberian Railway passes, and in proportion as it was opened to traffic, all kinds of industries, which already existed there, began to develop. It now seemed possible to export goods to the Russian and foreign markets, which could not be sent there under the former conditions of transport. The greatest improvement hitherto has been apparent in agriculture, which, as already stated, constitutes almost the sole occupation of the civilized inhabitants. Thanks to the railway, Siberian corn has found its way to foreign markets. Indeed, since the opening of the West Siberian line, the railway authorities have sometimes been unable to send off all the consignments of corn in proper time. These were often stored in large quantities along the line. In 1898 there were 6,500 wagon loads of corn stored in this way; 240 wagons were added daily, and the railway could only send off 120 wagons. The export to Russia of tallow, skins, wool and frozen meat has increased enormously of late years. This is one result of the development of cattle breeding in those districts traversed by the railway. Another

is the increased activity in the butter-making industry, especially in the Province of Tobolsk. This industry has found a large market abroad, some 2,600,000 kilograms of Siberian butter having been exported in 1896.

Of course these facts show only the small beginning of the great revolution which will be effected by the railway in all branches of Siberian economical life, in agriculture and cattle breeding, manufactures and trade. In the mining industry we might say that at present attention is only given to the working of gold. Such a state of affairs is abnormal, for besides gold there are immense stores of other mineral wealth. The construction of a railway near rich seams of coal, iron, copper and other minerals will give an impulse to the working of them; for, on one hand, the railway itself will require some of the productions of mining industry; on the other, it will make it possible to largely extend the market for them, and thus will bring about a better organization of existing mining enterprises.

The construction of the Great Siberian Railway has even now begun to produce a marked effect on Siberian trade, which formerly was carried on entirely by monopolists. In each district or town there was a local capitalist, who laid in a stock of goods at the fairs of Nijni-Novgorod, or

elsewhere, and then fixed his own prices according to the means of his customers, and competition was non-existent. An enterprising man, who had neither capital nor credit, could not compete with these monopolists, because of the absence of good means of communication. This abnormal state of affairs is already improving. The railway which has connected Siberia with centres of production has rendered travelling cheaper and quicker, and made capital circulate more freely. People of small means are now enabled to make long journeys for the purchase of stock, and they can enter into direct communication with the producers and wholesale merchants in large centres. The trade of Siberia has become more democratic, and increasing competition has effected a change in its character.

Notwithstanding the small population, the uniformity of occupation, the poverty of the inhabitants and the absence of important industrial centres along the line, the traffic on the portions of the railway already opened has exceeded all expectations. Instead of the former three pairs of trains each day, as originally intended, the managers have been obliged to send off five pairs daily. These convey consignments of raw materials, particularly grain, and are sent to the markets of Russia and western Europe. Purely

local loads sent from one part of Siberia to another are small in quantity, for, owing to the uniformity of occupation in western and central Siberia, large exchange of goods is unnecessary, and the country people can supply their own modest wants. The influence of the railway on the export of Siberian goods to the adjacent countries of Asia is so far also very insignificant. But, of course, this state of affairs is only temporary, and may be explained by the fact that the railway is not yet finished, and that Siberia is only beginning to emerge from very primitive conditions. With the termination of the railway and the influx of population and capital to the country, not only will the trade of the interior be developed, but Siberia will also supply the countries of eastern Asia with manufactured goods.

One of the inevitable results, in conjunction with the influx of immigrants and capital, will be a greater division of labor, so necessary to the economical development of these dominions. In dependence on the natural and economical conditions, the population of each locality will devote their attention to one or many defined industries, and the railway will assure the sale of their goods either abroad or in other parts of Siberia.

As far as we can judge at present, Siberia will

in future be divided into the following industrial regions:

1. The agricultural region, extending along the railway line from the Ural to Lake Baikal. The products of this region, which are principally grain, will be sent abroad through Russia in Europe and also to eastern Siberia and Turkestan. The project of a branch line to Turkestan has already been discussed by the administration, and its construction is merely a question of time. This branch line would indirectly be very advantageous to the whole Empire, for Siberian corn could be sent over it to Turkestan, and the inhabitants of that country would then devote their entire energies to the cultivation of the cotton plant.

2. Two cattle breeding regions, in Transbaikalia, and in the steppes of western Siberia, south of the agricultural region.

3. The forest region, occupying the immense forests north of the agricultural region.

4. The fishing centres, along the shores of the Pacific and near the mouths of large rivers.

5. The mining and manufacturing region, which coincides with the basin of the Amur, and to which we may add the territory situated northeast of it and the Island of Sagalien. Owing to its mountainous character and the compara-

tive absence of land suitable for agricultural purposes, the cultivation of cereals is not likely to be carried on here on a large scale, more especially as countries round about—central and western Siberia, Manchuria, Korea, Japan, China, India and America—are already well supplied with grain. We may presume that gold mining will for a long time remain one of the chief occupations of the inhabitants of this region. On the other hand, the abundance of coal and iron in this region—both such powerful aids to economical development—sufficiently guarantees the rise of the manufacturing industry at no very distant date. In the Amur territory there will doubtless be a rapid growth of factories to supply the large demand for cotton goods in the neighboring countries of Manchuria and Korea. These factories will draw their supply of raw material from Russian Turkestan, China, Korea, India and North America. The importation of woollen stuffs to China and Japan, where no sheep breeding is carried on, is increasing yearly. It would be greatly to the advantage of the Amur manufactories to participate in this industry, as they could procure large quantities of cheap wool from Transbaikalia and Mongolia. Finally, the climate and soil of the Amur territory are both favorable for the cultivation of the sugar beet, to-

for the different manufacturing and mechanical establishments of Siberia, which may be imported through the mouths of Siberian rivers.

Among other important articles exported from the United States the following may find a market in the districts traversed by the Siberian railways: In Manchuria, cotton goods and sugar and steel and iron ware, which, as contracted between the Chinese Government and the company constructing the Manchurian railway will be subject only to the ordinary Chinese customs duties when brought to Manchuria *via* Dalny; in Siberia, chemical goods, soap, fruit, hops, watches, musical instruments, cycles, typewriters, tinware, ready-made clothing, and last, but not least, raw cotton for the factories, which, as stated above, will certainly spring up in the Amur territory. Siberian productions which may find a market in the United States are hides, wool and especially coal.

It is not only the coal fields of Siberia, but likewise all the rich stores of natural wealth that are awaiting the advent of energetic and enterprising men. To such the Russian epithet "gold bottom," as applied to Siberia, will prove no misnomer. These vast treasures are lying idle because of the absence of capital and enterprise. In this respect Siberia offers a wide and im-

portant field of action to the capitalists of North America, who are famous for the breadth of their views and their energy. Every serious enterprise in Siberia in which American capital will be invested will be welcomed by the Russian Government.

The Siberian Railway will be an important factor in the trade of the world, as a means of transit between Europe and the Far East. It is true that, in this respect, it has rivals in the sea route through the Suez Canal, and the combined sea and land route through North America. Yet the Siberian Railway has on its side an advantage, which is most important in our day, and which is indicated in the old saw, "time is money." With the completion of this work, Port Arthur will be connected with St. Petersburg by a railway of 5,850 English miles, with Berlin of 6,350 English miles, with Paris of 7,100 English miles and with London of 7,300 English miles. With the quick trains on the European system, these distances could be covered in from eight to ten days (in five and a half days by the Nord Express). But even if we take the present speed of the West Siberian trains (twenty-two versts an hour), it follows that only eighteen days are necessary for the journey from Western Europe to Port Arthur. This speed can easily be in-

creased to twenty-five versts an hour. Then the journey from London to the Far East will take the following time by the rival routes:

	To Yokohama.	To Shanghai.	To Hongkong.
Via Siberian Railway...	18 days.	17 days.	20 days.
Via Suez Canal.....	34 days.	28 days.	25 days.
Via America.....	25 days.	31 days.	33 days.

This great advantage possessed by the Siberian Railway will cause an important revolution in the communications between Europe and the Far East. Firstly, the mails, for which speed is so essential, will be sent by this railway, and secondly, the greater part of the passenger traffic will come to it. It is true, that some apprehension is felt about the fatiguing effect of a long railway journey on the passengers, but in the special Siberian trains everything is done that can conduce to comfort and amusement. There are a library, bath rooms, and even cars fitted up for gymnastics. Of course, the railway journey is not so pleasant as the voyage on one of the excellent ocean steamers, when the weather is fine. But, first of all, the Chinese Sea and the Indian Ocean are never calm except in March and April, and, secondly, there is for two whole weeks no escape from the intense tropical heat when coming

through the Suez Canal. The Canadian route, on the other hand, involves a double transfer from ship to train. We must also bear in mind the fact that the Siberian route will be the cheapest as well as the most rapid one. At present the journey from Paris or London to the ports of China and Japan, by the transoceanic route, costs, first-class, from 1,800 to 1,840 francs, including food. But owing to the very low fares charged for long distances in the Russian Empire, the overland journey will cost in all only from 800 to 950 francs—that is, only about half the cost of the route by Suez or America.

With the goods traffic, things will be different; for most commodities, the cost of transport is more important than speed; therefore, as far as all heavy merchandise is concerned, the railway cannot compete with the sea route. But, in spite of this, we may anticipate that the greater part of valuable goods from Russia, or Europe, to the Far East will be sent by railway, as, with a tariff of half a cent per English mile, per ton, the transport by land would only be slightly dearer than by sea, not to speak of the possibility of reducing the land journey to twenty-five or thirty days, whereas, by sea, at present, goods from Moscow to Vladivostok are forty-five days in transit. Goods which suffer from sea-damp and

tropical heat will also be sent by the Siberian Railway.

The Manchurian Railway will have at its own disposal steamers running between the *termini* of the Siberian Railway and the chief ports in the Far East, which will also tend to attract passengers and goods to the Siberian line.

The Siberian Railway will greatly consolidate Russia's position on the shores of the Pacific, facilitating the transport of important military forces thither at any time.

The outlay of the immense sum of four hundred million roubles for the construction of the railway obliges Russia to do her utmost to recompense herself for this outlay by developing the economical forces of Siberia and attracting as much traffic as possible to the railway. Therefore, from the moment when the railway is completed, Russia's principal task in the Far East will be, not the encouragement of political and territorial aggrandizement, but a ceaseless effort to promote peace and tranquillity, those main factors which will enable the Siberian Railway to play its economical part as the vital artery of Siberia and all the Old World.

MIKHAILOFF.

CHINA AND THE POWERS.

Britain held an almost undisputed commercial position in that country. Subsequently, other European countries began to compete with her; but the American nation, which is probably about the latest of these competitors, has already outdistanced all rivals, and obtained eight per cent. of the whole trade, as against the twenty-eight per cent. of all other nations combined (including Japan). Viewed in this light, it will be seen that the disproportion between the trade of Great Britain and the United States is less real than apparent. There are one or two other factors which have to be taken into consideration in studying these statistics, which, like all figures, are more or less misleading.

The first point is that not only is a very large proportion of American trade carried in British bottoms, but, in addition, a considerable amount is consigned to the old-established British firms in China, and therefore is rightly treated as British commerce by the Chinese customs. This trade in American goods is very large, I am told; and, while it is rightly classified as British, being British owned, and carried in British ships to Chinese ports, yet its place of origin is none the less American.

The second point is, that this eight per cent. of *actual* American trade as against sixty-four

per cent. of *nominal* British trade, has been obtained in a comparatively few years, and the proportionate increase of trade in the last two or three years would therefore be found to be in favor of America.

The third, and still more important, point is that, while the British volume of trade is still growing, there is no doubt that in several directions, notably in drills, jeans and sheetings, the trade of the United States has steadily gone ahead in China, while in British trade there has been a decline. The cotton piece goods trade as a whole declined during 1897, but, in the items quoted above, there was actually an increase of nearly 500,000 pieces, all of American manufacture.

It is apparent, therefore, that the interest of the United States in the foreign trade of China is not only an increasing one, but is also a *proportionately* greater interest than that of all European competitors, with the exception of Great Britain, and this despite the fact that most of them had the start of the United States in competing with Great Britain for the China market.

I was pleased to find that on the whole the American press, as the representative of public opinion in the United States, warmly endorsed the views which I expressed relative to the open

door, in my speeches on my way back to Great Britain, and all appeared to be very much interested in the China problem. Despite this interest, however, I was unable to obtain any definite expression of opinion in favor of an active policy in Chinese affairs.

The commercial community of any country knows its own business better than any outsider can teach it, and all I propose to do is to lay plain facts before my American readers, without presuming to dictate to them as to what their line of policy should be.

The position and importance of American trade with China I have already shown to be considerable. The prospects of its development, and the many openings for increasing trade, will be found on reading my Report. The only question which remains, and which I propose to shortly deal with here, is the actual position and prospects of China herself, and how American interests are thereby affected.

Some of the American journals which disagreed with me, seemed to doubt the wisdom of the policy I suggested in my speeches in America, because, they say, "if inaugurated it would force the United States into a situation which might lead to war," and therefore the interests involved

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French Minister

SIR CLAUDE MACDONALD
British Minister
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EDWIN H. CONGER
United States Minister

are not commensurate with the risks and responsibilities likely to be incurred.

I can quite understand this argument, and how strongly it must appeal to the people of the United States, who have always endeavored to observe a policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs, unless important interests of the American people were at stake, or their sense of justice was appealed to. This is a perfectly intelligible policy on the part of a commercial nation, to which peace is of the highest importance, because of the disturbing effect of war on trade and commerce. But there are occasions on which it is necessary to protect commercial interests by going to war, and there are occasions on which an energetic policy is necessary in order to prevent war, and to avoid irreparable damage to trade and commerce. The situation we are now facing comes under the last-named head. In my humble opinion, in the present state of affairs with regard to China, it would be better in the commercial interests of both the United States and Great Britain, that they should support China, and so prevent the total collapse of this immense Empire, together with the consequent disorganization of trade, and the expenditure of blood and money which will be required to restore law and order, and to re-

establish that confidence without which trade cannot flourish.

If it were merely a question of the present value of American-Chinese trade being involved, I can quite see that it would pay the United States to remain an unmoved spectator of events in the Far East; but this is not the case. China is an almost untapped market. It is a vast country with an enormous population, and rich natural resources, all of which can be developed. Can either the United States or Great Britain afford to stand aside, and see their present trade disturbed, if not lost; and, also, their share in the prospective development of China as a whole interfered with? There is no doubt what the answer of the commercial classes in Great Britain will be, and I do not think that there will be much difference between their views and those of the business men of the United States, when the latter have carefully examined the *data* with which my Report will supply them.

There are only two policies open. The one, I contend, will inevitably lead to anarchy and rebellion in China, and possibly to war between the foreign nations whose interests clash in that country. In certain phases of situations, no such thing as a policy of non-intervention is possible. This is one of them. To calmly await

events really means to precipitate the dangers we all wish to avoid. Recent action on the part of the various European Powers has tended to discredit the Chinese Government in the eyes of the people. So called "spheres of influence" are being more or less openly mapped out. In those spheres, certain countries are endeavoring to set up a claim to exclusive rights and privileges. China is powerless to resist the demands which are made upon her, and, when she yields to one Power by *"force majeure,"* she is immediately bullied by other Powers to give them compensation for things she had neither the moral right to grant nor the physical power to refuse.

This selfish and cowardly policy has been pursued by all the European Powers in a minor or major degree. If it is continued much longer, it must inevitably lead to the break-up of the Chinese Empire. I will go further. It has been pursued too long already; events are moving so rapidly that we can no longer adhere to a policy of drift. The effete and corrupt Chinese Government has been so severely shaken that, the moment the people realize its impotence, it must fall. There are only two policies in my opinion to be adopted. The one is to acquiesce in this state of affairs, and so be compelled to join the dishonest "spheres of influence" policy, which

means that every one will take as much territory as he can. The second and alternative line of policy is that which I have described as the "Open Door, or Equal Opportunity for the Trade of All Nations." I will deal with both.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

It amazes me to hear people talk so calmly about the break-up of an empire of over 430,000,000 of people. It will be easy to destroy the present governmental system in China, but how is it to be reconstructed? What will become of the guarantees and undertakings of China, and what security have we that the expectant heirs of the Sick Man of the Far East will assume the responsibility for his obligations? The phrase "spheres of influence" is easy to use in theory, but *how* is the policy it indicates to be carried out in practice?

Nominal spheres of influence, such as Germany now possesses in Shan-tung, or Russia in Manchuria, may exist as long as there is a Chinese Government with some authority over the people to maintain law and order; but when that government is overturned and the authority of the hated foreigner is substituted for it, the question becomes less easy to settle than it looks on

the face of it. Are the Powers going to land armies to conquer or repress 400,000,000 of people, who even now show an undisguised hatred and contempt for the foreigner and all his methods? Are we going to destroy an empire which has lasted for 4,000 years, and replace it with something else in a satisfactory manner, within a period of ten, fifteen, twenty or even a hundred years? What man of common sense can doubt that such a policy means endless trouble, anarchy and rebellion; and an interference with trade and commerce which may be felt for years to come? To foreign bondholders it means a loss of between fifty and sixty millions sterling, because the debtor and his guarantee will both have disappeared.

How are the rival interests of conflicting nations to be amicably adjusted, if such a state of affairs is brought about? Capital has been invested and railways are being built by one Power in the "sphere of influence" regarded by another Power as peculiarly its own. For instance, in the Yang-tse Valley, which, if "spheres of influence" are marked out, Great Britain will take measures to secure as her own, several nations have lately obtained territorial concessions, which have resulted in the disturbance of British firms who owned land within such concessions.

It cannot be doubted that, if the disintegration of China begins, these and other questions will lead to international complications. Where is the United States' sphere of influence to be? I think the answer is very short. The United States' sphere of influence, like that of Great Britain, *should* be wherever American trade preponderates over that of other Powers. If one Power is allowed to close the door in the south, and others in the north, no sphere of influence can compensate America and Great Britain for the loss they must sustain.

The policy of inaction will, therefore, by allowing the Chinese Government to fall to pieces, bring about a condition of affairs which must lead to an expenditure of blood and money to protect the lives and property of foreigners resident in China. It most probably will lead to international complications, and to a European war, and most certainly it will mean great disturbance to, if not eventual loss of, trade.

"THE OPEN DOOR."

The alternative policy to that which I have just described is that of the "Open Door, or Equal Opportunity for All." This policy was advocated in my recent speeches in America on

the China question. I suppose that, even in a protectionist country, such as the United States, no one will deny the advantages of such a policy as applied to American exports to China; and that, whether the American manufacturer prefers to have preferential rights at home or not, it must be to his advantage that he has an equal opportunity with the foreigner abroad, and that no foreigner secures preferential rights in China which would leave American trade in the cold.

This being so, only the question of the cost remains to be calculated, and how such a policy is to be carried out if adopted. It is upon this point that I think some of the American journals misunderstood my arguments, which probably were not sufficiently clearly stated.

I deny that this policy can lead to war, or that it will cost the United States a single cent, or a solitary soldier to carry it out.

The first thing is to see how this policy is to be undertaken, and then we can estimate the cost of it. It means a policy to be inaugurated now, whereas the alternative policy is a policy of procrastination. This is a most important point when it is remembered that there are only two Powers ready to go to war in China to-day, or who can possibly do so with any chance of success. As time goes on this will be altered. At

the present moment Great Britain, with her enormous fleet in Far Eastern waters, and the 100,000 native troops she can bring up from India within a shorter time than any other Power can land an army, combined with her possession of the chief coaling stations, is pre-eminently in a position to deal with the China question by war, if she so desired. Next to her comes Japan, with a fine fleet in close proximity to the scene of operations, and a capacity to land 200,000 troops in China at any moment. Apart from these two, the United States, by her position on the other side of the Pacific, and the object lesson she has just given the world of her ability to mobilize men and ships rapidly and effectively, has also to be counted with; while, as any trouble in China would probably mean European complications, Germany would have to be regarded as an important factor in the position. Above all, these four Powers represent the foreign trade interests of China, the proportion divided up amongst other nations being so inconsiderable that it has no such strong claims.

These four Powers, therefore, have a moral right to protect their own interests, and the ability to do so. If they agreed to combine, not for purely selfish motives, but to guarantee the

independence of China, and the maintenance of a fair field and no favor for all comers, who can suppose that any other Power could reasonably (or even unreasonably) object. The whole *raison d'être* of such an understanding would lie in the fact that it would be too powerful to attack, and that it could maintain the peace while preserving the open door to all. There would be no menace to other Powers in such a combination, because the bond of agreement between the contracting parties would be the preservation of the open door with equal opportunity for all. To China herself the Powers would prove friends in need. By guaranteeing her integrity, they would give a new lease of life to the Chinese Empire. They would be entitled to ask, and powerful enough to secure, that reforms for the benefit of China and the improvement of foreign trade should be carried out.

The reorganization of China's finances and her army would enable her to stand alone in the near future. It is not necessary to go to Congress or to the Imperial Parliament to secure the men necessary to assist China to effect these reforms. As long as the four governments induced China to undertake the reforms in return for their protection, men would easily be secured from all of

these countries, and also from other nations, who would assist the Chinese in building up their Empire on more stable foundations.

The moral and political support of China by the four Powers I have named is all that is needed. They need not expend a single shilling, or move a single man, officially, in order to carry it out. All that is required is that China shall be assisted, and, in return for such assistance, shall employ foreigners of all countries who will reorganize her army and her finances, on as sound lines as the Imperial Maritime Customs of China is established.

Observation of recent events teaches us that, if we continue to leave China to herself without recuperative power from within, or firm and determined assistance from without, her ultimate disintegration is only a question of time. The reforms which are urgently required in China, both for the benefit of that Empire and its people, and for the development of the trade of friendly nations, may be shortly summarized as follows:

1. The appointment of a foreign Financial Adviser to direct the administration and collection of internal revenue.

2. The reform of currency, so as to afford a more stable exchange:

3. The establishment and centralization of mints.

4. The abolition of the present *octroi* and likin charges on goods which have already paid duty at the ports. In return for this, China should be allowed to increase her present tariff. Trade would not be damaged so much by slightly increased taxation, as it is injured and hindered by the delays and uncertainties of the present fiscal system.

5. The re-arrangement of the salt monopoly, and general administrative reform.

6. The establishment and maintenance of a proper military and police, capable of affording that protection to which the foreign merchant is entitled for himself or his goods.

7. The opening up of the country and its resources, by giving greater facilities to native or foreign capital in the development of the minerals of the country, and improvements in the lines of communication, including postal and telegraphic reforms.

8. The right of residence in the interior to be conceded to foreigners.

9. The promotion of all reforms and the introduction of all changes which are likely to promote the cause of civilization and the well-being of the Chinese people.

Such a coalition as that of the four great trading Powers I have mentioned could obtain these reforms with advantage to themselves, and benefit to China, and indeed the trading world.

In a very few years, with this assistance loyally rendered, China would have an army capable of protecting herself, as long as she retained the foreign officers. The idea that the Chinese are not good soldiers is a great mistake. I was permitted to inspect most of the armies, and all of the forts and arsenals of China, as will be seen by the detailed accounts in my Report, and I am convinced that, properly armed, disciplined, and led, there could be no better material than the Chinese soldier. I leave it to the commercial classes of the United States to say whether it is not worth their while to incur such slight risks for such great profit, and for so good an object.

On sound business lines this policy appeals to the American nation; but, in addition to that, are we going to let this opportunity slip of drawing the two Anglo-Saxon nations together for the cause of civilized progress, and the benefit of the world at large? Great nations have great responsibilities, to which they must be true, and when those responsibilities and self-interest go hand in hand, it would be unwise to miss the opportunity.

Events are moving very rapidly in the Far

East. A decision must be arrived at, and action of some sort taken very soon. It is the duty of Great Britain to lead, and I believe that the United States will not refuse to follow, but that both nations will combine to hoist aloft the banner of civilization and industrial progress, for the benefit of their own people, as well as for the benefit of China, and of the world.

CHARLES BERESFORD.

MUTUAL HELPFULNESS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES.

TRADE, which lies at the foundation of international intercourse, has an eminently selfish origin. It is a constant manœuvre on the part of men to sell dear and buy cheap. Since each party in a commercial transaction seeks only his own advantage, it was for a long time thought that one of them could gain only at the expense of the other. Thus the "mercantile system," which for centuries held Europe spellbound, made gold-getting the end and aim of all commercial activities. The promotion of friendly relations with the object of securing an exchange of benefits was not considered of even secondary importance. Then came the navigation laws which had for their avowed purpose the crippling of all rival shipping by laying a heavy tax upon the carrying trade of foreigners. Though such measures are no longer considered advisable in the commercial

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world, their baleful effects are still felt in the political thought of the present time.

Nations now enter into friendly relations with each other because it is believed that both sides are benefited by such relations. Their transactions cannot be one-sided affairs, for the simple reason that it takes two to make a bargain. If one party is dissatisfied with the arrangement, the other party will not long have an opportunity to enjoy its benefits.

Confucius was once asked for a single word which might serve as a guiding principle through life. "Is not reciprocity such a word?" answered the great sage. "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." This is the "Golden Rule" which should govern the relations of man to man. It is the foundation of society. It lies at the bottom of every system of morality, and every system of law. If it holds good with respect to individuals, it ought to hold good with respect to nations, which are but large aggregations of individuals. Therefore, if permanent relations are to be established between two nations, reciprocity must be the key-note of every arrangement entered into between them.

Having recognized this great principle of international intercourse, how shall we apply it to the case of China and the United States in such

a manner as to result in mutual helpfulness? Assuredly, the first thing to do is to take a general survey of the situation and see what are the present needs of each country. Then we shall perceive clearly how each may help the other to a higher plane of material development and prosperity.

The United States now has its industrial machinery perfectly adjusted to the production of wealth on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. Of land, the first of the three agents of production enumerated by economists, the United States is fortunately blessed with an almost unlimited amount. Its territory stretches from ocean to ocean, and from the snows of the Arctic Circle to the broiling sun of the tropics. Within these limits are found all the products of soil, forest and mine that are useful to man. With respect to labor, the second agent of production, the United States at first naturally suffered the disadvantage common to all new countries. But here the genius of the people came into play to relieve the situation. That necessity, which is "the mother of invention," substituted the sewing machine for women's fingers, the McCormick reaper for farm hands, the cotton gin for slaves. The efficiency of labor was thereby multiplied, in many cases, a hundred fold. The ingenious

manner in which capital, the third agent of production, is put to a profitable use, is equally characteristic of America. It is well known that there is an enormous amount of capital in this country seeking investment. Every one who has a little to invest wishes to obtain as large a return as possible. Since competition reduces profits, the formation of industrial combinations, commonly called trusts, is for the capitalist the logical solution of the difficulty. These enable the vast amount of capital in this country to secure the best results with the greatest economy. Whether they secure "the greatest good to the greatest number" is another matter.

The development of the resources of the United States by the use of machinery and by the combination of capital has now reached a point which may be termed critical. The productive power of the country increases so much faster than its capacity for consumption that the demand of a population of 75,000,000 is no sooner felt than supplied. There is constant danger of overproduction, with all its attendant consequences. Under these circumstances, it is imperative for the farmers and manufacturers of the United States to seek an outlet for their products and goods in foreign markets. But whither shall they turn?

At first sight, Europe presents perhaps the most inviting field. Both blood and association point in this direction. But here the cottons of Lowell would have to compete with the fabrics of Manchester. The silk manufactures of Paterson would stand small chance of supplanting the finished products of Lyons. The sugar of Louisiana would encounter a formidable rival in the beet-sugar of Germany. England could probably better afford to sell her coal and iron cheaper than Pennsylvania, and Russia could supply European markets with wheat and petroleum as well as could Ohio and Indiana. Competition would be keen and destructive.

Central and South America have as yet too sparse a population for the immense territory they cover to meet the conditions of a market for American goods. Some decades must elapse before American farmers and manufacturers can look to that quarter for relief.

But on the other side of the Pacific lies the vast Empire of China, which in extent of territory and density of population exceeds the whole of Europe. To be more particular, the Province of Szechuen can muster more able-bodied men than the German Empire. The Province of Shan-tung can boast of as many native-born sons as France. Scatter all the inhabitants of Costa

Rica or Nicaragua in Canton, and they would be completely lost in that city's surging throngs. Transport all the people of Chile into China, and they would fill only a city of the first class. Further comparisons are needless. Suffice it to say that China has her teeming millions to feed and to clothe. Many of the supplies come from outside. The share furnished by the United States was considerably larger last year than ever before, and might be greatly increased. According to the statistics published by the United States Government, China in 1899 took American goods to the value of $14,437,422, of which amount $9,844,565 was paid for cotton goods. All the European countries combined bought only $1,484,363 worth of American cotton manufactures during that same period. The amount of similar purchases made by the Central American States was $737,259, by all the South American countries $2,713,967. It thus appears that China is the largest buyer of American cotton goods. British America comes next in the list with purchases amounting to $2,759,164. Cotton cloth has a wide range of uses in all parts of the Chinese Empire, and it is almost impossible for the supply to equal the demand.

Up to the year 1898, cotton goods and kerosene were the only articles imported from the United

States in large enough quantities to have a value of over $1,000,000. But I notice in the statistics published by the United States Government for the year 1899, that manufactures of iron and steel have also passed that mark. This is due to the fact that China has now begun in real earnest the work of building railroads. The demand for construction materials is great. The value of locomotives imported last year from the United States was $732,212.

Besides the articles mentioned, there are many others of American origin, which do not figure in the customs returns as such. These find their way into China through adjacent countries, especially Hongkong. At least three-fourths of the imports of Hongkong, notably wheat, flour and canned goods, are destined for consumption in the Chinese mainland.

Such is the present condition of trade between the United States and China. That trade can be greatly extended. Let the products of American farms, mills and workshops once catch the Chinese fancy, and America need look no farther for a market. The present popularity of American kerosene illustrates the readiness of the Chinese to accept any article that fills a long-felt want. They have recognized in kerosene a cheap and good illuminant, much superior to their own

nut-oil, and it has consequently found its way into distant and outlying parts of the Empire where the very name of America is unknown. Stores in the interior now send their agents to the treaty ports for it. In the same way, foreign-made candles, because cheaper than those of home make, are selling easily in China. I would suggest that American farmers and manufacturers might find it to their advantage to study the wants and habits of the Chinese and the conditions of trade in China.

Thus we see that China can give the United States a much-needed market. What, on the other hand, can the United States do for China? Let us consider China's stock of the three requisites for the production of wealth—land, labor and capital.

The Chinese Empire embraces a continuous territory which stretches over sixty degrees of longitude and thirty-four degrees of latitude. Nature has endowed this immense region with every variety of soil and climate, but has, however, scattered her bounties over it with an uneven hand. That portion which comprises the eighteen provinces of China proper, extending from the Great Wall to the China Sea, and from the Tibetan plateau to the Pacific Ocean, is more highly favored than the rest. Whenever China

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CHINESE MINISTER TO THE UNITED STATES, WU TING-FANG

is mentioned it is generally this particular portion of the Empire that is meant. On this land hundreds of generations of men have lived and died without exhausting its richness and fertility. There remains for generations to come untold wealth of nature lying hidden within the bowels of the earth. The mines of Yunnan, though they have for centuries supplied the government mints with copper for the coining of those pieces of money commonly known as cash, only await the introduction of modern methods of extraction to yield an annual output as large as that of the famous Calumet and Hecla mines. The sands of the Yang-tse, washed down from the highlands of Tibet, contain so much gold that that part of its course as it enters the Province of Szechuen is called the River of Golden Sand. Much more important than these, however, are the deposits of coal which underlie the surface formation of every province. All varieties of coal are found, from the softest lignite to the hardest anthracite, and in such quantities that, according to the careful estimate of Baron Richtofen, the famous German traveller and geologist, the Province of Shansi alone can supply the whole world at the present rate of consumption for 3,000 years. In most cases beds of iron ore lie in close proximity to those of coal, and can

hence be easily worked and smelted. In short, the natural resources of China, both in variety and quantity, are so great that she stands second to no other nation in potential wealth. To reduce this potentiality to actuality is for her the most important question of the hour. For this purpose she has an almost unlimited supply of labor at her command.

Every village can count its thousands of laborers, every city its tens of thousands. Experience proves that the Chinese as all-round laborers can easily distance all competitors. They are industrious, intelligent and orderly. They can work under conditions that would kill a man of a less hardy race; in heat that would suit a salamander or in cold that would please a polar bear, sustaining their energies through long hours of unremitting toil with only a few bowls of rice.

But have the Chinese sufficient capital to carry on their industrial operations? They are a nation of shopkeepers. What capital they have is usually invested in small business ventures. It is their instinct to avoid large enterprises. Thus, the capital in the country, though undoubtedly large, may be likened to a pile of sand on the beach. It has great extent, but is so utterly lacking in cohesion that out of it no lofty struc-

ture can be built. Before China can be really on the high road to prosperity, it must find means of fully utilizing every economic advantage that it has. Modern methods are its greatest need. Here is America's opportunity.

The Yankee is never seen to better advantage than when experimenting with a new idea on a colossal scale. To direct vast or novel enterprises is a perfectly new experience to the Chinaman. Give him a junk and he will with ease ride out the fiercest typhoon that ever lashed the seas. But give him an ocean leviathan of the present day, with its complicated engines, dynamos, compasses and other modern appliances for navigating a ship, and he will be truly "all at sea" in knowing how to handle it, even in a dead calm.

Of all public works, China has most pressing need of railroads. Only ten years ago it would have been difficult to convince one man in ten of the immediate necessity for the introduction of railroads into all the provinces of the Empire. To-day at least nine out of every ten believe that railroads ought to be built as fast as possible. This complete change of public opinion within so short a time shows perhaps better than anything else how fast China is getting into the swing of the world's forward movement. There are at present only about 400 miles of railroad

open to traffic throughout the whole country, and all the lines building and projected foot up to 5,000 or 6,000 miles more. China proper covers about as many square miles as the States east of the Mississippi. Those States, with a population of 50,000,000, require 100,000 miles of railroad to do their business. China, with a population eight times as large, would naturally be supposed to need at least about an equal mileage of roads for her purposes. It would not be strange if the activity in railroad construction in the United States soon after the Civil War should find a parallel in China in coming years.

The building of railroads in China does not partake of the speculative character which attended the building of some of the American roads. There are no wild regions to be opened up for settlement, no new towns to be built along the route. Here is a case of the railroad following the population, and not that of the population following the railroad. A road built through populous cities and famous marts has not long to wait for traffic. It would pay from the very beginning.

The first railroad in China was built for the transportation of coal from the Kaiping mines to the port of Taku. I was chiefly instrumental in securing its construction. The line, though in

an out-of-the-way corner of the Empire, proved so profitable from the very start that it was soon extended to Tien Tsin and Peking in one direction and to Shanhaikwan, the eastern terminus of the Great Wall, in the other. Not long ago it was thought advisable to build a branch beyond Shanhaikwan to the treaty port of Newchwang. This branch has been completed and will soon be opened to traffic. Minister Conger, in a recent letter to the State Department, says that the road now pays a dividend of 14 per cent. on the whole capital invested, and that when the entire line is open a dividend of 30 per cent. is expected. The era of railroad building in China may be said to have just dawned. China desires nothing better than to have Americans lend a hand in this great work.

It gave me great pleasure two years ago to obtain for an American company a concession to build a railroad between Hankow, the great distributing centre of Central China, and Canton, the great distributing centre of South China. The line is to connect with the Lu-Han line on the north and with the Kowloon line on the south, and throughout its whole length of more than 900 miles will run through opulent cities, fertile valleys and cultivated plains. The construction of such a line by Americans through

the heart of China cannot fail to bring the people of the two countries into closer relations.

Besides railroads, there are other public works which China must undertake sooner or later. Among them are river and harbor improvements, city water supplies, street lighting and street railways. Owing to the traditional friendship between the two countries, our people are well disposed toward Americans. They are willing to follow their lead in these new enterprises, where they might spurn the assistance of other people with whom they have been on less friendly terms in the past.

Such being the economic interdependence of China and the United States, what policy should each country pursue toward the other in order to gain the greatest good from that relationship? In my judgment true reciprocity is impossible unless each country has perfect confidence in the other and displays on all occasions a desire for fair play and honest dealing.

Now, reciprocity demands the "open door." China long ago adopted that policy in her foreign intercourse. She has treaty relations with all the European Powers, together with the United States, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Japan and Korea. All these are equally "favored nations" in every sense of the term. The Swede and the

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LI HUNG CHANG

Dane enjoy the same rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions with respect to commerce, navigation, travel, and residence throughout the length and breadth of the Empire as areaccorded to the Russian or the Englishman. Any favor that may be granted to Japan, for instance, at once inures to the benefit of the United States. Indeed, China in her treatment of strangers within her gates has in a great many respects gone even beyond what is required by international usage. According to the usual practice of nations, no country is expected to accord to foreigners rights which are not enjoyed by its own subjects or citizens. But China has been so long accustomed to indemnify foreigners who have fallen victims to mob violence that she is looked upon in a sense as an insurer of the lives and property of all foreigners residing within her borders. To such an extent is this idea current among foreigners in China that some years ago an American missionary in the Province of Shan-tung, who happened to have some articles stolen from his house in the night, estimated his loss at $60, and actually sent the bill through the American Minister at Peking to the Foreign Office for payment. The Chinese tariff also favors foreigners resident in China much more than it does the Chinese themselves. Most ar-

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ticles imported for the use of foreigners are on the free list. Such is the treatment which Americans in common with the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers receive in China.

Justice would seem to demand equal consideration for the Chinese on the part of the United States. China does not ask for special favors. All she wants is enjoyment of the same privileges accorded other nationalities. Instead, she is singled out for discrimination and made the subject of hostile legislation. Her door is wide open to the people of the United States, but their door is slammed in the face of her people. I am not so biased as to advocate any policy that might be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the United States. If they think it desirable to keep out the objectionable class of Chinese, by all means let them do so. Let them make their immigration laws as strict as possible, but let them be applicable to all foreigners. Would it not be fairer to exclude the illiterate and degenerate classes of all nations rather than to make an arbitrary ruling against the Chinese alone? Would it not be wiser to set up some specific test of fitness, such as ability to read intelligently the American Constitution? That would give the Chinese a chance along with the rest of the world, and yet effectually restrict their immi-

gration. Such a law would be practically prohibitory as far as all except the best educated Chinese are concerned, for the reason that the written language of the Chinese is so entirely different from the spoken tongue that few of the immigrants would be able to read with intelligence such a work as the American Constitution. Nevertheless, a law of that kind would be just in spirit and could not rouse resentment in the Chinese breast.

Since the law and the treaty forbid the coming of Chinese laborers, I must do all I can to restrict their immigration. I should, however, like to call attention to the fact that the Chinese Exclusion Act, as enforced, scarcely accomplishes the purpose for which it was passed. It aimed to provide for the exclusion of Chinese laborers only, while freely admitting all others. As a matter of fact, the respectable merchant, who would be an irreproachable addition to the population of any country, has been frequently turned back, whereas the Chinese high-binders, the riffraff and scum of the nation, fugitives from justice and adventurers of all types have too often effected an entrance without much difficulty. This is because the American officials at the entrance ports are ignorant of Chinese character and dialects and cannnot always discriminate between the

worthy and unworthy. Rascals succeed in deceiving them, while the respectable but guileless Chinese are often unjustly suspected, inconveniently detained, or even sent back to China. A number of such cases have been brought to my attention. It must not be supposed, however, that I blame any official. In view of their limited knowledge of Chinese affairs, it is not strange that the officials sometimes make mistakes. The Americans judge us wrongly, just as we often misjudge them. This unpleasant state of things is to be deplored, and I would suggest that difficulties might be avoided, if the regular officials, in pasing on immigrant Chinamen, could have the assistance of Chinese consuls, or people fitted by training and experience in China for the discharge of such duties.

Great misunderstanding exists in the United States in regard to Chinese questions. There is a current fear that if all restrictions on Chinese immigration were removed, the United States would be flooded with my countrymen. Inasmuch as China contains some 400,000,000 inhabitants, a wholesale emigration would certainly be a serious matter for the people of the country to which they removed. But there is no danger of such a calamity befalling the United States.

Those who view it with alarm only show how profoundly ignorant they are of Chinese character. One of the most striking features of the conservatism of the Chinese is their absolute horror of travel, especially by sea. They regard any necessity for it as an unmitigated evil. They do not often visit neighboring towns, much less adjoining provinces or foreign countries. So pronounced is their prejudice against travel that until they could be educated into a different view, Chinese railroads would for the first few years have to depend for their profits on freight rates rather than passenger fares. To the American or Englishman, who proceeds to go abroad as soon as he has accumulated a little money, their state of mind may seem incomprehensible, but it is nevertheless a fact that must be taken into account.

How, then, is the presence of so many Chinese in America explained? By the fact that some forty years ago, when the Pacific Railway was building, there was great scarcity of laborers. Agents went to China and induced a considerable number of Chinese to come to this country and assist in the construction of the railroad. After their work was done most of them returned home, taking their earnings with them. They

seize this opportunity to strengthen friendly relations of mutual helpfulness between the two countries. No other nation has a stronger claim to the confidence of China than has the United States. The very first article of the first treaty concluded between the two nations provides that there shall be peace and friendship between them and between their people. Through a half century of intercourse no untoward circumstance has interrupted those amicable relations. More than once the United States Government has used its good offices to promote Chinese interests and welfare. Nations, like individuals, appreciate favors, and, like them also, resent indignities. The sentiment of good will entertained by the government and people of China toward the government and people of the United States is strong and profound because of the long, unblemished past, but underneath it all there is, I am sorry to say, a natural feeling of disappointment and irritation that the people of the United States deal now less liberally with the Chinese than with the rest of the world. If the best guarantee of friendship is self-interest, surely the friendship of a nation of 400,000,000 people ought to be worth cultivating. China does not ask for much. She has no thought of territorial aggrandizement, of self-glorification in any form. All she wants is gentle

peace, sweet friendship, helpful exchange of benefits, and the generous application of that Golden Rule which people of all nations and all creeds should delight to follow.

WU TING-FANG.

AMERICA'S SHARE IN A PARTITION OF CHINA.

AMERICA'S SHARE IN A PARTITION OF CHINA.

In a previous number of this *Review*,* I ventured to predict that the dissolution of the Chinese Empire was inevitable and not remote. Recent events have not diminished the probability of that disruption; and however reluctant each Power may be to begin the process, the anti-foreign sentiments of the Chinese masses, not less than the collapse of their government, will leave no practical alternative. The world will have to prevent anarchy in China, as well as to uphold the common interests of humanity and civilization. After proclaiming to the skies the superexcellence of the Open Door policy, the discovery will be made that the continued existence of a Chinese Empire is not necessary for its application, and that the states of the world can themselves come to a mutual understanding without

* *North American Review* for March, 1899, "The Dissolution of the Chinese Empire."

the intervention of Manchu Emperor or Tsungli-Yamen, to observe the common fiscal and commercial policy which is illustrated by the phrase of the "open door." The case of Central Africa will be cited to justify the summoning of a conference for the division of spheres, and also for the proclamation of the principles by which the Powers will regulate their conduct and action for the general good. The adoption of this course may come at any moment; on the other hand, it is quite possible that an amelioration of the situation in China may lead to its adjournment. But, whether imminent or deferred, it is the only course that will prevent China from falling under the exclusive domination of Russia, which would be the gravest menace for everybody.

The practical question which the American public has to decide, and which I wish to invest with some interest for American readers is, What will be America's share in a partition of China? I am quite aware that there is a preliminary question still nominally undecided, as to whether the United States should interest or at all events commit themselves in problems of government and conquest beyond the limits of their continent. Very few American citizens are not asking themselves the question, Can we wisely, or even possibly, depart from the Monroe Doctrine so



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as to include dependencies and conquests in the Republic? Even with regard to the Philippines, America's by the sword, where the task is not rendered more complicated and difficult by the interpolation of any outside claims or influences, as must be the case in China, no final, irrevocable decision has yet been taken toward laying the foundation stone of an American Colonial Empire. However reluctant the American people may be to take the plunge into the unknown, it seems to the onlooker that they have gone too far to draw back without loss of dignity and self-respect. They cannot make themselves a party to a hollow and ephemeral gift of autonomy to the Philippines, when they must know that their withdrawal would be at once followed by the enforcement of the German pretensions, which they only just anticipated two years ago. Committed to the task of ending Spanish misrule in the Pacific, neither the timidity arising from inexperience in colonial administration, nor the engrossing pursuit of material prosperity under conditions which make the United States "the spoilt child of Fortune" among the nations, will allow them to take their hand from the plough till their work is done. Nor can it be supposed for a moment that the people of America will voluntarily decline to take a share in the arrange-

ment of the affairs of China because it presents difficulties, and must entail responsibilities. The modifications introduced into the Monroe Doctrine for the comparatively small local question of the Philippines will have to be enlarged or extended so far as to embrace the vast, complicated and pregnant problem of China.

Evidence of these truths has already been afforded in the prominent part American diplomacy took in obtaining general assent to the theory of the Open Door, which represents common interest among all States that will prove far more durable than the Chinese Empire. The enforcement of this principle has to be provided for, not merely during the uncertain life of the existing Chinese administration, but also under the far more onerous conditions that will come into force when it has disappeared. Something far more definite and binding than the promises given to Mr. Conger will be needed to keep ambitious potentates and aggressive cabinets in the straight path of tolerance for others. The United States have made a formal and emphatic statement as to what they expect from other governments. They have demanded unrestricted trade privileges and freedom, the whole of China is to be free from prohibitive duties, and all the Treaty Powers are to enjoy equal rights and the same

tariff. The assent given to these demands, under one set of circumstances, is not to be ignored or put aside because new conditions have supervened. But to keep it in force will require far more vigorous action than was expected when "the open door" first became a popular phrase. It will not be enough for the United States Government to express a hope or a wish, to qualify its military preparations with a declaration that, in no eventuality, are they intended for war, or to leave England to bear alone the stress and heat of the day. The United States took an honorable lead in the process of arranging the Chinese question through Mr. Conger's despatch. They cannot back out of the whole business because events have moved with unexpected celerity, or because dark clouds appear on the political horizon. They must see the game out, whether it has to be played on the green cloth of diplomacy or "the ensanguined field of Mars." A regretful glance backward is permissible, but the American people have crossed the Rubicon of imperial responsibility.

Having done so, they must equip themselves so that they may meet these new obligations with a dignity and skill worthy of their name and power; and the point which I expressly wish to bring before them is that they should supplement

the accepted theory of the Open Door with a policy that will take its place at the approaching critical moment, and that will second England's efforts to prevent Russia's obtaining the preponderance in China. The Open Door theory possesses obvious recommendations, and it will continue to serve as a connecting bond between the governments when China has been broken into fragments. But its chances of future, practical value depend on the acquisition by those who advocate it of adequate territorial jurisdiction, or rather of spheres of influence in the future partition of China. Unless this precautionary measure is taken, it may reasonably be feared that the Open Door theory will be exploded, to the loss and confusion of those who may have clung to it too long. Therefore, wisdom dictates that deliberately and in good time each of the great Powers should indicate and claim what it considers would be its best sphere of influence and responsibility in a partition of China. The claim might not have to be enforced for a long time, if at all; as the work to be accomplished in China should be rather of a constructive than a destructive character. Each Power would accept the responsibility of maintaining order, security and freedom of trade, besides other treaty rights, within its sphere; and, in the first place, there would be little

or no interference with the existing Chinese administration or system of laws. Partition would not necessarily mean conquest, and it is probable that the Chinese themselves would create, with very little guidance or direction, administrations that would suffice for all practical purposes and render any conquest unnecessary. The work that has to be done in China is creative and restorative. A better feeling toward foreigners has to be evoked, and something like ordinary honesty and efficiency has to be restored to Chinese government.

The task, even in its most restricted sense, is too big to be entrusted to any single State. There are, indeed, only two States which would seriously think of undertaking it with a general mandate, or in pursuit of their own separate ambitions. They are Russia and Japan; and to neither could the rest of the world safely entrust the disciplining of China's millions, and their absorption in the systems of those two aggressive Empires. England, but only with America's co-operation, might have the strength to bring the work to a successful ending for the common good, but she has not the will. Public opinion in England would regard as a madman the individual who would suggest adding the burden of a Chinese Empire to that already borne in India and

South Africa. It will support a compromise, a postponement of responsibility in the Far East, as long as possible; and, when it finds that a decision must be taken, the widest range of its action will be within the sphere which has already been denoted as belonging to British interests. There is no want of sincerity in the timely decision to supplement the adhesion to the Open Door principle with the formation of a clear and definite plan to make the phrase a reality in the part of China which is essential to Pan-English trade. That plan has been adopted with greater vagueness and uncertainty than the importance of the matter and the perils of the hour demand, but still with sufficient clearness so long as the heart of the Empire beats true. The Yang-tse Valley has been declared a British reservation, and the statement has received solemn indorsement by appearing in a Blue Book. As all the world knows, it does not depend on the official imprimature; its value is bound up in English naval superiority.

England is not the only Power that has defined, so far as words go, a sphere of influence. France has acted similarly in southern China, where, with greater precision but less power, she has laid claim to the provinces of Kwangsi, Kweichow and part, if not the whole, of Yunnan. It is unnecessary for the moment to inquire how

far that claim violates the reversionary rights of India in the hinterland of Burmah. In the same way as France has done, Germany has announced that she regards the Province of Shan-tung as specially appertaining to her, and the theory of "the hinterland" is one that the countrymen of Prince Bismarck know how to work for all it is worth. The German appetite is so good that, in any partition of China, one province would scarcely suffice to satisfy it. Japan also, with one paw over on Corea, claims the Province of Fuhkien and its admirable port of Fuchow. Italy will not resign her hopes of Sanman Bay, Austria has still to be satisfied, and Belgium will claim a "neutral" port, or settlement perhaps, at Hankow, as a mode of adjusting some future Anglo-Russian difference. All these Powers have more or less clearly announced their expectations that a certain piece of Tom Tiddler's ground is to fall to their share. Two States alone have held back from making any similar declarations, Russia and America, but from very different motives. Russia regards as her sphere the territory covered by her Cossacks, and the watchword of her extreme representatives is that the whole of China, and indeed of Asia, is to fall to her share. With such views, the definition of a sphere in any circumscribed portion of China would be useless.

America has not defined a sphere of influence or action, because she has not long approached the consideration of the subject with any serious intention of taking part in its settlement. Recent events have had much to do with any decision she may have formed or be in process of forming; and, for a time, the belief in the Open Door panacea may have encouraged the hope that no more definite or committing step need be taken than to call upon the governments to subscribe to an admirable general principle. The extraordinary outbreak of animosity in China against all foreigners, accompanied by the collapse of the existing government, so far at least as the discharge of its responsible functions goes, has dispelled these expectations, and brings home to everybody the need of prompt and strenuous action. While it is tolerably clear what direction the plans of other Powers will take, over and beyond the assertion and enforcement of certain common rights and principles which none of them is yet disposed to see broken or destroyed in China, the plans of the United States are still shrouded in darkness, because they have not, as a matter of fact, been formed. The time has arrived, however, when a decision cannot wisely be any longer deferred, because the area of unappropriated, or rather unclaimed, sphere in

China is rapidly diminishing and may soon disappear. Of course, there is no need for a decision if the United States are content to play the passive part of a mere looker-on in the settlement of the Chinese question, and to limit their diplomatic action to the enunciation of admirable platitudes. But they can only stultify themselves in China at the cost of future losses and even dangers; for, in the evolution of the Chinese people is wrapped up the destinies of the human race.

Taking the more natural view of what America's policy will have to be, and assuming that she, like other Powers, will have to supplement her support of the general principle of the Open Door with a claim to a definite sphere in China, the practical question follows, What and where is that sphere to be? The diminishing area available renders a prompt decision necessary, for America may find herself supplanted by other contestants. Speaking practically, there are only two areas on the extensive seaboard of China left available that would suffice in themselves to meet America's claims and legitimate expectations. They are, first, the Province of Chekiang, with the ports of Ningpo and Hangchow, the famous Kincsay of Marco Polo; and, secondly, the northern part of the Province of Kwangtung, with the port of Swatow, to which might be added, by

arrangement with Japan, Amoy, across the frontier of Fuhkien. There would be some disadvantages in encroaching on a different province, and if America would accept the responsibility for Canton, there would be no necessity to claim Amoy, which would thus be left in the Japanese sphere. The opinion may be hazarded that the Province of Chekiang represents the preferable American sphere. It is more compact, and the immediate responsibilities would not be such as to deter or discourage American administrators on the threshold of their task. Canton itself represents the most difficult separate problem in China, because it is a focus of anti-foreign animosity and of perhaps the greatest ruffianism in the whole country. The Power accepting responsibility of the Kwangtung Province will, sooner or later, have to deal with it.

When the question as to what America's sphere in China should be first presented itself to my mind, the most attractive form seemed to be a joint Anglo-American sphere, because it could have embraced a larger part of China, and thus present a national form of government south of the Yellow River (Hwang-ho). But America has held back too long, and opinion is too much divided in the States to render such a project practicable. The enormously preponderant inter-

ests of England in China render it impossible for her to delay her measures for the convenience of any one else, or to subordinate her policy to the movements and intentions of any other Power. An Anglo-American sphere would be an ideal arrangement; but, unfortunately, American opinion is not sufficiently pronounced at this moment to render it practicable. We must, therefore, fall back on the separate sphere for America, which, practically speaking, can only be established in two quarters. The first step in the claim of a sphere is easy and surprisingly simple. The United States Government, like the German, the Japanese, the French and the English Governments before it, makes the announcement that it regards, let me say, the Province of Chekiang as its sphere. The statement is duly noted. Nobody protests, nobody applauds, yet on Time's iron tablets every one knows that an important notch has been made. America will then have left the benches to enter the arena.

Having denoted the sphere, America becomes an active partner with the other Powers in the regulation of the Chinese question, and she commits herself to the specific task of doing what good government, security of life and trade demand in her sphere. How it is to be done is a question for the future and also for each gov-

ernment to settle according to its own lights. The preliminary stage of study and investigation will probably prove one of many years, and in some of the spheres active intervention, in any other form than advice and possibly admonition, would never become necessary. A partition of China in the manner indicated does not necessarily imply its conquest. It signifies, primarily, the easier treatment of a vast subject, by its subdivision among a number of interested parties or States. It also signifies for the rest of the world that no single State shall be permitted to develop and utilize the latent strength and resources of China for its own purposes and policy. The policy of partition among spheres of interest and, if necessary, of action may be described as one of precaution and vigilance. By directly interesting the great body of the Powers in the work, a policy of assurance may be considered to have been taken out against the undue aggrandizement of any one of them. When the governments announce that they are directly interested in what happens or has to be done at one spot, they will watch more closely what is being done at other spots, lest it should encroach on their rights or prove the harbinger of peril to the common interest and weal. It is a partition of interest, interference and control to which the world is being invited in China,

and not of conquest. The present events, however they turn out, must prove fatal to the existing Chinese Government. The period of hoodwinking by the Tsungli-Yamen must be ended, as well as that of irresponsibility among the officials with whom we have to conduct business. Whether the Chinese authority be an Emperor or a Viceroy, it must be clear, first, that he understands the rights of those who are in treaty relations with his country and possess formally conceded privileges; and, secondly, that he has the power as well as the will to perform his part of the transaction. He may pity the ill-starred and well-meaning young Emperor, Kwang-hsu, but we cannot safely regard him as the *deus ex machinâ* who is to save the situation. And if Kwang-hsu is not possible, then it may reasonably be doubted whether any other member of the present ruling Manchu family would be eligible. For it cannot be overlooked that the present outbreak has been mainly due to the Manchu element in the government, and to the bitter and implacable hostility of the princes of the reigning House. It almost looks as if the Tartans, believing their supremacy to be menaced between the demands of the foreign Powers and the propagandum of the native Chinese Reform Movement, had decided to enter upon a life and death struggle with the foreign

devils, in the hope of expelling them forever and thus saving their own position. To entertain such a scheme reveals no doubt extreme ignorance, but all the available evidence before the Boxer outbreak pointed to the conclusion that nothing had been learnt at Peking; and those in diplomatic relations with the Chinese reported, after Li Hung Chang's return from Europe, that both he and the Dowager Empress had become more reactionary than ever. Among the princes, ministers and diplomatists of the existing rotten régime in China there are none capable of forming a new, sound administration. They are more than incapable; they are not even willing.

Whatever chance of internal reform there may be in China must be sought for in a different direction, and new men can alone supply the material out of which a reformed administration can be constructed. That such men are to be found cannot be doubted; and the example of Kang-yu-wei is encouraging for those who believe that, amid the chaos of Chinese affairs, and the catastrophes still awaiting the ancient system of their race, the Chinese will themselves be able, with some external assistance and direction, to restore order in their own household in, say, the next half century. They have the old Confucian dictum that "after long union must come dis-

union, and after that again will be reunion," and they know that seven centuries have elapsed since the Middle Kingdom was divided between the Lungs and the Kins, and that before them the subdivision of the country into several kingdoms was no uncommon feature in its history. The fact that daunts foreigners in prescribing for the Sick Man of the Far East, viz., that he may go to pieces under treatment, has no terrors for a Chinese reformer, who knows that the provinces could be grouped into kingdoms, and that any amelioration of the situation must first be local and progressive before it becomes general and national. If thoughtful and instructed Chinese were taken as counsellors by the foreigners in each of the spheres, their advice would be to interfere as little as possible with the fabric of the existing administration, and indeed to restrict all interference at first to restraining the corruption of the officials, controlling the revenue and expenditure, and softening the cruel penal code. These changes would be so popular that little or no coercion would be needed to give them effect. The direct responsibility incurred by the partitioning Powers would be far less than is thought, and the task that seems so formidable at a distance might, on closer inspection, prove exceedingly light. That it is a task for the good of the world cannot

be doubted, and it is equally certain that sooner or later the Powers will have to take it in hand. What is not so certain, for the moment, is whether the United States will lend a hand in the work, or stand aloof.

This uncertainty brings us back to the question with which we started, "Where and what America's share in a partition of China is to be." A decision on the question cannot be safely deferred. The area left open is diminishing, the number of competitors is increasing, and those who face the responsibility before all the Treaty Powers in China will not show any consideration for those who shirk it, when the rewards have to be divided. The responsibility is not adequately faced by declarations in support of an Open Door, when the mansion behind it is in flames. The period when Mr. Conger's despatch was the feature of the question is quite recent in point of time, but it is already ancient history. A momentous decision has to be taken, and that within a brief period, as to whether America will participate in the imminent disruption of the Chinese Empire. Her standing out will not prevent the contingency, which may be pronounced inevitable; but it will somewhat alter the form in which the problem will present itself for solution. It will be a form more unfavorable and more onerous for England,

the champion of the Open Door under all circumstances, and the abstention of the United States will encourage not only Russia, but France and Germany also, to make their spheres exclusive to outside trade and special reserves for their own. The consequences of this shrinking from honorable responsibility at the psychological moment for action must be felt by America herself, not so much, perhaps, in the immediate present as in the future; but I will not obscure the fact that it must also prove very injurious to England, who is in special need at this moment of moral support and backing. She has to face the open rivalry of Russia, the secret rancor of France and the very questionable good faith of Germany. The alliance of Japan alone is not sufficient to enable her to successfully confront so formidable a coalition, based on a common sentiment of jealousy and dislike. Only the hearty co-operation of America can adjust the balance, and warm the chilled friendship of Germany into something like community of action.

The partition of China, which recent events have rendered practically certain, is not as formidable a contingency as has been imagined, provided that America agrees to take her legitimate share in it. Far from precipitating the arrival of Armageddon, as some alarmists affect

to believe, it would tend to peace, because separate ambitions have to be subordinated to the general opinions and wishes of the Powers. America's abstention would alter the outlook, and the Continental Powers would combine to squeeze England, when war would inevitably follow for the maintenance of her Empire. If she were beaten by numbers, that dire event would signify the door more firmly closed than ever in China, and the United States would be the next mark of an anti-English league. If she were victorious, there would still remain on the debit side the cost and sacrifices of an unnecessarily colossal struggle, due to the abstention of America, with the consequent alienation of two great, kindred nations, which acting together might control and improve the destinies of the world.

I hope I have made it clear that the partition policy in China does not imply conquest. It would be an acceptance of responsibility, and each partner would agree to do a certain portion of work. The governments having agreed among themselves that the only practical way of dealing with the Chinese problem is to subdivide it into certain parts for each of them to perform, would in the next place hold a conference for the enumeration and acceptance of common principles of action, and for the division of the responsibilities

of the defunct Chinese Empire. The assets would, fortunately, be amply sufficient to discharge them, and to leave a good margin for the future. Proof of this may be found in the extraordinary development of trade during the last two years, despite the reactionary policy of the Empress Dowager and her advisers. The first decisions formed would no doubt be tentative and experimental, and the permanence of any arrangements made would very largely depend on the amount of co-operation received from Chinese reformers. But it would be made clear to everybody that the Powers had formed the resolution to treat the Chinese question as a common interest, and to take timely steps to prevent the Yellow Peril from becoming a menace to them all. The work in which America is asked to take her share is a highly honorable one, and from the human point of view of the deepest interest. She can only refuse her co-operation by taking a lower seat in the family of nations, who will see in her abstention the selfish indulgence of her good fortune in possessing a position of splendid isolation.

DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

AMERICA'S INTERESTS IN CHINA.

AMERICA'S INTERESTS IN CHINA.

In order that the present crisis in China may be properly understood, and that our real stake—the commercial and diplomatic interests of the United States—in that far-away region may be properly considered, a glance at the country, the people and the government seems to be necessary.

Fortunately, China has long since ceased to be a land of mystery. From the days of Marco Polo and Ibn Batuta its innermost recesses have been known to the world. In later years it has been more fully explored in all directions by Jesuits, missionaries and scientific travellers. Its limits, its physical conformation and its climate have been described with sufficient accuracy. Its mineral resources, which are of great variety and vast extent, but almost entirely undeveloped, have aroused the interest and excited the cupidity of foreign promoters and financiers. Full details and particulars can be had from the cyclopædias on all these points, but a more specific reference

to the area and population of the Empire will perhaps serve better than anything else to arrest the attention of this country and its statesmen to the enormous importance of the events which are now taking place in the Far East.

China proper and exterior China, including the eighteen densely populated provinces and the surrounding desert region, constitute what is known as the Chinese Empire. It extends from the Pacific Ocean, where it has a coast line of about 2,500 miles, to Central Asia, and covers an area of something over 5,000,000 square miles, or nearly one-tenth of the habitable globe. Its population has never been accurately enumerated, but it has been estimated variously from a fifth to a third of all the people in the world! There may be anywhere from three hundred to four hundred millions. One guess is as good as another, but the latter has the endorsement of Sir Robert Hart, Commissioner of the Imperial Maritime Customs, and may be considered the more trustworthy.

The average condition of these people, as contrasted with those of Western nations, is one of great poverty, though it would be a mistake to assume that they are peculiarly miserable and unhappy, except at times in the region of famine, which, from climatic conditions, frequently pre-

vails, and, owing to great distances and the lack of railroad transportation, can hardly ever be relieved or mitigated. Living almost entirely by agriculture and the accessory callings, the Chinese contribute but little per capita to international commerce. They are a remarkably homogeneous, docile, industrious and robust people, frugal and kindly in their habits, with no indications of ever having been aggressive and warlike in temper. Belonging to the Turanian race, it is becoming the fashion to designate them as the "Yellow Peril," and to conjure up harrowing visions of a devastated and ruined world when they shall learn their power and sally forth for rapine and conquest. More than one European writer, and notably Professor Pearson, have predicted that they will yet dominate the earth by force of arms or ruin it by competition in commerce. Without recounting the arguments upon which this opinion is based, it is here sufficient to state that, so far as history shows, the Chinese race are about as much of a menace to the rest of the world as the lamb in the fable was to the wolf.

Obviously, this "Peril," be it great or small, may be dismissed for the present with the suggestion that, if the Chinese cannot defend themselves from a few thousand Japanese "*wojen*" (or dwarfs), a still smaller number of Russians, or

a couple of German cruisers, they can hardly hope for several generations to be able to menace seriously the rest of the world as conquerors. When it is further considered that they have but little surplus capital and few if any of the appliances of modern civilization, and have yet to supply themselves altogether with railroads, rolling mills, furnaces and factories, and to develop their mines of coal, iron, copper, lead and precious metals, before they can seriously think of satisfying their own demands for manufactured goods, wares, and merchandise, much less of entering into active competition with other nations, practical statesmen may well dismiss these apprehensions for the present. Yet China is awakening from the lethargy of ages, and is joining slowly but certainly in the march of modern progress. It must not be forgotten, however, that while she is moving her great exemplars will advance still further. Her ancient and complete isolation, which has hitherto kept her stagnant in the background, and which was primarily due to the wide expanse of desert, steppe and mountains separating her from the civilized world on the land side and to an almost illimitable waste of waters on the ocean side, was first broken seriously in upon by the big ships of modern days. The approach and early completion of the Trans-Siberian rail-

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EDWIN H. CONGER, UNITED STATES MINISTER TO PEKING

road to Vladivostok, Port Arthur, and ultimately to Peking, the construction of trunk railway connections along the principal trade routes of the interior and the multiplication of the great steamship lines which already connect her ports with all parts of the world, will surely at no distant day open her innermost recesses to the trade and influence of the more progressive nations.

It cannot be too frequently repeated that the peculiarities of civilization and government and the extraordinary conservatism of the Chinese are mainly due to that isolation which has remained unbroken from the beginning of time to within less than a half century, but fortunately may now be regarded as quite at an end forever.

If human experience is of any value, or has any application to this case, nothing can be more certain than that the Chinese must ultimately move as all other races and nations have moved. They have similar wants, similar affections and similar interests, and must gratify them by means similar to those employed by other peoples. And so it may be safely assumed that when they do seriously set about the task of bettering their condition and improving their civilization and government, they will proceed much as other people have proceeded. Their efforts will be followed by success and failures in the usual pro-

portions. They will have the usual amount of bright anticipations and bitter disappointments; the usual proportion of great men and small ones, and possibly an unusual proportion of dishonest men and scoundrels; but withal, they are sure, if left alone, and possibly if not left alone, by outsiders, to progress both in the arts of peace and in the arts of war, and to grow in wealth and power.

Manifestly, the new economic changes which we may count upon with absolute confidence will be such as grow out of the construction of railroads, the opening of mines, and the erection of furnaces, rolling mills, factories and shipyards, and generally the better employment of labor; wages will rise, the scale of living and expenditure will improve, which in turn will create a demand for better food, better clothing, better furniture and better houses. When the extent of the country and the almost infinite number of the people are considered, together with the enormous amount of work to be done in order to bring them abreast of even the poorest people of Europe and America in respect to the facilities and comforts of civilized life and to the means of national defence, it will be apparent that they will not only have all they can do at home for the next half-century at least, and possibly even for the entire

century or longer, but also will be compelled to borrow heavily and to buy largely from foreign nations of the things which they cannot yet nor soon produce. Of course if they buy they will have to pay, which they can do only in the precious metals, and in the products which now constitute their principal articles of commerce.

The isolation and conservatism of the Chinese had their counterpart with the Japanese, the history of whose extraordinary progress is now fully known to the world, and need not be dwelt upon here. While it is not to be denied that the circumstances which surrounded Japan were different from those which surround China, it may be fairly claimed that the difference was one of extent rather than of character. The awakening must come and progress must follow in one case as surely as it did in the other; but inasmuch as the area of the Chinese Empire is twenty-five times as great, and its population probably ten times that of the Japanese dominions, the aggregate contributions of the former to the progressive forces and movements of the age, when once fully developed, must be many times greater than any that have ever yet made themselves felt in the Asiatic world. Hence it will be perceived that the territorial possessions and commercial prizes to be struggled for by the great Powers are of

supreme value, and well calculated not only to arouse their cupidity and stimulate their enterprise, but to dull their consciences as well.

When it is remembered that British and Russian conquest in Asia has already resulted in the division of all of that continent, except Turkey in the West, and China in the East, between the conquerors; that France has helped herself to Tonquin, Cochin China and part of Siam, and is now seeking to further extend both her absolute sway and commercial influence; that Germany has, under a flimsy pretext, seized Kiao Chou Bay and forced the Chinese Government to give her a long "lease of sovereignty" on the mainland and adjacent waters; that the Chinese buffer states and outlying dependencies of vast extent have been seized one after another, and above all that no conquered territory anywhere in Asia, except that which was held for a while by Russia about Kuldja in the far northwest of Chinese Tartary, has been relinquished to its rightful owner by any European power during this century, the Chinese Boards and ministers may well feel profoundly alarmed at the "glaring beasts" which now seem to threaten their country with dismemberment and destruction.

It is true that their government is a government of conquest and corruption, the history of

which is for the most part the history of violence, intrigue and anarchy, with only here and there a great ruler to stay the hand of plunder and to save the country from absolute ruin. The reigning dynasty is effete and incompetent, the boards of government are cumbersome and inefficient and the leading men generally weak or powerless. But these are misfortunes inherited from a past age. They call for reform and regeneration, which may be had with the assistance and advice of foreign nations rather than by spoliation and dismemberment.

And yet it must not be forgotten that China has made substantial progress for the last fifty years, especially since the capture of the Taku forts and Peking by the allied French and British armies in 1861, and the termination of the Taiping rebellion in 1863. The most potential influence in this movement has been the determination of the Powers to open China to the trade of the world, and it is to be noted that in enforcing this determination they have never hesitated to invoke all the resources of war as well as those of diplomacy. Up to 1834 the English, through the East India Company, had a virtual monopoly of the China trade, and the individual merchant, no matter what was his nationality, had but a poor chance. Trade was at first closely supervised

by government and Company agents, but gradually outgrew their control. Outside merchants, especially Americans, forced their way into it, and this made trouble, which was followed by treaties and trade regulations. The English insisted upon having better facilities, and upon trading where they pleased, freely and without annoying restrictions, and especially upon the right to engage in the introduction and sale of opium, to the great injury, as the Chinese officials believed, of those who consumed it. The Chinese authorities resisted, and this led to the Opium War, followed soon after by the "Lorcha" War, in both of which they suffered great loss, humiliation and defeat, and were finally compelled not only to legalize the opium trade, and pay their assailants a heavy subsidy in money, but in addition to limit themselves to the collection of an *ad valorem* duty of only five per cent. in silver on all goods imported from foreign countries. A few years later the allied French and English forces captured the Taku forts, and marched by Tien Tsin and Tungchow to the imperial capital, drove the Court across the borders, looted and destroyed the Summer Palace, levied tribute sufficient to pay the entire expenses of the war, and again showed the helpless Chinese that it

was impossible for them to stand up against the "Foreign Devils."

During all these operations the diplomatic representatives of the United States, although always claiming their right under the doctrine of co-operation to share in the concessions made to their colleagues, maintained an attitude of neutrality, or sought by an independent show of friendship to gain some special advantages for our own country, while our naval commander looked on with complacency, till overcome by the thought that "Blood is thicker than water," when he set to work to rescue the British sailors, whose boats had been sunk by Chinese shot. It must be confessed that the conduct of our representatives throughout that period was rather that of the jackal than of the lion, and must have been extremely puzzling to the Chinese officials.

But when it comes to the action of individuals, the story is much more creditable to Americans. Our missionaries, after the earlier Jesuits, were almost the first in that wide field. They were generally men of great piety and learning, like Morrison, Brown, Martin and Williams, and did all in their power as genuine men of God to show the heathen that the stranger was not necessarily a public enemy, but might be an evangel of a

his life for Great Britain at Khartoûm, it is true, rendered valuable services; but he was an erratic and uncertain man, and it is now generally admitted that had it not been for the work of Ward the rebellion would have been successful and the Manchu dynasty would have been expelled. The Chinese recognize the extraordinary character and influence of Ward's services at this critical epoch by the posthumous honors bestowed upon his memory, and by the stories of his courageous deeds which have spread broadcast among the people to the remotest corners of the Empire.

It was the good fortune of another American to point out the defenseless condition of China, her lack of an adequate army, the absence of a general staff and of a system of military transport and administration nearly ten years before the Japanese invasion which ended in the utter humiliation of the Empire and has become the fruitful source of all the foreign troubles which now encompass it. How much greater the humiliation, and how much heavier the indemnity would have been but for the sagacious counsel of a distinguished American statesman whom the Chinese had called in to assist them in their negotiations for peace must remain for the present a matter of conjecture, although it is certain that the Japanese greatly moderated their de-

mands in both money and territorial concessions after their terms were first submitted.

Other Americans in private life, as well as our able minister, *chargé d'affaires,* and consuls in China, have done much for the last twelve years, each in his proper sphere, to extend and strengthen the influence of the American name, till now it is safe to say that no power on earth stands so well or, independent of force, is so highly respected by the Chinese. In their aspirations for better government, and in their desire for railroads and the other appliances of a better civilization, there is every reason to believe that but for the intrigues and jealousies of the British, French, German and Russian diplomatists, promoters and agents for the last decade, and especially since the close of the war with Japan, Americans would have been selected as experts to conduct and advise in all public works, and to furnish locomotives, rails, cars, machinery and all sorts of supplies. No one knows better than the Chinese officials that the United States has no desire to despoil their country of its territorial possessions, nor to limit the sovereignty and independence of the Chinese Government in any direction. But, unfortunately, the Chinese are like the rest of mankind, prone to withhold favors from their friends in order to placate the

enemies against whom they cannot defend themselves.

It has been suggested that perhaps the great Powers have no intention of further dismembering the Chinese Empire, or of permanently occupying its territory and seaports, and this may be true. Nobody not in their confidence can be certain as to what may be their real policy and intentions, but it is an indisputable fact that so far no European Power which has ever gained a footing in China has permanently or voluntarily relinquished it. It is certainly fair, therefore, to assume that they intend to hold on to what they have taken, and even to take more, as opportunity offers. Russia cannot well help herself, for it seems to be the fate of a higher civilization and a stronger government to encroach upon a lower civilization and a weaker government whenever they come in close contact or have coterminous boundaries. Great Britain asserts authoritatively that she has no purpose of occupying Chinese territory or Chinese seaports, but that she intends merely to see that others do not, and that whatever privileges or extensions one Power obtains shall be for the equal benefit of all. This is altruism on an imperial scale, and it must be confessed that of later years she has been fairly true to her free-trade principles, even in

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MINISTER CONGER'S CART, AND LADIES OF THE LEGATION

Asia, in her policy concerning ordinary commerce. But surely the United States would make a serious mistake if they should trust Great Britain or any other Power to give their citizens a fair or even chance at any great business, such as assisting in the reorganization of government, or as contracting for railroads or for any other public works or supplies within the limits of conquered or annexed territory.

But on the general proposition as laid down by Mr. Balfour in his late Manchester speech, and later by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, it is not to be denied that our interests are with our ancient antagonist, England, and for the first time against those of our ancient allies, France and Russia. How far we should go in an independent effort, or by open co-operation, or by an alliance expressed or implied, for safeguarding or extending these interests, is a matter for careful consideration.

As for France, her policy can hardly be in doubt. As before stated, she has seized and now holds the whole of Cochin China, Tonquin, Anam, and a great part of Siam, and is credited with the purpose of raising her flag over Hainan at the first opportunity, and all this has been without a shadow of honest title. So far, her acts are simply acts of spoliation. Her statesmen

and public journals make no disguise of their purpose to participate in what they euphemistically call the exploitation of China, and if a writer in a late number of the *Revue de Deux Mondes* can be credited with speaking the national sentiment, they will seek to draw their alliance closer with Russia for that purpose. The danger is that with the latter dominating at Peking and pressing forward from the north, the Japanese on the eastern coast and France in the south, each eager to get a share of the spoils, and each distrusting the other, Great Britain, in spite of her benevolent declarations, may be compelled to abandon her good intentions and advance both from the frontier of Burmah in the west and from her base at Hong-Kong in the south-east to protect her vast commercial interests as well as to restrain the rapacity of rivals.

Notwithstanding the seizure of Kiao Chou Bay, the declarations of the Emperor in his speech at Kiel, the despatch of Prince Henry with reinforcements, and the later intelligence that the Chinese have conceded a lease of sovereignty over the bay and adjoining district, it is hardly possible that Germany is to be considered as a serious factor in the Chinese question. It is true that she is credited with having actively co-operated with Russia and France in breaking the

victorious grasp of the Japanese after the close of the late war, and that she has not, up to a late date, received any adequate reward for her services. It is also true that she has been most active for some years in pushing her commercial interests in both Japan and China, but inasmuch as she has no colonial dependencies anywhere in the Far East, and cannot yet be reckoned as a first-class naval power, it is difficult to perceive how she can hope to play any great part either in the regeneration of China or in her dismemberment, if unhappily that should be her fate. In considering Germany's part in the game, it may help to understand her position if it is remembered that after the close of the Franco-Prussian war she succeeded in getting a call to assist in organizing military schools and in drilling the Chinese troops for the Viceroy Li Hung Chang; but the utter rout of the Chinese forces and the collapse of the Chinese military administration, in the effort to resist the Japanese invasion, was a great setback to German pretensions, and in the eyes of the Chinese an absolute "loss of face" to them.

If it should turn out, however, that there is to be no further dismemberment of China, and no concert of the Powers for that purpose, but merely a general scramble for influence, contracts

and trade, the base at Kiao Chou may serve the Germans a useful purpose, especially after it is connected with Peking and the other interior cities by rail. For the present it is badly situated for anything but a naval depot and rendezvous.

In considering the Far Eastern question great embarrassment has been met with for lack of exact information as to the real purposes of the Powers. Collectively it is nearly certain that they have entered into no agreement and have no concerted policy for dismemberment or spoliation. It is known that Japan was permitted to go into the war with China without allies. The Powers, one and all, kept their hands off both belligerents. The United States alone tried to keep the peace, to protect Japanese subjects in China, and as opportunity offered to act as an intermediary after war had begun. When it was over and the terms of peace were agreed upon, Russia, supported by France and Germany, intervened to limit the Japanese occupation and finally to assist China in raising the money with which to pay the first instalment of the war indemnity, after Great Britain had been asked and declined to do it. But here all certainty ceases. There have been rumors from time to time, more or less circumstantial, of understandings between Russia and Japan, Rus-

sia and France, and last between Great Britain and Japan. And, strange as it may seem, it has even been reported that Lord Salisbury has instructed the British Ambassador to sound the government at Washington as to the feasibility of a mutual understanding for the maintenance of China's autonomy. Finally, it is reported that the money for the last instalment of the Japanese war indemnity has been offered by the British Government as the best means of restoring her lost *prestige* and strengthening the Chinese Government, that this has brought the Russian Government forward with new offers of assistance, and that the government at Peking is again resorting to the old game of playing one European Power against the other.

If all this proves but little as to the real plans and purposes of the Powers, it makes it certain that the Far Eastern question has reached an acute stage, full of danger for China as well as for all who really desire to see her saved from destruction and made strong enough to maintain her right of national existence against the world.

In any aspect of the case the interest of the United States in it cannot be regarded with indifference. Being, as they are, China's nearest neighbor across the sea, and the only one of the

great Powers which has absolutely no plans hostile to the peace, integrity and general welfare of the Chinese people, they must look with the deepest apprehension upon the events taking place in that quarter. They cannot afford to be mistaken as to the plans of the other Powers, nor to depend upon even the most benevolent of them for their proper share of the commerce now in existence, and which is sure to increase rapidly hereafter if China is permitted to work out her own salvation with her possessions intact and her autonomy unimpaired.

In considering the question of duty to our neighbors, and to our own great interests, it may be fairly assumed that the government at Washington will not forget that our territory not only abuts upon the sea abreast of China for two thousand miles, and almost encloses the whole of the North Pacific in the wide sweep of its shores and islands, but that our people, having practically occupied the whole of their own vacant land, and exploited all its resources except those of its forests and mines, must necessarily turn their attention more and more to the commerce of the Pacific islands and of the countries beyond. To this end the annexation of Hawaii, which is freely offered to us as a naval station and a half-way house, would seem to be fully

justified. When it is remembered in addition that the extraordinary resources of the country tributary to Puget Sound and Columbia River in timber, and to Portland and San Francisco in wheat and fruits, are sure to make those regions and their seaports the seat and centre of a great and ever-increasing commerce with the trans-Pacific countries, the importance of maintaining unbroken relations and extending our commerce with the latter can hardly be exaggerated. It is not to be denied that the American people have many questions of national and international importance to consider, and that hitherto scarcely a doubt has arisen as to the wisdom of confining their diplomacy to the cultivation of peaceful relations with all nations, entangling alliances with none; but it is conceivable that circumstances may arise even in Asia, and a time may come when it will be the duty of our government not only to exert its own powers to their utmost, but, if need be, to accept even the co-operation of Great Britain if it can be obtained on proper terms, for the maintenance of our common interests beyond the Pacific.

JAMES HARRISON WILSON.

THE AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA.

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WHEN Mr. Choate wrote to Lord Salisbury to ask British concurrence in a proposed line of policy in China, he stated that:

> "The President has strong reason to believe that the governments of both Russia and Germany will co-operate in such an understanding as is here proposed."

It is not quite clear what that understanding was. The passage of the despatch which immediately preceded that which I have quoted began with a most important statement as to American policy in China. This was followed by an expression of a desire for support in the effort to obtain, from each of the Powers claiming spheres of influence, a declaration in favor of an international policy of the "open door," as contrasted with a selfish policy of preference for "nationals" —that is, subjects or citizens. At the moment of writing I have not seen the actual text of the Russian and German replies. I hear from those

who have read them that the German answer is satisfactory but general, and the Russian guarded and far from clear. What I do not know is how far any of the Powers have responded to what appears to me to be the gist of the American despatch, instead of confining their reply to the proposed declaration as to the "open door."

A more pregnant but less obvious portion of the American policy revealed in the despatches which began to be written in September lies in the expressed hesitation of the government of the United States to "recognize" "the exclusive rights" of any Power within any part of the Chinese Empire, and its acceptance, as the policy ultimately in view and now to be "hastened," of "united action of the Powers at Peking to promote administrative reforms, so greatly needed for strengthening the Imperial Government and maintaining the integrity of China in which it" ("my government") "believes the whole Western world is alike concerned."

This is a far more important pronouncement than anything which merely concerns the "open door." It has attracted less attention than the proposed declarations of disinterestedness. It is not, however, novel as an expression of policy by distinguished Americans, though it has never

previously been so frankly adopted as a national policy by the President and Secretary of State and Ambassadors of the Republic. In 1867 the same policy was proclaimed by an American, Mr. Anson Burlingame, at one time a Senator, at another time American Minister in China, and ultimately first Chinese Ambassador to Europe, who came to us with a legation composed of representatives of all the Powers, serving with the consent of their various countries. Mr. Burlingame's policy was exactly that now adopted on behalf of the United States. It was preached by him with the leave of the United States Government, which at one time he represented, and whose service he left for that of China, in which he shortly died. The policy was a wise one when taught by Mr. Burlingame in London in 1868; it was premature. The question that must now be asked with regard to it is not whether it is wise, for we shall agree upon that score, but whether the United States "mean business" about it, and are prepared to push it with their great influence—an influence to which the reception of their despatches testifies, if indeed testimony were needed.

It ought to be a portion of the policy, if that policy be seriously intended, that the United States should be strongly represented in China.

At Peking there must be a Minister of high authority who will take the lead in pressing the enlightened and trading views of our governments and of the Powers who will concur with them, and, on the coast, a commodore who will use the naval power of the United States, in conjunction with the British admiral on the station, in suppressing piracy and lawlessness on the West River, the Yang-tse and other inland waters where British trade and the trade of the United States are, and in an increasing degree will be, done. The United States are now showing their power, as a manufacturing and exporting nation, to hold their own in markets far more distant from their shores than those of China. Rivals we must be in trade; but we have, both of us, everything to gain by making ours a friendly rivalry, and by co-operating in maintaining order throughout China, and in asking, as a return, for the regularization of inland duties and for the extension of the Imperial Customs system to financial matters which are at present outside its control.

We must recognize the fact that, although other countries may yield to the views put forward by the United States and supported by ourselves, they are not friendly to them. There was a most interesting debate in the French Chamber

on the 27th of March, in which several of the leading speakers discussed the colonial policy of France and Germany, making as it were common cause with Germany in the matter, and explaining that it is a policy which is intended to enable Europe to face the future development of the United States. The speakers pointed out (to use the words of M. Raiberti, the Radical Deputy of Nice) that England has under her sceptre a world; that Russia has absorbed all northern Asia; that, in face of what the British and Russian Powers and the United States already are, France and Germany are forced to establish themselves outside Europe, and "to be extra-European if they are to live."

"The old nations of Europe feel that its worn-out frame has no longer the strength to carry their future. They cross the frontiers of Europe and go to new continents to search for life. The European Powers with limited population and territory are threatened with extinction or with lapse into the position of States of the second order, when considered in comparison with such extraordinary agglomerations as the United States, if they do not themselves constitute outside of Europe their empires of the future. The only means to create an equilibrium with the United States and with Greater Britain is to create a Greater France and a Greater Germany."

We in the United Kingdom do not seek to be alone or to be first in China as a whole, or even

in the Yang-tse Valley. Some English speakers have, for party reasons, asserted that we have obtained a separate and individual control of the Yang-tse Valley, which in fact has not been granted to us, and which the majority of our statesmen and of our people do not desire. What they wish is that the vast population of that region, doing already a large trade with foreign countries, and likely to do a rapidly increasing trade with them in the future, shall be accessible to the enterprise of the world. We know that we shall have in that territory the growing competition of the United States and that of Germany, possibly also that of Japan, but we are content to take our chance, and are content also to let America, if she chooses, take the lead, or act equally with us, in insisting that the future of these territories shall not be marred by piracy, brigandage and rapacious inland taxation. The aims of Russia in the north, of Germany in one Chinese province at least, and of France in the south, are different; but the action of the United States, which has virtually arrested for the moment the selfish action on the part of France and Germany, will, if continued, be strong enough, in conjunction with our own, to check for good the process of disintegration and of division which had commenced.

Let no American hater of militarism fear that this language points to alliance in view of war. The government of the United States is not asked by the British Government to pull chestnuts out of the fire for us, or to offend Russian customers for our benefit. The impulse on this occasion has come from Washington, and our Foreign Office, though unable to resist the national feeling here, is not enthusiastic about the American new departure which our people welcome. In the debate of the 9th of June last, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs declared that the United States were hostile to a policy of concert of the Powers at Peking in favor of reform. We have advanced since that day, for the policy which Mr. Broderick told us was repudiated is now avowed as the aim of the Republic. Resolutely keep the lead in the policy of reform; give an earnest of your desire for co-operation by offering to assist in the complete opening of the rivers to the trade of the world, and rest assured that, with less risk to peace than a policy of abstention involves, American action will be crowned with a full measure of success.

CHARLES W. DILKE.

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